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ABSTRACT 
 
Chinese Transnationalism and the Creation  
of a Liberal Public Sphere 
 
by 
Lanelle Elizabeth Christman 
Dr. Sue Fawn Chung, Examination Committee Chair 
Associate Professor of History 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
 
This thesis is a global comparative study tracing the functions and historical 
development of Chinese huiguan [“official organization”] and its leadership in China, 
Indochina, and San Francisco.  Early Chinese immigration to America and Indochina 
involved the formation of huiguan, organizations based on dialect and native place, 
paralleling the functions and demography of merchant associations originating in China.  
The merchant elite representing its leadership were preeminent arbitrators of Chinese 
tradition and authority.  French Indochina and America recognized their status as 
community leaders, further exalting the social standing of merchants and increasing their 
positions of authority.  These organizations greatly influenced the lives of a majority of 
Chinese immigrants in an attempt to replicate, with varying degrees of fidelity, the social, 
religious, and networking environments of native-place regions.  By providing material 
aid, financial connections, and charitable functions, huiguan existed within a framework 
of carefully-defined relationships essential to the very survival of Chinese communities.   
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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is a global comparative study tracing the functions and historical 
development of Chinese huiguan [“official organization”] and its leadership in China, 
Indochina, and San Francisco.  Early Chinese immigration to America and Indochina 
involved the formation of huiguan, organizations based upon dialect and native place, 
paralleling the functions and demography of merchant associations originating in China.  
The merchant elite representing its leadership were preeminent arbitrators of Chinese 
tradition and authority.  French Indochina and America recognized their status as 
community leaders, thus further exalting the social standing of merchants and their 
positions of authority.  These organizations greatly influenced the lives of Chinese 
immigrants in an attempt to replicate, with varying degrees of fidelity, the social, 
religious, and networking environments of native-place regions.  By providing material 
aid, financial connections, and charitable functions, huiguan existed within a framework 
of carefully-defined relationships essential to the very survival of Chinese communities.  
One cannot overemphasize the importance of Chinese huiguan in Indochina and the 
American West, their ties to one another and to their native places, and the ways in which 
French colonial authorities and the American government both nurtured and undermined 
these ties.   
Placing huiguan within the historical context of China, Southeast Asia and the 
American West contributes to an awareness and understanding of the competing forces of 
imperialism, colonialism, and transnational ties in the lives of early Chinese immigrants.  
Moreover, this study raises important theoretical questions regarding the status of elites, 
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transnational social organizations, and identities transcending national and cultural 
boundaries.   
The first chapter is a reassessment of the historiography of Chinese in Indochina 
and the American West and it illustrates how the pronounced revival of diaspora studies 
and the formulation of newer theoretical constructs such as transnationalism, 
globalization and the de-territorialized nation state continue to suggest alternate 
perspectives from which to approach migration and border studies.  These theoretical 
frameworks attempt to center mobility and dispersion as a basis from which to begin 
analysis rather than as streams of people merely feeding into or flowing along the 
margins of national histories.  Thus, a diasporic perspective both complements and 
expands upon nation-based perspectives by drawing attention to global connections, 
transnational networks, activities and consciousness that bridge more localized anchors of 
reference.  The second chapter investigates the origins of Chinese global migration as 
well as the origins and development of huiguan in China, followed by investigations into 
the respective origins and development of huiguan in Indochina in the third chapter.  
Because of the larger accessibility to source materials on huiguan in San Francisco, the 
fourth chapter explores the organizational development of huiguan and its leadership in 
San Francisco, and the fifth chapter explores the charitable functions and services the 
organization provided for its membership, including legal protection and aid in the era of 
Chinese exclusion.  This chapter also discusses the challenges made to huiguan from 
other Chinese American organizations at the turn of the twentieth century, and the 
concurrent rise of Chinese nationalism and its effect on traditional huiguan foundations 
of power. 
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While Chinese international migrations occurred for centuries, and continue to the 
present day, circumstances surrounding overseas migration and the political, economic, 
geographic, and social environments of immigrant societies prior to the mid-twentieth 
century were dramatically different from those in the post-1960s era.  These earlier 
emigrants primarily were villagers from Guangdong and Fujian provinces in southern 
China and travelled abroad as laborers, merchants, and farmers.   
Most Chinese who immigrated in the nineteenth century intended to return home 
wealthy enough to live a comfortable life in China.  At the immigration and detention 
facility on Angel Island in the San Francisco Bay, a detained Chinese immigrant’s poem, 
written on a barrack wall, characterized the dream of many early Chinese immigrants, 
“Wait until the day I become successful and fulfill my wish.”1  For many, realizing the 
dream took years; for others, success remained elusive.  Many individuals died in coal 
mines or while working on railroads before they could achieve their dreams.  Their final 
hope lay in the wish that their bones would return home to the land of their ancestors.  In 
the process of working toward their dreams, Chinese contributed much to the economic 
growth and development of the regions to which they immigrated.  Aspirations drove 
them to new lands, and even if dreams of wealth went unfulfilled, their true success lay in 
forging a new culture blending both Eastern and Western traditions. 
Once Chinese immigrants arrived in Southeast Asia and the American West, they 
attempted to reconstruct the associations of their homeland.  Their minority status in 
these new regions, however, required them to structure these organizations differently.  
Gradually, Chinese enclaves developed, complete with traditional hierarchical structures 
and familiar social support groups.  They lived in homes echoing traditional households 
                                                 
1
 New York Times, November 11, 1990.  
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in China, but in the male-dominated immigrant societies of the nineteenth century, these 
homes took on new forms.  Based on common heritage, most Chinese immigrants, 
though individually unique, carried with them similar cultural concepts, none stronger 
than the ideas of family and clan.  Chinese immigrants vigorously upheld the values of 
clan and kin while attempting to reconstruct traditional households throughout the 
American West and Southeast Asia. 
In several respects, Chinese immigrants created new communities similar to those 
left behind in China.  From their inception, Chinese communities became a safe haven for 
immigrants.  Even though environments beyond Chinese communities and enclaves 
provided for economic livelihoods, returning to these communities after working in 
mines, on railroads, or in factories meant returning to the familiar.  These communities 
were also porous environments where immigrants possessed agency to make choices 
based on personal experience and opportunity.   
Because of both social and economic factors, however, Chinese peasants with 
limited educational backgrounds encountered not only a limited range of occupational 
pursuits but also an increasingly racialized climate in both Indochina and the American 
West.  In general, Euro-Americans and European immigrants carried prevailing anti-
Chinese sentiments with them to the West Coast.  As Chinese immigration became a 
heated political issue on the West Coast and across the United States during the 1870s 
and early 1880s, the outcries of the western congressional delegations were loud enough 
to persuade the federal government to suspend and then prohibit the immigration of 
Chinese laborers.  Thus, in 1882, the Chinese became the first ethnic group legally 
excluded from the United States.  Moreover, as discussed in the following chapter, no 
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first-generation immigrant of Chinese descent would be eligible to apply for naturalized 
citizenship before these exclusionary laws were lifted in 1943. 
While Chinese immigration to Indochina long predates immigration to the 
American West, Chinese communities within each region are of great historic and 
economic significance.  From the mid-nineteenth century onward, what primarily 
distinguished Chinese communities in Indochina from those found in the American West 
was the marked pattern of powerful groups competing for the allegiance of Indochina’s 
established and emerging Chinese communities.  This thesis will demonstrate how 
Chinese communities in Indochina differed even more significantly from the Chinese 
model than many of their counterparts in other Southeast Asian countries by exhibiting a 
far smaller degree of intercommunity segmentation than Chinese communities in 
Singapore, for example, where Chinese groups by the hundreds allowed intra-community 
division to a remarkable degree.  As discussed, this homogenization was in large part due 
to the combined effects of regulating legislation imposed upon them from the outside, 
first by the Nguyen regime and later by French colonialists.   
The wealth of recent scholarship focusing upon urban organizations in modern 
China provides unprecedented access into the structure, function, and evolution of 
Chinese societies, organizations, and associations in the great cities of the Chinese empire 
and republic.  This recent scholarship also illuminates how different elements of Chinese 
immigrant communities interacted with one another.  For example, Chinese competition 
and conflict between sub-ethnic groups generated ferocious rivalries and devoted 
partnerships long before French colonial occupation of Indochina.  As this thesis 
illustrates, this phenomenon was most marked in the case of Cochinchina’s secret 
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societies, where rivalry between the Trieu Chau and Phuoc Kien Chinese in the Mekong 
Delta was so intense that French police and local authorities spent months trying to stem 
the wave of violence that open conflict between these two groups spawned.  
 France’s ever-expanding colonialism in Indochina and the politics of exclusion in 
the United States continued to alter Chinese immigrant communities, while the growing 
Chinese awareness of China’s national interests eventually spawned a new kind of 
nationalist self-identification.  For example, the heightened crescendo of Chinese 
nationalism, coupled with anti-foreign sentiment, permeated the activities in Saigon and 
Cholon sponsored either by united federations of huiguan or led by the Guomindang 
Committee for Indochina, a group boasting a leadership comprised of local Chinese from 
various huiguan.  Chinese huiguan continued to negotiate the pathways and pitfalls of 
colonial or national rule and law in order to achieve their own agendas, which included 
maintaining multidirectional ties not only with other huiguan branches, but also with 
native place organizations in China. 
In an attempt to place this thesis within the historiography of modern China as 
well as the historiography of Chinese in the American West and Southeast Asia, a 
discussion of German social theorist Jurgen Habermas’ concept of public sphere is of 
primary importance.  In the post-World War II era, scholars of state and society 
repeatedly confronted the issue of public sphere as Habermas conceived it.  As Habermas 
contends, public sphere is:  
A domain of our social life in which such a thing as public 
opinion can be formed.  Access to the public sphere is open 
in principle to all citizens…Citizens act as a public when 
they deal with matters of general interest without being 
subject to coercion; thus with the guarantee that they may 
assemble and unite freely….  The term ‘public opinion’ 
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refers to the functions of criticism and control of organized 
state authority that the public exerts.2   
 
In other words, Habermas’s “public sphere” deals fundamentally with the modern notions 
of democracy and participatory government.   
For Habermas, public sphere is not the inevitable result of history’s natural 
evolution; rather, it is the by-product not only of a specific time and place, Western 
Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but also of a specific class of citizens, 
the bourgeoisie.  He writes: 
under conditions of complete mobility of producers, 
products and capital, supply and demand would always be 
in equilibrium…under these conditions, but only under 
these, would each person have an equal chance…to attain 
the status of property owner and thus  of ‘man,’ that is, the 
qualifications of a private person admitted to the public 
sphere – property and education.3   
 
In this context, issues of public sphere seem singularly unsuited to Chinese history, 
whether in the imperial or republican era.  And yet, as William Rowe summarized in his 
comprehensive historiographical article on the subject, public sphere is the very topic to 
which historians of Chinese state and society relations turn.4   
From Chan Hao’s study of Liang Qichao’s attempts at mass-politicization to 
William Rowe’s works on Hankou, scholars such as Mary Backus Rankin, David Strand, 
Keith Schoppa, Joseph Fewsmith, Philip Kuhn, Prasenjit Duara, and Kwan Mun Bun 
                                                 
2
 Jurgen Habermas, “The Public Sphere,” in Rethinking Popular Culture:  Contemporary 
Perspectives in Cultural Studies ed. Chandra Mukerji and Michael Schudson (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 1991), 398-9.  
 
3
 Jurgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a 
Category of Bourgeois Society tr. Thomas Burger (Cambridge, MA:  The MIT Press, 1989), 86-7. 
 
4
 William Rowe, “The Public Sphere in Modern China,” Modern China 16, no. 3, (July 1990):  
323.  
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have all made the issue of the public sphere, or of its Chinese vocabulary, a centerpiece in 
the historiography of modern China.5  The issue of the public sphere in China, however, 
is quite contentious, as evidenced by Frederic Wakeman’s blistering rejection of its 
applicability to the Chinese case.6   
In the Introduction to his edited volume, A History of Private Life, Philippe Ariès 
suggests that, in Europe, the public sphere grew most rapidly when the state’s 
bureaucracy proved least able to back up its claims of control,7  or, in the words of 
William Rowe, the growth “took place in precisely that early modern interval when the 
state’s jurisdictional claims were expanding at a far greater pace than its institutional 
abilities to realize these claims.”8  While Rowe goes on to say that recent scholarship on 
China makes Ariès’s model more applicable to late imperial and republican China, this 
model also raises interesting questions when applied, with additional clarification, to 
overseas Chinese.   Public sphere, as it is described by Habermas, is a clearly defined 
                                                 
5
 Consult Chang Hao, Liang Ch’i-ch’ao and Intellectual Transition in China (Cambridge, MA:  
Harvard University Press, 1971); Prasenjit Duara, Culture, Power, and the State:  North China Villages, 
1900-1942 (Stanford, CA:  Stanford University Press, 1988); Joseph Fewsmith, “From Guild to Interest 
Group:  The Transformation of Public and Private in Late Qing China,” in Chinese Business Enterprise:  
Critical Perspectives on Business and Management ed. R. Ampalavanar Brown (New York, NY:  
Routledge, 1996); Philip Kuhn and Susan Mann Jones, “Introduction,” in Select Papers from the Center for 
Far Eastern Studies 3 (Chicago, IL:  University of Chicago Press, 1979); Kwan Man Bun, The Salt 
Merchants of Tianjin:  State Making and Civil Society in Late Imperial China (Honolulu, HI:  University of 
Hawai’i Press, 2001); Mary Backus Rankin, Elite Activism and Political Transformation in China: 
Zhejiang Province, 1865-1911 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1986); William Rowe, Hankow:  
Commerce and Society in a Chinese City, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1984) and Hankow:  
Conflict and Community in a Chinese City (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1989); Keith R. 
Schoppa, Chinese Elites and Political Change:  Zhejiang Province in the Early 20th Century (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1982); and David Strand, Rickshaw Beijing: City, People, and Politics in 
1920’s China (Berkeley, CA:  University of California Press, 1989). 
 
6
 For a fierce post-Tiananmen rebuttal to the existence of a Chinese public sphere, consult Frederic 
Wakeman, “The Civil Society and Public Sphere Debate:  Western Reflections on Chinese Political 
Culture” Modern China 19, no. 2 (April 1993):  293-328.  
 
7
 Philippe Ariès, “Introduction.” in A History of Private Life:  Volume III, Passions of the 
Renaissance ed. Roger Chartier and tr. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1989), 9-11.  
 
8
 William Rowe, “The Public Sphere in Modern China,” 323.  
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intellectual category, implying the rise of common space, public gatherings, and the 
freedom of speech provided therein.  However, the strict geographical, temporal, and 
demographic bounds placed upon the public sphere by Habermas renders the category’s 
direct applicability to any Chinese case a bit far-reaching.  More useful, perhaps, would 
be an examination of public sphere from a structural perspective, the very scenario that 
Ariès described.  To that end, this thesis removes the definition of public sphere from its 
original context, altering its meaning in order to describe the space between overt 
autocratic dominance claimed by French colonials or the United States government, 
whether practically or through legislation, and the extent of this authority’s impact upon 
Chinese immigrants, embodied within the organizational structure of the huiguan. 
To more appropriately situate these questions in a Chinese context requires a 
more careful examination of the public sphere debate as it pertains specifically to China.   
The roots of this debate are found much earlier in the works of German sociologist Max 
Weber.9  Weber, in an exhaustive examination of the secondary sources available on 
China at the time, determined China’s material inferiority to the West in the modern era 
stemmed directly from a failure to develop a “rational” organization or system of 
behavior, an inadequacy he attributed to China’s lack of an “urban community.”  Weber 
is incorrect in his assertion, as urban communities did exist in China, but according to 
Weber, equality under a rational legal system represents an urban community, along with 
many other characteristics such as general enfranchisement, bureaucratic accountability, 
and a heavy emphasis on trade and commerce, forming the basis of a sort of proto-
capitalism. 
                                                 
9
 Max Weber, The City ed. and tr. Don Martindale and Gurtrud Neuwirth (New York:  Collier 
Books, 1958) and Max Weber, The Religions of China: Confucianism and Taoism, tr. Hans Gerth 
(Glencoe, IL:  Free Press, 1951).  
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The presence of a powerful, autocratic government whose control of commercial 
operations and natural passages of trade (for example, rivers), worsened China’s failings, 
according to Weber, and determined the development of the economic sector rather than 
the increasing autonomy of any urban commercial community.  More damningly, Weber 
asserted that the Chinese emphasis on native-place and kinship effectively precluded the 
development of any urban community or urban autonomy.  Weber noted, “The ‘city’ 
was…never the ‘hometown’ but typically a place away from home for the majority of its 
inhabitants.”10  Thus, the sojourning nature of urban-dwelling Chinese, and their strong 
ties with native-place communities, prevented them from developing a shared urban 
culture of their own that transcended particularistic ties.  In other words, these 
particularistic groups impeded “the fusion of urban dwellers into a homogenous status 
group.”11   
These are the very notions addressed by William Rowe in his study, Hankow: 
Commerce and Society in a Chinese City.  However, Rowe takes a rather different view 
of the Chinese situation.  In fact, he disagrees fundamentally with Weber on several 
points.  First, Rowe maintains that Weber’s scenario ignores the possibility of the 
existence of different cities across China geared to different functions; for example, one 
city to imperial administration and another to commerce and trade.  This oversight, 
according to Rowe, stems largely from the fact that Weber provides for only two types of 
settlements, cities and villages, and allows for no urban degrees in between.12  As proof 
                                                 
10
 Weber, The Religions of China, 90.  
 
11
 Weber, The City, 97.  
 
12
 Rowe, Commerce and Society, 7.  
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of the magnitude of this oversight, Rowe proffers G. William Skinner’s “central-place” 
theory, which posits the increasing differentiation of China’s urban structures alongside 
the gradual commercialization of the Chinese world.13  More significant, according to 
Rowe, was Skinner’s suggestion that different cities with different purposes also 
occupied different places in China’s administrative and commercial hierarchies.  In other 
words, Rowe claims that Skinner’s notion allows for a more nuanced comparison of 
Chinese cities of roughly equivalent size.  Rowe asserts, “Thus, an urban center whose 
position in the administrative hierarchy was disproportionately higher than its position in 
the marketing hierarchy would be likely to have a very different social structure from one 
in which the relative hierarchical rankings were reversed.”14   
By using Hankou as his model, Rowe strives to demonstrate how this atypical 
Chinese city not only deviates from Weber’s autocratic model, but also emphasizes how 
imperial administrators actively supported the modernization of Hankou’s commercial 
interests and operations across a broad range of commercial ventures.15  In fact, in the 
second volume of his remarkable urban study, Hankow: Conflict and Community in a 
Chinese City, Rowe goes so far as to suggest that this fledgling “modernity” exhibited in 
Hankou constituted a form of public sphere along the lines of Habermas’s European ideal. 
Rowe’s powerful and persuasive foray into Chinese history’s civil society debate 
charted a path for other scholars of Chinese local rural and urban elite; however, it did 
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not go unopposed.  In particular, the noted Chinese historian Frederic Wakeman took 
issue with a number of Rowe’s assertions, a disagreement ranging from the theoretical 
applicability of Habermas’s public sphere in the Chinese case to whether or not Hankou 
even constituted a city in the first place.  According to Wakeman, Rowe’s assertions 
about the existence in Hankou of a “broader urban community” with which merchant 
guilds “increasingly sought to identity their [own] interests”16 bears no validity because 
the merchant guilds in question were not themselves natives of Hankou.  Urban 
community, Wakeman suggests, is impossible when the community in question is 
comprised of sojourners who were not only alien to the city, but who maintained other 
residences in their native places during the commercial off-season.17  In fact, whether 
unconsciously or deliberately, Wakeman’s response to this phenomenon echoes the stand 
originally taken by Max Weber when he claimed that particularistic groups impeded “the 
fusion of urban dwellers into a homogenous status group.”18 
In the context of urban Chinese history, this thesis addresses directly the issues 
and enduring questions of the public sphere and civil society debates raised by prominent 
scholars of China.  Is Max Weber correct about Chinese differing from Westerners in 
their failure to achieve institutional autonomy from the state?  Is he correct when he 
attributes that failure to the unsuccessful modernization of the commercial practices of 
Chinese merchants and their unwillingness to relinquish kinship or other particularistic 
ties as a prerequisite for mercantile relationships?  Is William Rowe correct in tackling 
the shortcomings of Weber’s paradigm so directly?  Did the Chinese guilds of Hankou 
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achieve institutional autonomy from the state, as Rowe suggests, or is Frederic Wakeman 
justified in his skepticism?  Did Rowe’s evidence fail to show that Chinese guilds or any 
other non-state institutions attained autonomy from the state in Hankou?  As Wakeman 
suggests, should one completely set aside Habermas’ notion of public sphere as a concept 
for understanding Chinese history? 
Historians and social scientists specializing in China continue to debate these 
issues widely, and a rich body of scholarship addresses these questions in various forms.  
However, historians have yet to raise these questions with respect to Chinese 
communities outside of China.  Did Chinese immigrant communities devise non-state 
institutions that went beyond the particularism of family and native place associations?  If 
so, did these institutions achieve autonomy from the state in countries outside of China?  
Did these institutions create a public sphere? This thesis attempts to directly address these 
questions by examining the scope and functions of huiguan outside of China and in doing 
so, illuminates the degree of autonomy accessible not only to urban overseas Chinese 
elite, but also to overseas Chinese communities at large.   
When traditional imperial authority vanished in Indochina, to be replaced by the 
autocratic colonial power of the French, what happened to the Chinese?  To what degree 
were Chinese immigrants in Indochina and America able to attain autonomy from state 
dominance?  Did they manage to adapt the institution of the huiguan to meet the needs of 
their own communities, even if those needs went against the wishes of the state? Did they 
achieve some degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the respective governments, and if so, did this 
autonomy represent a type, or even a proto-type, of public sphere?  In the final analysis, 
were immigrant Chinese able to create a public sphere? 
 xxiii  
In a global comparative context between the huiguan of Chinese immigrants in 
Indochina and the American West, the objective is not to address the idea of the Chinese 
“problem” or to examine the ways in which state power in either region constructed the 
“problem.”  Rather, one must investigate the often ambivalent and ambiguous positions 
that Chinese communities occupied within the economies and societies of these two 
varied regions, paying particular attention to three fundamentally linked issues: first, the 
role of the state in creating, or closing, Chinese spaces of citizenship and economic 
activity; second, the shifting status of the Chinese in both areas over time; and third, the 
notion that Chinese existed as an excluded community. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
RECONSIDERATIONS FOR THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF CHINESE IN 
SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE AMERICAN WEST 
In a provocative article, the late Australian scholar Ian Tyrrell writes: "In an era of 
unprecedented internationalization in historiography, the legacies of nationalism and 
exceptionalism still haunt the study of American history."19   Although the historical 
experience of immigrant Chinese communities often reifies conceptions of nationalism, 
the theme of Americanization or Westernization predominates not only Chinese 
American historiography, but also the historiography of Chinese communities throughout 
the world.  Reflected in articles published in recent periodicals, much of the scholarship 
specifically pertaining to Chinese communities in general areas of the American West 
and Southeast Asia is a product of the last three decades.  This body of scholarship 
coincides with the emergence of Asian and Asian American studies as a discrete field.   
While there are no doubt individual reasons for scholarly interest in Chinese 
immigrant communities, this noticeable proliferation owes much of its stimulus to the 
increasing awareness promulgated by Asian American studies, and the prominent role 
Asian Americans now occupy in the American consciousness.  The historical role of the 
Southeast Asian Chinese, and specifically the Chinese in Indochina under French 
colonialism, is one of the most understudied aspects of a generally understudied sub-
discipline.  The reasons have to do not only with the difficulty of finding available source 
material but also with the persistent ethnocentrism in writing about the region in 
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European languages, which sees European influence as in some sense the successor to an 
older civilizing impulse from India, and the Chinese role as an awkward sideshow.  
Moreover, a more profound and enduring problem is whether it is possible or desirable to 
know who is and is not “Chinese”  in a world now dominated by nation states.   
In addition to the development of Asian American studies as a discrete field, the 
rapid economic growth of Asia and Southeast Asia over the last thirty years continues to 
draw attention to the prominent role played by approximately twenty million “Overseas 
Chinese” living in Southeast Asia.  Individuals sometimes refer to this remarkable group 
of “prodigious savers and investors” as the classic case of the “marginal trading 
minority,” of which other cases are the Jews in Europe, Indians in East Africa, Lebanese, 
Armenians, and Parsees, among others.20 The Southeast Asian Chinese are currently the 
largest and most successful of such minorities, and their role in the development of 
capitalism in East and Southeast Asia is crucially important.  Their success has stimulated 
much writing, both scholarly and ephemeral, about them in recent years, seeking to 
unveil the secrets of their commercial success.  Ambitious scholarly models of “Chinese 
capitalism” exist in addition to narrower studies of commercial and kinship networks, 
trust (xinyong), and family firms.21 Yet very little of this writing possesses a serious 
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historical dimension or takes into account the extraordinary depth and diversity of 
China’s interactions with Southeast Asia.   
The vicissitudes of Chinese immigration to Southeast Asia, and Indochina in 
particular, demonstrates cases of total integration into the host society and of long-term 
coexistence and competition with it.  Chinese gravitated toward different identities at 
various times, including Chinese sojourners abroad, Westernized colonial subjects, loyal 
citizens of their adopted countries, revolutionary communists, or modern, multi-national 
capitalists.  Numerous specialized monographs appear on their political loyalties to 
Beijing, Taipei, or Southeast Asian capitals, on the patterns of social and kinship 
organization, on their economic roles, religious beliefs, and economic experiences, but 
few studies offer global comparisons. 22  
As a comparative corollary, historian Sucheng Chan delineates four periods in the 
writing of Asian American history.23  Works produced during the first period, between 
the 1870s and 1920s, were almost entirely partisan, in that writers either opposed or 
supported Chinese immigration.24   During the second period, from the 1920s to the 
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1960s, two topics captured the attention of social scientists regarding the Chinese 
experience:  the extent to which Chinese immigrants and their descendants assimilated to 
Euro-American norms and the internal organization of Chinese immigrant communities 
in the United States.   Although written by sociologists, these studies continue to be of 
particular interest to contemporary historians because they reflect the prevailing 
worldviews and concerns of earlier decades.  Moreover, such secondary writings can now 
be considered primary sources.25   
The third period, from the late 1960s to the early 1980s, is of great significance 
because it involved attempts to overturn earlier sociological and historical perspectives, 
infusing the broader field of Asian American historiography with the rhetoric of 
politically active students and young scholars demanding the replacement of negative 
stereotypes of allegedly docile and silent Asians with portraits of Asian immigrants and 
Asian American workers actively struggling against capitalist oppression.26 Additionally, 
beginning in the 1960s, the resurgent immigration and social mobility of Chinese to the 
American West and elsewhere heightened an awareness of the need to include them 
centrally in the study of group processes.  This historiography, however, frequently 
utilized Euro-American perspectives.  Despite evidence of increasing structural 
integration, scholars concentrated on Chinese subordination through discriminatory 
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policies and movements.27  Nevertheless, breakthroughs occurred, leading to an approach 
emphasizing group life.  As early as 1961, Lawrence Fuchs authored a sensitive 
examination of Hawai’i’s Asian ethnic groups, treating them as both sources of action 
and perspective.  Subsequently, Gunther Barth, John Modell, Edna Bonacich, Lucie 
Cheng and Ronald Takaki, among others, began to bring Asian Americans within the 
new social history framework of American ethnicity.28   
 In the fourth period, beginning in the 1980s, scholars studying Asian Americans 
began to carve out a niche in academia.  According to Sucheng Chan, professional 
historians only began to play "a leading role in creating historical knowledge about Asian 
Americans" in the early 1980s.29  Much of this path-breaking scholarship deconstructed 
and rejected racial discourses.  The creation of such an intellectual space enabled scholars 
focusing on the Chinese in the American West to complete the painstaking archival 
research required to depict the Chinese and other Asian groups as agents of history, 
depictions based on careful analysis of extant documentary evidence.   
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Presently, Asian American history courses across the country continue to utilize 
general scholarly syntheses.30   These publications demonstrate convincingly how the 
Chinese actively participated in American social, economic, and political life. However, 
the most significant achievement of this body of scholarship was its revision of American 
history and culture to include the Chinese.  While attempting to reject assimilationist 
viewpoints, however, scholars presented the Chinese in the American West as less a 
Chinese and more an American story, a tale of diverse people becoming one nation.  In 
such writings, Chinese immigration is a linear progression from rural to urban, from 
traditional to modern, from alienation to Americanization. The historian’s priority thus 
became the struggle for representation and inclusion of Chinese in American history, the 
challenge of the homogeneous image of American “whiteness,” and conversely, the claim 
of Chinese “American-ness.” Rooted in the context of the American West, these writings 
emphasized how the Chinese in America gradually became distinct from the Chinese in 
China.    
Defining the Chinese as "settlers" rather than "sojourners," explaining how the 
Chinese adapted themselves to American society in the West, and describing their 
resistance against racism remained dominant themes in scholarship during this period. In 
the discussion of the process of identity formation among Chinese Americans, for 
example, most scholars underscored the willingness of Chinese to embrace American 
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values and their desire to be accepted as Americans. "When we write the histories of 
Asians in America, we add something to U.S. history," claimed K. Scott Wong and 
Sucheng Chan, editors of a Chinese American anthology published in 1998.31 
Unquestionably, Chinese American scholarship from the 1980s and 1990s 
represents a significant step forward compared with previous works either presenting the 
Chinese as passive victims of racial prejudice or works focused largely on how Euro-
American society perceived and responded to the Chinese presence in America. 
Economic participation, changes within each respective Chinese community and identity 
formation emerged as central issues in the scholarship of this period. However, the 
historiography of the Chinese in America remained an American-centered and nation-
based literature.  
Transformations in the field as it unfolded further marginalized the history of 
Chinese in the American West.  As new immigration swelled the numbers of first-
generation Chinese, there was a shift of interest to the Chinese roots at the expense of 
interest in historical roots in the United States, including the community interests 
informing the work of earlier scholars.  A class element existed as well.  Unlike earlier 
Chinese immigrants, new generations of immigrants include, most prominently, 
professionals and entrepreneurs to whom histories of successful contemporary Chinese 
role models may be more relevant than the history of the working class in the nineteenth 
century.   
As early as the 1980s, historians specializing in America expressed uneasiness 
about the emphasis in Asian American history on “railroads and concentration camps.”32  
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Without miners and railroad workers, however, there is little in the way of early Chinese 
American history, especially in the region of the American West. As the current 
preoccupation with diasporas shifts attention to global migrations of Chinese, it is 
important to note that unless a study is place-grounded, the study of diaspora in its very 
naming “Chinese” invites the return of reified racial and cultural identifications to mark 
diverse populations, a “Chinese-ness” that exists independently of time and place.   
While present economic success endows these markers with positive value, one 
should remain aware that it was these same markers that were the cause of prejudice and 
discrimination against the Chinese at an earlier time.  National historiography for some 
time provided something of an antidote by substituting identity defined by the nation-
state for racially- or culturally-conceived identities.  But the nation-state itself, while 
more grounded territorially and historically, suffered from its own reifications by 
abolishing differences within its own spaces, and, more pertinently, by excluding 
populations outside of its national boundaries.  For example, Chinese immigration 
continually presented problems to a Chinese nationalist historiography.  The national 
history of China excluded the history of Chinese immigrants, leaving it to those 
specializing in regions or countries with locations of immigrant populations.  The same, 
incidentally, was the case for foreign historians of China.  So long as the nation-state 
provides the unit of historical analysis, its boundaries shape the study of history.  Thus, 
the history of Chinese immigration has not been a part of Chinese historians’ training. 
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The fifth period of Chinese American historiography, characterized by efforts to 
fill extant historical gaps through paradigmatic shifts, emerged in the late 1990s.  
Changes in substantive focus became apparent in studies examining Chinese immigrants 
and their descendants in regions other than the Pacific coast, in works attempting to shed 
light on hitherto scarcely researched periods, and through conceptual shifts reflected in 
the changing framework scholars used to interpret their substantive findings. Because of 
their complexity, migration patterns forming Chinese communities in the West required 
analysis transcending parochial geo-historical boundaries.  
 An emergent key task for scholars of Chinese in the American West is to relate 
community-building to historical movements, such as the contest of imperialism and 
nationalism, the spread of the demographic transition and capitalism to underdeveloped 
counties, and the establishment of overseas Chinese communities outside the United 
States.  One can thus visualize Chinese immigration to the American West as occurring 
in a trans-Pacific arena that deploys both human and economic resources.  Only then can 
one observe Chinese immigrants as simultaneously functioning in two socioeconomic 
settings:  the system of family instrumental labor and the system of wage labor in 
American society.   
From the perspective of the homeland, Chinese were agents for spatially 
extending traditional household economies.  Case studies focusing specifically on 
Chinese communities in the American West permit previous assessments of the 
American frontier as an international safety valve of opportunity for non-Western peoples, 
as well as indigenous cultures and white settlers.  From a Western perspective, the 
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Chinese were one of the first racial minorities to become a proletariat in the early stages 
of industrialization and in the development of the trans-Mississippi hinterland.33  
Revisionist in nature, more recent monographs on Chinese Americans, for 
example, shake the historiography embedded in nationalist discourse, pushing Asian 
American studies in a transnational direction.34  Moving between China and the United 
States in a discussion of Chinese American life, this scholarship reinvigorates Chinese 
American studies as an intersection of Chinese and American studies.  In this way, it 
seriously challenges the American-centered and nation-based research paradigm by 
promoting a more transnational, trans-cultural and multilingual approach to the history of 
Chinese and their experience in the American West.   
Although scholarship in Chinese American history has undoubtedly made 
significant strides in the last thirty years, much of the attention sidesteps the legacy of 
Chinese women.  Long treated by scholars as either passive prostitutes or subservient 
wives, Chinese American women and their lives remained unclaimed for decades.  Judy 
Yung’s scholarship focuses on the diverse experiences of Chinese women, in which these 
women appear both as agents of their own transformation as well as victims of racist and 
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patriarchal structures of power.35   Moreover, her account identifies immigration as a 
particularly gendered process.  Integrating theoretical concepts of race, class and gender 
throughout her work, Yung’s study testifies to the human agency and diverse roles of 
Chinese American women during the first half of the twentieth century in San Francisco.  
Through the metaphor of foot binding, Yung argues that, within the lifetime of the first 
two immigrant generations, women shed their subordinate status in the community and 
mainstream society, gradually becoming independent, liberated individuals.  Whether as 
Protestant mission-home inmates, flappers in the 1920s, labor activists of the New Deal 
era, or fighter pilots during World War II, Chinese American women overcame the 
barriers of sexism and racism and left their mark on the history of the American West. 
Erika Lee’s rich and evocative study of Chinese immigration during the exclusion 
era demonstrates how Chinese exclusion turned the United States into a gate-keeping 
nation, patrolling its borders and immigrant neighborhoods for individuals deemed 
undesirable and deporting those who somehow slipped in anyway.36  Lee argues that this 
process had several important consequences.  First, Chinese immigration and the anti-
Chinese rhetoric against it became the prototype for successive nativist movements to 
discriminate against other ethnic populations in an attempt to prevent immigration of 
those groups deemed undesirable.  Once they designated one group as illegal and 
undesirable, nativists could utilize similar arguments and attempts at racialization to 
either exclude or restrict the entry of other immigrant groups.  Second, efforts to enforce 
exclusion created a large and powerful bureaucracy, the Immigration and Naturalization 
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Service, whose power went beyond guarding America’s gates as it encroached into 
neighborhoods and targeted illegal immigrants for deportation.  Third, exclusion created 
illegal immigration, and with the initial conflation of illegal immigration with Chinese 
immigration virtually ensures that the term “illegal immigrant” continues to carry a racial 
meaning. 
Lee examines the enforcement of Chinese exclusion as experienced by 
immigration officials and immigrants, including prospective immigrants.  Although her 
story is enriched by the use of local, national and transnational frameworks to explore 
Chinese immigration and exclusion, at heart it is a story about America’s first illegal 
immigrants, national discrimination, and its consequences for successive immigrant 
groups.  Moreover, it examines the development of a bureaucratic structure to control 
immigration and institutionalize racism in its initial pursuit of “illegal immigration” 
defined as “Chinese immigration.”  Lee’s work moves steadily through four parts, from a 
discussion of the origins of Chinese exclusion and American gate-keeping measures, to 
Chinese efforts to enter and Euro-America’s efforts to keep them out, and the national 
legacy of Chinese exclusion. 
A continually daunting task faced by scholars studying Chinese in the American 
West is the paucity of primary sources left by the Chinese themselves; early Chinese 
immigrants left relatively few written documents.  While historians may recognize the 
material contributions of Chinese to the American economy, or acknowledge the 
importance of the Chinese exclusion movement to the development of American nativism 
and xenophobia, the scarcity of Chinese sources makes it difficult to reconstruct the 
Chinese experience of “becoming American.”  K. Scott Wong and Sucheng Chan attempt 
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to examine the construction of a national identity that is both Chinese and American 
through seven essays investigating English-language writings of Chinese in America 
during the exclusion era.37   
 The editors concede that using the writings of those fluent in English means that 
the authors of the sources were not representative of the Chinese American public in 
general.  Nevertheless, Wong and Chan suggest that the very fact that these individuals 
were proficient in the new language meant that that they served as spokespersons for their 
communities.  This assertion raises a perpetual problem for historiography in general:  
how does one know that the spokesperson really voiced the concerns of the silent?  While 
this difficulty may be unavoidable, one must engage in some speculation and imagination 
in one’s efforts to see American history from the Chinese perspective.   
As a corollary, historian Sucheta Mazumdar raised the concern that as Asian 
American Studies programs became a component in mainstream academia, it weakened 
links with the Asian community, stripping it of much of its international characteristics.38 
While Mazumdar was a lone voice in the field at that time, new attempts to address the 
complexity of human migration emerged within immigration studies. Rejecting the well-
established stereotype of immigrants as the "huddled masses," revisionist scholars like 
Virginia Yans-McLaughlin and Ewa Morawska illustrate the variety of social 
backgrounds immigrants reflect.  This scholarship negates the assumption that 
immigrants always represent the lowest economic classes and the poorest regions.  
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Immigrants tend to be highly motivated people with levels of education and labor skills 
often above average populations in the home country.39  Few scholars in Asian American 
studies caught up with this transnational trend and pushed the field in this direction. 
Indeed, transnational research about the Chinese can be risky because the end product can 
be viewed as a marginal work in both Asian studies and Asian American studies. 
  The year 2000 proved to be a fruitful year for Chinese American scholarship 
from a transnational perspective. 40   Historian Madeline Hsu explicitly rejects an 
American-centered and nation-based research paradigm by documenting how Chinese 
immigrants and their families lived for a prolonged period of time on both sides of the 
Pacific. Instead of a localized history, their story is a transnational odyssey, challenging 
conceptions of human migration as a one-way trip.  As Hsu illustrates, the United States 
is not always the final destination of immigrants.  Economic success rather than 
assimilation is often the ultimate goal for immigrants. Tracing the internal migration of 
the Cantonese beginning in the seventh century, and the sojourning lifestyle of the 
Chinese during the Tang Dynasty (618-907), Hsu provocatively discusses migration as a 
long tradition in Chinese society.  Devoting a considerable portion of her book to how 
events in China affected immigrants and how Chinese immigration impacted China, Hsu 
defines her transnational scholarship as a bridge between "historically related but as yet 
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critically unlinked fields of Asian American and Asian Studies."41  This claim itself is 
significant as it could easily invite criticism of her work as half-hearted or as a less 
genuine form of Chinese American scholarship.  
The rejection of an American-centered approach does not always imply a China-
centered position in immigration studies. A transnational perspective focuses on the 
immigrants rather than the nation states between which they shuttle back and forth. The 
transforming power of transnationalism is its immigrant-based perspective. As Hsu 
contends, scholars lacking Chinese language skills must comprehend the global nature 
and important nuances of loyalty, achievement and relationships brought about by the 
immigration experience.42 
Hsu's introduction contains a revisionist theoretical paradigm for a study of 
Chinese migration patterns. She defines Chinese migration as a trans-Pacific circular flow 
of people, money, information, and social relationships crossing national boundaries. 
Transnationalism challenges the established premise that regards migration patterns as 
straightforward, two-step, unidirectional movements.  China did not "push out" its 
citizens so that other countries could "pull" them in. Having recognized the limitations of 
extant literature on Chinese immigration, Hsu rejects the notion of migration as a process 
characterized by social dislocation, adjustment, and ultimately, Americanization or 
Westernization. Immigrants did not simply uproot themselves from one set of social 
relationships in order to absorb themselves in different social relationships.  To assert this 
notion characterizes immigrants as only being capable of maintaining involvement in one 
community at a time, defined by the nation-state.  
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Through multiple links and orientations, Chinese immigrants constructed complex 
transnational and multicultural identities. As a social activity, migration developed its 
own momentum and self-reproducing energy to sustain the continuity of the movement. 
During the migration process, transplanted social networks expanded and created new 
possibilities for later generations of immigrants. Therefore, departure from China did not 
sever immigrants' ties to their past but, rather, facilitated the creation of a new life and 
new networks linking home to a new home away from home.  
The social origin of early Chinese immigrants is one of the most important topics 
that Asian American historians discuss and debate. However, few scholars explore this 
subject as deeply as Yong Chen.  Chen analyzes the dynamic economy of and social 
relations with Guangdong, China’s southern province.  "The world the California-bound 
immigrants left,” asserts Chen, “was not a one-dimensional, stagnant and closed society. 
Instead, the Pearl River Delta was (and still is) one of the most dynamic areas in 
China."43  Chen’s revisionist view on the social origins of Chinese immigrants naturally 
leads to a reinterpretation of their lives in San Francisco. The title of his work, Chinese 
San Francisco 1850-1943: A Trans-Pacific Community, signifies Chen’s theoretical 
approach through his illustration of San Francisco as the capital of the Chinese 
transnational community in America.   
The colorful life of the community leader Ah Quin supports Chen's challenge to 
the long-standing image of Chinese immigrants as rigid and passive peasants who took 
whatever jobs were available, instead characterizing them as highly motivated people 
aspiring to upward mobility. There is perhaps no other individual in the early history of 
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the Chinese in California who challenges this stereotype more than Ah Quin.  Born in 
Guangdong Province in 1848 to farmers who sent him to an American missionary school 
in China, he learned to read and write in Chinese and English.  Wishing for a better life 
for their son, his parents sent him to America and unlike most Chinese immigrants, Ah 
Quin's family was able to pay for his passage across the Pacific in advance.  His ten-
volume diary recounts his travels and his employment, and also includes the names and 
addresses of prominent men with whom Ah Quin had contact.  He worked in Alaska as a 
cook and also made contact with the Chinese Christian mission upon his arrival to San 
Francisco.  He continued his religious study there, and this experience added to his 
knowledge of English and helped him to develop contacts with individuals outside the 
Chinese community. Ah Quin remained in San Francisco for about six years, working in 
a variety of jobs, which included serving as a domestic laborer and cook.  He became a 
railroad recruiter and businessman in San Diego, eventually earning the unofficial title of 
“Mayor of Chinatown.”  As a successful entrepreneur and father, he was respected by all 
who bridged the gap between the Chinese and Euro-American establishment.  Due to his 
bilingual capability he continued to be a spokesman for the Chinese community, serving 
local courts on behalf of other Chinese immigrants.44  
Chinese immigrants continue to inhabit both a geographically and culturally 
transnational space.  The turn to the study of diasporas, while it shares much in common 
with earlier race- or culture-based identification, also differs from the latter because it is 
post-nationalist.  Moreover, it questions the very notion of the nation-state as a locus of 
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identity and it is globalist.  Nevertheless, its very globalism tends to erase differences 
based on place and the different histories articulated through place.  This gave rise in 
recent years to a concern with pitting global studies against more localized histories.45  
History informed by a sense of place not only resists erasure by globalist reification, but 
also serves as a reminder of the very concrete experiences and activities through which 
Chinese constructed and defined their identities.   
 If bringing the Chinese experience in Indochina and the American West into the 
larger framework of Chinese historiography presents significant conceptual consequences, 
the reverse is also the case.  General studies of the American West suffer from blindness 
where Chinese populations are concerned.  A perusal of state histories indicates that 
references to Asian populations are still rare.  However, one may draw from much of the 
recent work about immigration to the American West a multitude of questions of interest 
pertinent to the Chinese experience.   
It is important to underscore a few of the very prominent issues presented from 
the perspective of historiography about Chinese in the American West:  settlement and 
coastal patterns; oppression, resistance and violence; the dynamics of Chinatowns; and 
interethnic relations.  It is also important to consider the distinction between older, 
established Chinese communities and new settlements in the American West, which may 
be of more significance than the distinction of coastal and interior Chinese communities 
in the American West.  Indeed, what primarily distinguished inland regions from the 
coast was its unsettledness, where tensions and violent confrontations between Euro-
Americans and Chinese characterized many small settlements dotting the landscape of 
the nineteenth-century American West.   
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 Transnationalism remains an important approach to understanding the Chinese 
immigrant experience. It reflects both regional and international social, political and 
economic forces, as well as the Chinese response to these forces through the creation and 
maintenance of transnational networks.  Racialized environments within Indochina and 
America, coupled with political unrest and social instability in China, prevented Chinese 
immigrants from developing a sense of connectedness to either society for some period of 
time.  Therefore, transnational family and community networks became the focal point of 
life for early Chinese immigrants.  
Through the inclusion of Chinese-language sources, an investigation of 
community life throughout the Pacific Rim, the search for the dialectical explanation of 
China’s cultural roots, and an integration of larger ethnic and international studies are key 
components in transnational scholarship. Contrary to misconceptions about this approach, 
transnationalism continues to advocate socially-embedded, community-based and 
immigrant-centered scholarly research.  From the perspective of Chinese immigrants, 
migration is not about relocating their homes from one country to another, but rather it is 
about exploring economic opportunities beyond national boundaries and creating 
alternative social spaces away from home.  A transnational journey thus begins in China, 
follows a pattern of circulation, and may end, for some returning immigrants, back to 
China as well.  In this study, Chinese immigration did not begin nor necessarily end in 
Indochina or America.  By transcending assimilationist paradigms, one can begin to fully 
comprehend the difficult realities of immigration and the transnationality of the Chinese 
experience. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
FROM ZHONGGUO, ‘CHINA’ TO ‘BIG CITY’ AND ‘BIG MARKET’:  
HUIGUAN DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA 
Nowhere were the effects of imperialism, colonialism and industrialization more 
pronounced than around the Pacific Rim in the nineteenth century.  This region shared a 
precarious position along the edges of an industrial frontier, 46 and even though many 
areas possessed economies based on long-standing traditions of overseas commerce, 
forces from the West created new social dynamics within these regions. 47   An 
examination of Chinese immigration during the nineteenth century requires one to 
investigate myriad social, political, and economic changes occurring within China, and in 
doing so, it thus becomes easier to see the entire Pacific Rim as a region in transition.  
Moreover, one must analyze how Chinese society depended on tradition and family to 
sustain its culture at home and abroad during this transition.   
Describing the process of immigration explains how the intertwining of Pacific 
Rim economies and cultures linked China, Indochina and America.  The vast Pacific 
Ocean separated distinct land masses and cultures.  Over its waters, new ideas and 
cultures traveled, and during the nineteenth century, the ocean barrier, so intriguing to 
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early Chinese philosophers, slowly lost its much of its mystery when Chinese immigrants 
sailed to new lands.  The Pacific Rim economies of the twentieth century largely 
developed from this cultural exchange, whereby one today can still observe the vestiges 
of a vibrant, albeit dependent, economy of nations.48   
Industrialization arrived around the Pacific Rim at uneven times up until the end 
of World War II.  It arrived in the American West in the form of mining and railroad 
construction between 1860 and 1885, and it arrived in East and Southeast Asia on the 
heels of Western imperialism.  Japan’s desire to modernize fueled changes altering the 
course of the nation’s history.49  In China, this industrialization took root slowly.  It grew 
out of the necessity to modernize China’s military but soon encompassed a broader range 
of economic initiatives, including the production of consumer goods. 50   
While social change in China reflected its pace in modernization, Japan’s arrived 
with a rapidity that astounded the rest of the world.  Economic development in both 
countries, however, occurred in cities and seemingly skipped over the countryside, unless 
one listened to the whistle of steamboats traveling along the rivers of Guangdong 
Province or plying the coastal waters of Japan. 51  Southern China, throughout much of its 
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history and up to the present day, remains predominantly rural, a place where life 
historically centered around family and small farming villages.52   
According to Confucian principles, a well-ordered family provided the foundation 
for a well-ordered society.53  Chinese households extended beyond the walls of the family 
house to include clans and extended relatives outside the home.  The size of a Chinese 
family varied, and although households and nuclear families remained small, extended 
relationships nonetheless opened families to a wider world.  Chinese related through 
lineal descent and marriage bound themselves together by kinship rights and duties.54   
In southern China, relatives belonging to one lineage group often comprised entire 
villages and sometimes even larger towns.55  Lineage groups or clans extended to people 
sharing the same family name.  Even if blood relationships proved sketchy, the family 
name bound the lineage group.  Most lineage groups lived like a large family, with an 
elderly patriarchal member at its head.  For example, in some villages everyone in the 
village had the family name of Ma (in Cantonese, Mah) and, according to tradition, all 
descended from one man bearing the same name.  Generally, the eldest male led the 
village.  Mas in other villages, theoretically, also belonged to this same lineage group or 
clan, thus relating all Mas, wherever they lived, together.56   
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In villages, houses and “halls” lay close together.57  In these compact villages, 
Chinese shared a common history linking their pasts and their futures.  In the village of 
Nanqing near Guangzhou (Canton), for example, ancestor tablets for the village describe 
its establishment in 1091.  Forty-two generations of villagers tied to one patriarch lived in 
this community.  As a result, the family and the lineage clan shaped and governed the 
southern Chinese village for centuries.58   
Communities could be comprised of more than one family lineage group, but the 
ability to trace one’s family back to the inception of a village meant Chinese lived in a 
society bound by a depth of tradition and custom, and these deep-seated traditions and 
customs traveled with Chinese abroad.59  So entrenched were these cultural roots that 
once abroad, Chinese structured their lives similar to the villages they left behind.  While 
villages in southern China formed the core of rural society, they also formed the initial 
model for many Chinese communities outside of China.60  
Except in a few isolated cases where the topography did not permit it, rural 
Chinese distributed themselves in villages and towns.  As Kung-Chuan Hsiao notes, “The 
village was in fact the basic unit of Chinese rural life, as the family constituted the 
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primary unit of Chinese social life.”61  While the average size of a rural family household 
was 6.5 persons,62 the number of families representing a village varied greatly.63   
Changes to traditional Chinese society would be inevitable, however, and these 
changes had roots in China’s historic past.  During the Tang (618-907), Song (960-1279), 
and Yuan Dynasties (1279-1368), Guangdong Province, the southernmost of China’s 
provinces, underwent rapid growth in river and oceanic trade.64   Only the island of 
Hainan lies farther south than Guangdong, and like this island province, Guangdong 
borders the South China Sea, a body of water that opened to Southeast Asia, eastward to 
the Philippine Islands and, ultimately, to the wider Pacific Ocean.  It was along the river 
systems of warm and subtropical Guangdong Province where China’s merchant class, 
dependent on foreign trade, emerged. 
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Figure 1.  Pearl River Delta Region65 
 
On the banks of rivers emptying into the South China Sea, market towns and 
sizeable cities based on commerce and industry developed in Guangdong Province.    
While these urban areas developed along the region’s waterways, villages, more 
numerous than cities, provided food and markets for larger cities.  Waterways now 
connected them to growing towns downriver and along the coast.   
The region’s prosperity from the beginning of the Tang (619-907) and into the 
Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) grew out of its maritime trade system.  Along with the 
construction of port facilities and canals during the Ming Dynasty, knowledge of 
navigation and shipbuilding improved.  Ultimately, the shipbuilders of Guangdong 
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Province constructed oceangoing vessels capable of crossing not only the South China 
Sea but also the Pacific Ocean.  As a result, the number of passengers and the volume of 
goods the oceangoing vessels held increased dramatically.  By the beginning of the Qing 
Dynasty (1644-1912), a sophisticated water transportation network with the Pearl River 
as its main artery was in place.  The Pearl River, with its numerous river and sea ports, 
allowed Chinese traders to move into the interiors of China and out onto the open sea 
with ease.66 
During the Qing Empire, ships from Guangzhou, the capital of Guangdong 
Province, traveled the coastlines of China or sailed out to sea to Southeast Asia and 
beyond.67  With one of the longest coastlines in China, and with its excellent water 
transportation system into the interior, Guangdong Province, with Guangzhou as its 
economic center, enjoyed a booming foreign trade during the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries.68  In addition to its natural benefits, a change in imperial policies in the mid-
eighteenth century further contributed to the region’s importance and economic success.  
In 1757 Emperor Qianlong (1736-1795) restricted all foreign trade in China to the ports 
of Guangzhou.69  Restricted foreign trade to Guangzhou from 1757 to the end of the 
Opium War in 1842 allowed the city to enjoy a trade monopoly that enriched the entire 
province.  Chinese in Guangdong held the tradition of overseas commerce in Guangdong 
firmly in place by the time of China’s defeat in the Opium War and the subsequent onset 
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of Western imperialist ambition in the region.  This long tradition of outward-looking 
commerce helped launch the nineteenth-century Chinese immigration that followed 
China’s war with England. 70   
The Opium War, lasting from 1839 to 1842, ended with the signing of the Treaty 
of Nanjing in 1842.  This agreement, the first of what China would refer to as “unequal 
treaties” with foreign powers, demanded the opening of Chinese ports to foreign trade 
and signified virtual occupation.  Two years later, the Americans and French, modeling 
England’s success, signed treaties allowing them access to Chinese ports.71  From the 
arrival of foreigners with gunboats in 1842 until 1911, with the collapse of the Qing 
Dynasty and the formation of the Chinese Republic, southern China continued to undergo 
profound change.   
The larger cities of the Pearl River and Han River delta regions in Guangdong 
Province prospered while other Chinese areas experienced economic depression.  
However, economic development in the area proved uneven; portions of the province 
prospered through expanded foreign commerce, while other areas lagged behind the cities 
economically.72  This uneven economic development was evident as early as the late 
eighteenth century.73 
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Figure 2.  China's Agricultural Regions, 198674 
 
In spite of this uneven economic development, Guangdong’s population grew 
from 6.8 million to 21.1 million people between 1762 and 1820.  By comparison, the 
United States grew from about 3.9 million people in 1790 to 9.6 million in 1820. 
Guangdong, comprising about 130,000 square kilometers, is approximately the size of 
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Oregon.  Although the province’s population stood at sixteen million in 1787, Oregon’s 
numbered only about 2.8 million in 1990.75    
The steady growth of Guangdong’s population resulted primarily from a steady 
increase in agricultural production, as well as the development of industry, commerce, 
and trade expansion into foreign markets.  Chinese labor in the form of packaging tea, 
weaving and sewing garments, and firing ceramics further powered industrial and 
commercial growth.  Moreover, Guangdong’s flourishing production of Chinese ceramics, 
silks, and teas, was legendary and Europeans greatly desired all three commodities.  Steel 
manufacturing, ship building, sugar refining, and the manufacturing of porcelain ware 
were additional staples of the southern Chinese commercial economy, and Guangdong 
merchants carried these goods far and wide. 76 
As a result of its international trade, Guangdong became a province where 
entrepreneurs and laborers looked beyond China for resources and revenue.  The Chinese 
success at attracting capital and Guangdong’s potentially large market for goods 
manufactured in Europe made the region extremely alluring.  Although European traders 
desired exclusive access to this lucrative market,77 the means to enter southern Chinese 
markets required extensive investment dollars, and capital, in the form of silver, flowed 
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into the province.  A banking industry would also emerge, fueled by British and then 
Chinese capital investments, centered first in Guangzhou and later Hong Kong.78   
In many ways, capitalist trade systems and feudal land-use patterns coexisted in 
Guangdong Province.  During the end of the nineteenth century, Western imperial 
capitalism dominated the region and the world.  Because Guangdong long held an 
important position in international trade, the transition to a Western capitalist system 
proved more fluid than in the northern interior provinces of China.  As historian Yong 
Chen illustrates:  “As early as 1730 the Emperor Yongzheng noted:  ‘East Guangdong is 
surrounded by the ocean on three sides, where merchants arrive from various provinces 
and foreign barbarians come with money to purchase goods.  Trade is very heavy….”79  
By the middle of the nineteenth century, ties to Western commerce and banking placed 
Guangdong in a unique position in China. 
In 1842, the Treaty of Nanjing also opened four new Chinese ports of trade to 
Europeans.80  The new port cities of Xiamen, Fuzhou, Ningbo, and especially Shanghai, 
competed directly with Guangzhou for foreign trade.  Guangzhou long held a monopoly 
on foreign trade, but it quickly felt the effect of new competition from the other port 
cities, all vying for access to European goods and markets.  Chinese merchants had to 
compete with European traders as well as their own countrymen for a strategic role in 
foreign trade.  Moreover, Guangzhou competed with the newly-established British port 
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city of Hong Kong for economic dominance in Guangdong Province. 81   Not surprisingly, 
this rapid change led to increased uncertainty for Chinese merchants.  To understand why 
Chinese laborers left China to seek new fortunes is inevitably linked to the profound 
economic changes China underwent following the Treaty of Nanjing. 
In the hopes of making a better living abroad, Chinese workers and merchants 
sailed from the South China Sea to Southeast Asia and later traveled east.  The years 
between 1840 and 1930 saw over eight million people leave Zhongguo (“middle country” 
or the “Middle Kingdom”), or China, for residence abroad.  Roughly six million Chinese 
settled in the East Indies, Taiwan, and Thailand, but immigration spanned the entire globe, 
with Chinese men and women immigrating to British, Spanish, Portuguese, and Dutch 
colonies.82  Chinese also sailed to Europe, Australia, New Zealand, Africa, and Latin 
America.  Those choosing to sail to the American West and Indochina, like fellow 
countrymen headed for destinations around the world, left China hoping to improve their 
lives.83 
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Figure 3.  Historical Map of Guangzhou (Canton) and Town Plan, 187884 
 
Along with traditional family and kinship networks that are essential to 
understanding the Chinese world, as well as the economic conditions in southern China 
that catalyzed large numbers of Chinese to immigrate, the origins and development of 
merchant associations within China are crucial to understanding huiguan as they 
developed in Indochina and America.  Moreover, one must underscore their importance 
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to the history of urban life in late-imperial China.  Extant historical literature focuses on 
two aspects of huiguan development:  namely, the various principles of organizational 
structure such as common native place, surname, occupation, new location identity, 
interactions with other huiguan, and their relationship to the formation of other 
community structures.  This scholarship further illustrates the functional relevance of 
huiguan first to the various needs of Chinese immigrant societies and the local elite, and 
secondly to the overriding concerns of the ruling authority, be it the Chinese imperial 
bureaucracy or governing authorities in a foreign settlement. 85   
Merchant associations in China, huiguan or gongsuo, are generically translated as 
“guild” or “associations.”  This translation takes into account the services and function of 
European guilds, beginning in the late Middle Ages, including protectionism and 
exclusiveness.  Chinese merchant associations, emerging by the eighteenth century, were 
protectionist and exclusive, but their precise forms differed.  European guild members 
formed a component of the municipal government and operated in a fairly dependable 
order. 86   From the standpoint of institutional legality or political authority, Chinese 
merchant associations differed dramatically.   
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To illustrate this difference, it is necessary to explore earlier Chinese history 
during the Song Dynasty (960-1279 C.E.).  As in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
China, a remarkable degree of urbanization and commercial growth occurred during the 
eleventh through the thirteenth centuries.  Moreover, there occurred enduring institutional 
and cultural developments, including a centralized government structure under 
unquestioned imperial authority.  China developed its examination system to recruit civil 
service officials, and an ethos of the elite literati (shi dafu) class also developed. Daily 
administration of the imperial government was largely in the hands of a sub-
bureaucracy.87   
 China’s civil service, which emerged from the examination system, and to which 
the local elite primarily had access, largely replaced the aristocratic ruling class of 
medieval China.  This further encouraged the ethos of the Chinese literati-official class.  
Largely owing initial opportunities to economic advantage, this class’s dominant 
concerns were service to the state as well as personal cultural achievement.88  As officials, 
they were supposed to attend to the needs of their families as well as their communities.  
Yet they did not directly rule, even as paterfamilias of the county, which was the lowest 
division of the administration.  As population grew within counties, the number of civil 
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officials at this low level did not increase.89   Instead, growing members of the sub-
bureaucracy who did not possess the benefits of civil service status handled increasing 
numbers of affairs.  Members of the sub-bureaucracy included yamen clerks and runners; 
yamen clerks were managers and scribes in charge of taxes and of general administration 
and yamen runners were agents and policemen.  They most likely originated from bailiffs, 
estate-managers, and servants to the aristocratic families of the past.  At this time, 
however, they handled the details of government, and under their supervision were 
service organizations, created at the village or city borough level, responsible for the 
collection of taxes and requisitions.90 
Garrisoned by the dynasty’s loyal forces, China’s large cities and towns were 
under imperial authority, as represented by civil officials; however, they were actually 
administered by clerks and runners.  Sections of large cities recognized local “headmen” 
(hangtou or hanglao) of each business or occupation group.  Chinese described each 
specific group as hang (literally meaning “line”), according to its trade or the kind of 
service it provided.  Historians also translate this term as “guild.”91 
Headmen of the trade or craft association in the Song era were essentially passive, 
primarily serving brokerage functions in service trades, such as employing servants.  The 
headmen of urban trade associations (hang or tuanhang) controlled prices of merchandise 
such as tea.  They achieved their positions mainly in response to the government’s 
purchase or requisitioning of goods and services.  The hang or tuanhang were primarily 
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associations in the service of the government, although their headmen would make the 
best of an opportunity to bargain with functionaries.  Such associations for government 
service lasted through the urban prosperity of the Song Dynasty (960-1279), the Mongol 
Yuan Dynasty (1271-1368) and continued into the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644). 92   
The major social, political, and economic patterns characterizing Chinese society 
during these dynasties are also an important historical context.  Geographical 
circumstances partly explain the domination of militarily-backed autocracy in the 
Chinese tradition.  Vulnerability to attack from inner Asian nomads created the need for a 
large army, while the unreliable rainfall in North China periodically resulted in famine 
and consequent rebellion.93   
Added to this milieu was the socio-ethical orthodoxy of China’s Confucian 
tradition, a philosophical doctrine weaved into the institutional fabric of monarchy, 
family, and patriarchy.  Under the Song, Yuan and Ming emperors, China adopted a Neo-
Confucian curriculum for the civil service examination system that reinforced Confucian 
social ethics through self-cultivation reminiscent of Buddhist ideals. 94   Meanwhile, 
through rituals and popular religions, Confucian ideals of goodness and success affected 
the society at large, contributing to a widely-shared respect for order and stability.  This 
system of orthodox ritual and ethics largely contributed to the success of the Manchus 
who, with less than a million conquerors, ruled China after they captured Peking (Beijing) 
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in 1644 and established the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911).  They declared their public policy 
of abiding by Confucian principles, thus justifying the new mandate of heaven.95 
As previously discussed, in the long periods of stability under the Ming and the 
Qing, there was exponential population growth in China, and with it, expansion of the 
commercial economy.  The Ming inherited a population estimated at sixty-five million, 
which rose to 150 million by the sixteenth century before temporarily declining during 
crises of the seventeenth century.  From 1700 on, however, there was rapid population 
growth, reaching 250 million by 1750 and 400 million by 1850.  By the early nineteenth 
century, the population of China’s largest cities was perhaps no higher than that of the 
imperial capitals of the Song dynasty, but there were more large cities.  At least five of 
them – Beijing, Suzhou, Nanjing, Guangzhou, and the Wuhan region – had a population 
of more than 575,000, with some cities approaching a million.96   
The Ming-Qing period also witnessed the development of rural market towns.  By 
the mid-nineteenth century there were approximately 1,650 market towns in all of China 
(except Manchuria and Taiwan) with populations of 2,000 or more.97  Yet the major 
aspect of trading within these rural market towns was the exchange of farm products and 
handicrafts among peasants.  At periodic markets and fairs, Chinese merchants offered 
the few necessities that could not be supplied locally, including salt and metal goods.  
Merchants also met the demand in cities and towns for grain, for other kinds of food, and 
for clothing materials.  Rural-urban trade was substantially one-directional, from country 
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to city, based on taxes and rent.  This system, operating through a market economy, 
moved peasants’ grain and sideline products to towns.98 
Instead of advancements in technology, the economic history of the Ming-Qing 
period is essentially the story of an expansion of production accompanying an increase in 
population.  There was expansion in commercial goods such as cotton, silk, salt, tea, 
sugar, and tobacco.  As previously discussed, the peasants’ cottage industries, subsidiary 
to farming, largely completed the production of these goods.  Beginning in the late-Ming 
period, and into the Qing Dynasty, along with systems of silk-weaving in the cities and 
towns of the lower Yangtze River, small workshops in peasant households employing 
approximately fifteen people developed in some lower Yangtze cities for the dyeing, 
calendaring, and printing of cotton cloth collected at local markets.  The production of the 
cotton cloth continued entirely as a peasant cottage industry.99 
Recent scholarship emphasizes that by the Ming Dynasty, the major Chinese 
institution of officially sanctioned brokerage that came to exist in every city and rural 
market facilitated economic development.  While required to hold licenses, brokers were 
responsible to the government for the behavior of traveling merchants and for taxes on 
their transactions.  Through government-provided registration books, brokers entered 
facts about each traveling merchant.  They provided hostelry, dockage, and storage 
facilities to long-distance merchants and arranged to collect local produce ordered.  Such 
services included the guarantee of security for the traveling merchant and entailed the 
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cooperation of local officials, including the clerks and runners.  Eventually, custom 
sufficiently regularized business practices to encourage long-distance merchants to return 
again.100  The clerks and runners received commissions, ensuring a degree of stability in 
the marketplace.  Yet, as Kwang-Ching Liu contends, there was enough potentiality for 
arbitrariness in the arrangement to discourage long-term investment in the improvement 
of production.  The cities represented the largest concentration of licensed brokers.  For 
example, in a city like Suzhou, hundreds of them existed and covered all major wholesale 
businesses.101 
It is in this context that one must view Chinese merchant associations, for the 
guilds that arose in the late-Ming and early-Qing periods took over the functions of 
officially-licensed brokers in some trades, though not in all of them.  The new kind of 
Chinese merchant associations represented a trend toward the privatization of certain 
commercial functions.  When they first appeared, these Chinese guilds were identified as 
huiguan.  Merchants, whose native place was different and usually far away from the city 
in which they were sojourning, formed huiguan.102   
In this fundamental respect, they were not like European guilds.  The term 
huiguan is often correlated with the term Landsmannschaft, defined as an association of 
persons of common geographic background in a place away from their home territory.103  
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Huiguan, however, also referred to the hostels existing under the Ming dynasty in Beijing 
for qualified degree-holders who came to the capital to await imperial audience and 
appointment, and in some provincial cities that provided lodging for candidates from the 
same native place taking the civil service examination.  Huiguan also provided a location 
for feasts and gatherings for officials of the same native-place origin.104   
In Him Mark Lai’s research on the origin and development of huiguan in America, 
he underscores the connection between overseas trade and the development of the 
huiguan.  Chinese established some of the earliest huiguan in present-day Vietnam in the 
late-Ming or early-Qing dynastic periods.  They were associated with temples dedicated 
to Tianhou or the Queen of Heaven, protector of seafarers.105  Merchants adopted the 
phrase huiguan, however, by at least the eighteenth century for their own associations in 
Peking (Beijing) and other Chinese cities.  In each case, huiguan represented men from 
the same native place who also happened to be engaged in the same trade.  Historians 
attest to the dating and nature of these associations by the stone steles that still mark sites 
of huiguan temples or meeting halls.106 
The identity conferred by common geographical heritage was the major bond – 
whether it was that of the same county, same group of counties, or same province.  
Common geographic origin was second in importance only to family and kinship.  Yet 
Chinese merchants also formed huiguan on the basis of the businesses which its members 
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represented and attempted to legitimize through the institution.  Chinese merchants, once 
they ventured outside family and lineage relationships, found common ground in religion 
and ritual.  Huiguan were usually not the place to worship one’s ancestors, and of course 
one could not worship other people’s ancestors.  Yet huiguan did not represent the state.  
Imperial authority and all properly-authorized officials monopolized the worship of 
Confucius; huiguan could not perform sacrifices to Confucius.  They had to worship 
deities of their own, and these were primarily folk deities, most commonly the martial 
god, the Lord of Guan (also known as Guanyu), an historical figure of the third century 
C.E., well known for his loyalty to the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.E.–220 C.E.) as well as to 
sworn brotherhood.  Huiguan often represented this martial god, still enshrined in many 
Chinatowns around the world, as the god of prosperity.107 
Although it was with the worship of popular deities that huiguan often identified 
themselves, they did not lose touch with the major institutions of family and bureaucracy 
in Chinese society.  Huiguan members’ family-mindedness was only in temporary 
abeyance when the individual worshipped or watched opera at the huiguan temple or met 
with other members on business.  Each member had his own family, of course, and they 
often returned to live amongst their kinsmen in their home county, although not 
everybody could afford to do so.  One of the huiguan’s most common and important 
functions was to found and manage a temporary or permanent “charitable burying 
ground,” or yizhong, especially for fellow-provincials who died in the city of their 
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sojourn and whose families found it beyond their means to have their remains shipped 
home to their native place.108 
 Huiguan were not, however, simply ritual associations.  Chinese merchants 
established them in order to meet the needs of fellow provincial merchants in a specific 
trade.  In some cases, this also involved setting prices for their merchandise, so that profit 
could be secured despite manipulation of the market by government-licensed brokers.109  
Not all huiguan established in the eighteenth century set prices for their commodities.  
They all, however, contended with officially-licensed brokers and shared the common 
purpose of gaining legitimacy in the eyes of the bureaucracy and the community at large.  
The pattern of merchants depending on officials for legitimacy remained true throughout 
the eighteenth century, but there were also signs of merchant initiative.  Beginning in the 
late eighteenth century, Chinese merchants referred to new huiguan as gongsuo (“gong” 
meaning “public,” and “suo” meaning “meeting place”), rather that huiguan (“hui” 
meaning “association,” and “guan” meaning “official”).  Although this name change 
suggests an emphasis on common trade rather than common geographic origin, Chinese 
used these terms interchangeably, and protection still largely depended on common 
native-place relationships as well as rapport with government officials.110  Despite the 
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increasing initiative taken by merchants, they did not become independent in the social, 
cultural, or political sense.111 
 Historian Kwang-Ching Liu also addresses the creation of two new Chinese 
huiguan, or guilds, emerging in the early nineteenth century, namely the craft and service 
guilds in China’s large cities.  Although craft guild members were usually persons of 
common geographic origin, persons of different origin were not explicitly barred from 
membership.  The huiguan demanded sizeable fees for those new to the trade, however, 
and for apprentices recruited locally.  An apprentice’s terms of service were usually from 
three to five years.112   
 The craft as well as the merchant huiguan grew exponentially in the last seventy 
years of the Qing Dynasty, after the Opium War of 1840.  Europeans in China’s treaty 
ports, Japanese scholars travelling to China, and Chinese historians themselves, including 
historians of the People’s Republic particularly interested in the foreshadowing of 
Chinese capitalism, collected numerous Chinese guild regulations, or hanggui, dated after 
1850.113  Ultimately, stability in processing industries depended on the coercive power of 
the government, which periodically suppressed the workmen’s trade-union like actions.  
During these infrequent outbreaks, workers sometimes claimed to belong to a society, or 
tang, to use the Chinese term suggesting “sworn brotherhood.”  Such a combination of 
workers was regarded by the imperial government as illegal and dutifully suppressed.114 
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 From the mid-nineteenth century on, huiguan in other trades also multiplied but 
were still substantially based on fellow-provincial connections.  An increasing number of 
huiguan, based on common trades, did include members from more than one place of 
origin.  To facilitate negotiations with government officials, huiguan adopted the practice 
of appointing a principle secretary of the guild, chosen among degree-holders who 
understood the language of both officials and merchants.  This was now a more common 
practice than in the eighteenth century.  Huiguan were supposed to elect managers or the 
groups of managers that served alternately.  However, fellow-provincial groups 
dominating the trade or sector of the trade with which the huiguan was affiliated most 
often chose these individuals.115  In terms of resources and power, trade huiguan thus 
overlapped considerably with fellow-provincial huiguan.   
 By the late seventeenth century, the rise of commercial huiguan and gongsuo 
reflected Chinese society’s trend toward privatization.  As voluntary associations, 
increasing numbers of huiguan were established on merchant, not official, initiative.  By 
the late eighteenth century on, there were also an increasing number of craft associations 
not in government service.  Both the merchant guilds emerging in the eighteenth century 
and the craft guilds appearing in the early nineteenth century devoted themselves to the 
purposes of protectionism and mutual aid and served to regulate the conditions of trade, 
at least to some extent.116   
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The huiguan’s socio-economic as well as political contexts were unique to China.  
The numerous huiguan and gongsuo, founded by merchants in order to protect the 
interests of merchants engaged in long-distance trade, essentially involved exchanges of 
grain, on the one hand, and handicraft products on the other.  They served primarily 
domestic markets at a time when foreign trade was as yet of uncertain importance, and 
represented the interests of the merchants themselves, not the producers of their 
merchandise.  Nor were the craft guilds that became important in the nineteenth century 
concerned with the initial manufacturing of the basic commodity of rural-urban exchange, 
cotton cloth.  They were associations principally engaged in providing urban services or 
in processing luxury products.117   
With the increase of the import-export trade in the mid-nineteenth century, 
huiguan multiplied, and their geographical reach within each province expanded.  Yet 
many economic historians agree that traditional patterns of the Chinese economy, 
including handicraft production, continued to persisted, along with traditional patterns of 
prestige and power.  From the eleventh through the nineteenth centuries, there was no 
development of merchant-controlled municipal government.  There was, however, a 
continued domination of the imperial bureaucracy and the examination system, even 
though there was also expansion of the tax-farming system.118    
This basic political framework survived the Opium War into an era that saw the 
accelerated development of the Chinese merchant and craft huiguan.  It was especially 
after 1860 that the exclusive and collective aspects of the huiguan became pronounced.  
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This was due in large part to merchant tax-farming procedures, beginning with the likin 
tax of the 1850s, and also due in part as a response to Western encroachment.  Foreigners 
in the treaty ports found huiguan acting effectively to ensure monopoly in a manner 
reminiscent of European guilds.  Time and again, Chinese merchants adopted uniform 
prices for such major commodities as silk, and took common action in boycotting 
European firms on issues of trade practice and out of concern for fellow-provincial burial 
grounds.  The concerns of Chinese huiguan were, however, essentially conservative.119  
Nevertheless, there is evidence that huiguan in some treaty ports began to fulfill 
some civic functions, including developing firefighting facilities and hospitals.  With the 
encouragement of the Qing government, huiguan sponsored chambers of commerce in 
the early years of the twentieth century.  Moreover, and for a brief period in at least some 
Chinese cities, huiguan also participated in municipal affairs.  To fulfill public functions 
was, however, not the same as to exercise control in them.120  Nevertheless, huiguan 
continued to fulfill the functions of protecting and providing for the general welfare of its 
members.  
By the first decade of the twentieth century, while both huiguan and chambers of 
commerce existed within China and while wealthy merchants were able, as individuals, 
to exert influence there still existed a bourgeois class of significance.121  Personal access 
to government officials and, ultimately, to the military remained the principal channel of 
power.  There remains little question that there was extensive domestic commerce in late 
                                                 
119
 Ibid. 
  
120
 Wellington K.K. Chan notes the pattern of merchant guilds acquiring some municipal functions 
and then losing them to local officialdom in Merchants, Mandarins, and Modern Enterprise in Late Ch’ing 
China (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press, 1977), 214-216, 241-243.  
 
121
 Rowe, Hankow:  Commerce and Society in a Chinese City, 1749-1889, 344-346.  
 47  
imperial China and that association of merchants based on common native place played 
an important part in this trade.  However, one should not deduce from the existence of 
huiguan any basic change in the structure of Chinese society.  One must instead view 
huiguan in China in the context of an agrarian society bureaucratically governed and 
legitimated by a long-established system of traditional Chinese social values. 
 
 
Figure 4.  China's Special Economic Zones, 1997122 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
FROM ZHONGGUO TO BAZAR CHINOIS, CHOLON, ‘BIG MARKET’: HUIGUAN 
DEVELOPMENT IN INDOCHINA 
The relationship between Chinese communities in Indochina and the French is 
primarily characterized by legislative procedures enacted by French authorities with the 
intent to solidify authoritative control over resident Chinese.  The legislative interference 
of the French vis-à-vis the membership, scale, and responsibilities of Chinese 
associations and organizations influenced the scope and function of these institutions to a 
considerable degree.  Thus, the huiguan of Indochina differ from huiguan in China and 
America in one significant respect:  French law mandated their existence, their 
organizational and leadership structures, and their official roles within colonial society. 
Huiguan are crucial to understanding Chinese politics and society in French-
controlled Indochina.  This institution attained its final official form throughout 
Indochina on October, 5, 1871, when French authorities passed a law requiring every 
Chinese individual to belong to a huiguan, or what the French would term 
“congregations,” and it continued to be the focus of interactions between the French and 
the Chinese for the next seventy-five years – until 1954 when French colonial rule in 
Indochina came to an end.123  During this period, Chinese made many uses of huiguan, 
and their appropriations and reinterpretations of them are the primary subject of this 
chapter.  Before considering how Chinese used the huiguan system to their own 
advantage, it is important to understand why the French initially adopted the 
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congregation system and how they relied upon huiguan to extend their colonial rule 
throughout Indochina. 
 The French began promulgating laws concerning the Chinese in Cochinchina 
within months of their assumption of power in the provinces surrounding Saigon and 
Cholon.  On April 14, 1863, the Annamite Emperor Tu Duc attempted to preserve the 
sovereignty of Annam by placating the French, ceding to France the provinces of Bien-
hoa, Gia-dinh, and Mytho, as well as the Paulo Condore islands.  The French-educated, 
Vietnamese legal scholar Nguyen Quoc Dinh asserts that four months after they became 
custodians of the three provinces, on August 11, 1863, the French administration passed 
the first colonial law ever to concern Chinese huiguan in the newly acquired territory, 
and three more laws joined this law on the books over the next two years.124  According 
to Nguyen Quoc Dinh’s contemporaries, who were legal scholars in France, the rationale 
behind French restrictions placed on Chinese was primarily socioeconomic.  Nguyen 
Quoc Dinh wrote extensively on the questions of Chinese suffrage within the 
congregations, discussed later in this chapter.  His work Les Congregations Chinoises en 
Indochine Francaise, originally published in 1941, and based on research compiled in the 
late 1920’s, serves as a primary source for this study. 
Although the French took possession of three provinces of Cochinchina, another 
three provinces along the southern coast and the Cambodian border remained nominally 
in Annamite hands.  However, because of the cession of territory to the French, these 
territories, comprised of the provinces of Vinh-long, Chau-Doc, and Ha-tien, remained 
completely cut off from the Annamite kingdom.  Within three years of acquiring their 
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first territorial foothold in Cochinchina, the French extended their control across the 
entire territory when they used the excuse of social disorder to occupy the remaining 
three provinces of Cochinchina.  In the case of Vinh-long, Bien-hoa, and Chau-Doc, the 
French did not wait to acquire legal possession of the region to begin legislating the 
affairs of the provinces.  The French military asserted control over the provinces in 1867 
and retained their de facto influence until France officially gained power over the three 
provinces in 1874.125 
 In the years prior to 1871, the French debated their colonial position with regard 
to Chinese huiguan membership and had even enacted some preliminary regulations, but 
had yet to formalize their ultimate approach to managing the Chinese community.  As 
early as 1862 and 1863, early Cochinchinese laws of French design summarily abolished 
the former imperial practice of requiring huiguan membership. 126   Whether 
unintentionally or deliberately, France actually removed the social and organizational 
restrictions mandated by the Nguyen Dynasty (1802-1945), essentially allowing the 
Chinese unfettered access to the mercantile spoils of the new colonial order.  But French 
magnanimity quickly succumbed to Sino-French competition on local economic and 
administrative fronts.  Thus, the French began first to examine their options for control 
and then to apply this control to the Chinese residing in their territories.   
 In 1871, three years before the French consolidated their control over the colony, 
French extended laws regarding huiguan to include Chinese living in all six provinces of 
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French-controlled Cochinchina.127  The passing of this law on October 5, 1871 represents 
the formal birth of the French congregation system, extending the system’s reach across 
French-controlled Cochinchina, and formally launching the two most fundamental 
components of the colonial congregation system.  First, it officially recognized seven 
Chinese huiguan based upon regional identity, or congregations as the French translated 
the term:  Canton, Fukien, Hakka, Hainan, Trieu-chau, Phuoc-chau, and Quinh-chau.128  
Second, it required all Chinese nationals residing in Cochinchina by law to belong to one 
of the seven huiguan if they desired to remain in the country.  Chinese citizens employed 
by European firms were the only exception to this law.129  Although a number of other 
laws in later years developed and refined the French system of monitoring and 
controlling Chinese communities in Indochina,130 the 1871 law created the very first 
example of how Sino-French relations would play out within Indochina during the 
colonial period.  As the fundamental organizational component of Indochina’s Chinese 
community, the congregational system was unique to Indochina, though as discussed in 
the previous and following chapters, huiguan emerged wherever large native-place 
communities settled outside of China.131   
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 The establishment of the 1871 law represents a watershed moment for French 
laws governing the Chinese.  Some French sources attribute this revision of policy as a 
French attempt to encourage Chinese immigration in order to meet the urgent demand for 
manual labor in Cochinchina.132  This notion seems somehow insufficient.  The basic 
economic situation of Cochinchina and the financial networks exploited by many of the 
Chinese living there meant, essentially, that hiring indigenous laborers proved far more 
economical than hiring Chinese laborers for any given task.  Although early French 
investors and colonials could prefer to rely on more expensive but better connected 
Chinese labor to establish their colonial infrastructure, it seems unlikely that it would take 
the French nearly ten years to see the economic realities of Cochinchinese labor. 
 It is, perhaps, more likely that the fledgling colonial administration sought to 
depart from the long-established Nguyen imperial policy to forge its own relationship 
with the powerful and well-connected Chinese merchants and businessmen.  Chinese 
businesses and networks were, to varying degrees, a critical component of the economic 
stability of the Mekong Delta.  In any case, according to Nguyen’s account, when the 
number of Chinese immigrants increased considerably and began to include individuals 
labeled as “dangerous” and “troublemakers,” French reworked the original Annamite law 
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and reinstated it to require huiguan or congregational affiliation.133  Mandatory affiliation 
also tacitly removed the huiguan of Phuoc-chau and Quinh-chau from the list of 
acceptable affiliations by mandating that all immigrants had to belong to one of the five 
remaining huiguan in order to continue to reside in Cochinchina.134  In fact, the French 
actually extended the Nguyen huiguan model, originally intended for the Chinese, to 
eventually include Indians, non-indigenous Muslims, and Japanese on the list of groups 
requiring congregational representation.135 
 The law on January 23, 1885 cemented the system of mandatory congregational 
affiliation into place in Cochinchina., and it became the blueprint for all future Chinese 
legislation in the colony.  As a result of this law and the 1887 establishment of the 
Government General of Indochina, the period between 1885 and 1887 effectively marks 
the true beginning of the tactical maneuverings between Indochina’s Chinese community 
and the French.  Sino-French interaction before this time illustrates an important 
significance, especially in the colony of Cochinchina, which acted as the proving ground 
for French colonial policy vis-à-vis the Chinese communities.  However, early 
interactions represented a testing phase, whereby long-established Chinese communities 
interacted with newly-established French colonial administrators in an attempt to define 
the boundaries of their working relationship.136   
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 Providing a general overview of French history in the region is important because 
it reflects patterns of expansion as French asserted control over the five regions of 
Indochina.  Furthermore, the establishment of the French administrative hierarchy 
provides a clear picture of the authoritative ladder to which Indochina’s Chinese were 
subordinate.  In addition, a brief outline of the geographically-based hierarchy established 
by French colonials raises interesting questions not only about French patterns of control, 
but also the Chinese response to those patterns. 
 France’s relationship with Indochina developed as much by serendipity as 
colonial design.  In France, popular sentiments toward colonial expansion were generally 
indifferent at best, and often downright antipathetical.  The occupation and annexation of 
large tracts of Tonkin and Cochinchina were more representative of reaction than of 
action.  This was primarily due to the result of fierce colonial competition with the British 
across the globe, particularly in Asia, and the ever-present evangelical influence of the 
Roman Catholic Church.  In fact, the Church itself eventually ensured France’s colonial 
foothold in Indochina.  Colonialism was motivated by trade but justified by the need to 
protect Catholic missionaries.137   
 The British occupation of Hong Kong and the persecution of French missionaries 
in China caused a waxing of French interest in Asia, a circumstance that coincided 
directly with new aggressively anti-Catholic policies undertaken by the Nguyen regime.  
Whether their concern was legitimate or pretextual, the French used the protection of 
missionaries as the justification for attacking Indochina.  In the summer of 1858, a French 
fleet led by Admiral Rigault de Genouilly occupied Tourane, present-day Da Nang, but 
disease plagued his troops and he moved south to Saigon early the following year.  More 
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pressing events in Europe, Africa, and China diverted the attention of Napoleon III for a 
few years, but in 1862, the Nguyen regime ceded Saigon and three of Cochinchina’s 
provinces to the French.  In 1867, acting on his own recognizance, the French 
commander at Saigon occupied the other three provinces, bringing all of Cochinchina 
under French control.  During this time, the French expansion into Tonkin also began in 
earnest, first with the ill-fated occupation of Hanoi by Francis Garnier in 1872.  In 1883, 
Henri de Riviere led a more serious attempt to capture Hanoi, and although he met with 
more military success, Chinese Black Flag soldiers killed him and Garnier before him.138  
Disgraced yet again in the quest for control in Tonkin, the French then turned their full 
military attention to the area.  The final result of the full-fledged French invasion was the 
establishment of the protectorates, lasting into the early years of the twentieth century.139  
The following map provides a more comprehensive overview of the patterns and timeline 
of French control over Indochina, as well as their periodic assertions of control over 
Chinese communities in Indochina.   
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Figure 5.  French-Controlled Indochina and Chinese Communities140 
 
To achieve a clearer understanding of the intricate interplay between French 
colonialists and Chinese huiguan, geography and the colonial administrative hierarchy 
are just as important as chronology.  Whether intentional or inadvertent, the Government 
General constructed a vast pyramid of geographic and administrative authority in order to 
administer to colonial matters.  In order to convey a clearer idea of the territories with 
regard to Chinese-French interactions, one must also address the issues of demography, 
geography, and colonial personnel. 
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 As evidenced by the preceding map, the French exercised control over the various 
regions of Indochina gradually over a rather extended period of time.  Administratively 
speaking, the French colonial apparatus was complex and hierarchical, but also 
occasionally internally oppositional regarding interactions with local Chinese 
communities.  Directives from Paris carried the most weight in the colonies, although 
typically, the Governor General easily persuaded the French government into specific 
courses of action.  When governor Le Myre de Vilers assumed colonial control of 
Cochinchina at the start of the Third Republic, he instituted the Colonial Council to act as 
a check upon the possible future irresponsibility of the Governor General.141  While the 
success of his attempt at creating checks and balances remains open to debate, the 
Colonial Council became a significant player in directing the governance of French 
territories in Indochina.142   
 The Governor General was master of the territories, while the Lieutenant 
Governor of Cochinchina and the Residents Superior of Tonkin, Annam, Cambodia and 
Laos were direct subordinates.  In practice, and perhaps in theory as well, the Lieutenant 
Governor of Cochinchina wielded greater power and influence than the Residents 
Superior because Cochinchina, unlike the other four regions, was a direct colony rather 
than a protectorate.  Moreover, Cochinchina was integral to the financial health of the 
colony in a way that other regions were not, not only because of its production capacities, 
but also because of its role as a major Southeast Asian regional entrepôt.143  
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 Provincial Administrators were beneath the Governors and Residents on the 
colonial hierarchy, and they were the direct representatives of the French government in 
the provinces.  In some areas, as was the case with northern Tonkin after the 
establishment of the Government General prior to “pacification” of the area, Military 
Commanders ruled individual provinces, wielding both civil and military authority in 
their jurisdictions.144  The task of governing large cities fell to each city’s mayor and to 
the Municipal Councils.  Only the largest cities had mayors, among them Saigon, Cholon, 
Hanoi and Haiphong.  While the mayors were always French, the Municipal Councils 
enjoyed a more diverse membership, including Frenchmen, indigenous peoples, and, 
when urban demographics warranted it, overseas Chinese.   
On the city level, powerful tensions between the colonial administration and local 
representatives were most apparent.  Particularly in the case of Cholon, city mayors 
tended to view the Chinese far more sympathetically than did their counterparts in the 
Government General. 145   This phenomenon was due, no doubt, to the fact that the 
Chinese community played such a socially significant role in ensuring the welfare of the 
urban community.  As described in this chapter, huiguan continued to perform their usual 
charitable and mutual aid activities in Indochina, including building hospitals, tending to 
the poor, building schools and contributing to a number of French projects.  Accordingly, 
prominent Chinese individuals developed close working relationships with French 
municipal administrators.  
 Prior to the establishment of the Government General in 1887, French governed 
interests in Indochina from Saigon, where the French Governor of Cochinchina also 
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resided.146  However, after 1887, when Tonkin and Annam became part of the colonial 
fold, the French moved their headquarters to Hanoi, built a new governor’s palace there, 
and reduced stewardship over Cochinchina to a Lieutenant Governor’s position.147  While 
this transfer of authority to the north ostensibly meant that Hanoi took precedence over 
Saigon, the distance of over one thousand kilometers between the two cities meant that 
the Lieutenant Governor, despite resting under the authority of Hanoi’s Governor, still 
controlled an area of tremendous value in terms of trade and agriculture.  More to the 
point, Saigon lay just downriver from a city that early French explorers referred to as the 
Bazar Chinois.  This city, known in Vietnamese as Cholon or, literally, “Big Market” and 
known in Cantonese as Tai-Ngon, meaning “embankment,” laid claim to a vibrant and 
energetic trade, as well as the largest established population of Chinese in the five 
territories of Indochina.148  The following map is a 1795 representation of Saigon and the 
Bazar Chinois, giving some idea as to the proximity and locations along local waterways. 
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Figure 6.  Map of Saigon and the Bazar Chinois, 1795 149 
 
Eventually, as urban sprawl caused Saigon and Cholon to meet, they became 
collectively incorporated as Saigon-Cholon, although each had its own mayor and 
municipal councils until well into the twentieth century.150  Just as the establishment of 
the Governor General favored Hanoi over Saigon, from a French perspective, the colonial 
administration of Cochinchina gave preference to Saigon over Cholon.  However, from 
the perspective of Chinese demographics, exactly the opposite was true.  The French 
selection of Saigon as their center of power in the area may also be attributable to French 
desire to avoid the Chinese domain.   
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Such reluctance likely had its origins in two discriminatory phenomena.  The first 
is the overt racism expressed by the French for areas settled or controlled by Chinese 
communities.  This prejudice had its roots in French stereotypes depicting the Chinese as 
plague-ridden and unclean.  French racial typing also informed the second phenomenon 
characterizing French avoidance of Chinese-dominated areas.  The perception of Chinese 
as greedy and possessed of pecuniary cunning perhaps also led the French to stake claim 
to territory outside the traditional bailiwick of the Cholon Chinese.  In either case, it is 
certain that the French viewed Indochina’s Chinese as a force to be reckoned with.151  
 
 
Figure 7.  Chinese in Cochinchina, ca. 1909152 
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In 1901, French censuses153 estimated the Chinese population of Cochinchina at 91,727 
people.  In comparison, Liang Qichao, an important Chinese intellectual who visited 
America at about the same time period, reported there were approximately 120,000 
Chinese in America in 1900, a figure larger than the United State census figure of 
89,693.154  While records indicate the Chinese population in America was larger that in 
Cochinchina at this time, French statistics did not account for another 40,632 people who 
were of mixed Chinese and Vietnamese heritage.  In February 1902, the city of Hanoi 
boasted 1,900 Chinese residents in a total population of 127,114.  By 1926, the Chinese 
population exploded in all regions of the colonies.  In Cochinchina, the numbers of 
Chinese increased by 150%, resulting in a Chinese population of around 250,000.  With 
95,000 Chinese in Cambodia and 48,000 in Tonkin, the Chinese were a significant 
presence in the colonies.  The total Chinese population of the five French controlled 
regions numbered 405,000 and Chinese continued to enter the colony in great numbers.  
33,800 Chinese immigrated to Cochinchina in 1926 alone.155 
 For the French, the resident Chinese were a bit of a two-edged sword.  On the one 
hand, they established pre-existing trade networks and relationships throughout Indochina 
and possessed a long-standing tradition of competition with the indigenous population for 
economic supremacy.  The existence of a substantial Chinese population concerned 
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primarily with its own economic interests gave the French immediate, if limited, access 
to trading routes and markets that they would find greatly difficult accessing so quickly 
on their own.  When it came to rice production, fisheries, and other staple industries, 
major Chinese firms dispatched agents into the countryside at harvest time to buy the 
entire rice crop of rural villages.  After returning to Cholon or other cities with their 
purchase, the firms proceeded to sell the rice in Indochina or on the world market, 
achieving a form of vertical integration by means of monopolizing responsibility for 
every task but the actual farming.156  On the other hand, the Chinese population enjoyed 
numbers large enough to make it a significant threat to French economic and political 
authority, a dilemma that became increasingly apparent as the twentieth century 
progressed. 
 Only three out of the five territories in Indochina possessed a Chinese population 
of significant magnitude to make it of serious concern to the French:  Cochinchina, 
Cambodia, and Tonkin.  The Chinese of Cambodia, while self-governing and ruled 
independently by the French under the standard congregation system, were largely 
subordinates to the Chinese of Cochinchina when matters of international or community-
wide politics came to the fore.  In fact, in many respects, the overseas Chinese of 
Cochinchina and Cambodia were easier to govern; access to those territories was 
primarily by sea and could be more strictly controlled.  Many of Indochina’s wealthiest 
and most respected businessmen made their profits from dealings in Cochinchina and 
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Cambodia and, therefore, had a vested interest in law and order as it pertained to the local 
Cochinchinese communities of overseas Chinese.157 
Tonkin’s situation was much more complicated.  The immense border with China 
stretches more than six hundred miles along the southern Chinese province of Guangxi 
alone, a circumstance that made controlling Chinese migration into the protectorate 
nearly impossible.  The dense alpine terrain made a perfect safe haven for smugglers, 
criminals fleeing Chinese officials, criminals fleeing French retribution, or the less 
nefarious vagrant wanderers populating the region.  Large bands of anti-Qing 
revolutionaries found refuge in Tonkin’s mountains in the early-twentieth century, a 
circumstance that frequently aggravated relations between France and China.158  Wealthy 
Chinese merchants in Hanoi and Haiphong refused to take responsibility for the actions 
of Chinese elsewhere in the region and the French had no choice but to accept their 
reluctance.  After all, it took French authorities well over a decade to achieve control over 
far north Tonkin’s villages and highways.159  As the following map demonstrates, the 
long and winding Sino-Tonkin border rests entirely in the mountains and is sparsely 
populated, settled only in the form of small towns and villages from Laos all the way to 
the South China Sea. 
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Figure 8.  China-Vietnam Border160 
 
Arguably, the porous character of the border region remains to this day.  In the 
high country of far northern Vietnam, along the Chinese border, Hmong and Dzao 
women sold traditional fabrics adorned with Chinese coins and baubles.  Later in the 
twentieth century, one watching the bridge between Lao Cai in Vietnam and Hekou in 
China revealed a ceaseless stream of pedestrian and bicycle traffic, where individuals 
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laden with refrigerators, air-conditioners, or washing machines headed into Vietnam to 
villages unknown.161   
As French colonialism developed its course, each component of the Indochinese 
colony established its own specific regulations intended to govern the Chinese in 
individual territories.  Laws controlling all aspects of the membership and institutional 
lives of the huiguan emerged gradually as each region succumbed to French colonial 
ambition.  After the French gained complete colonial control, initial, regionally-specific 
regulations were adopted in Cochinchina on October 16, 1906, in Tonkin on December 
12, 1913, in Laos on January 7, 1919, in Cambodia on November 15, 1919, and in 
Annam on September 25, 1928.162  Not until 1935 did the French use the excuse of the 
establishment of the Union of Indochina to promulgate one law intended to govern all 
Chinese in French-controlled Indochina, irrespective of the individual extant legal 
differences.163   
Ultimately, the texts of each region’s laws underwent little revision when the law 
of 1935 superseded them, but the basic requirements of huiguan membership, intended as 
an extra measure of control over what the French considered to be an otherwise 
suspicious population, found expression in language redolent with contractual 
implications: 
In order to gain admission into Indochina, the Chinese immigrants must be 
accepted into a congregation which agrees to be responsible for their 
personal tax, and for any fines which may be due for any reason, and 
which further agrees to foot the expenses of repatriation to China in case 
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they are expelled, or in the case that the congregation no longer wishes to 
be responsible for them.  By admitting them to membership the 
congregation agrees to accept these responsibilities.164 
 
The 1935 law gave the huiguan, as represented, ultimately, by its elected president, the 
unenviable task of vouching for the moral integrity of its members, a statement of trust on 
the part of the huiguan made much more dramatic because of the stiff penalties applied if 
its trust proved ill-advised.  The risk to the huiguan did not end with the behavior of its 
members.  This law obligated huiguan to accept, essentially without recourse, the 
decisions made by French colonial authorities with regard to any malfeasance or 
dishonesty on the part of Chinese in Indochina.  It is a law written in strong language, 
expressing expectations and consequences with great clarity, and it served as the 
keystone for Sino-French interactions in Indochina until the departure of the French in 
1954.165 
 Practically and logistically speaking, the French strategy of controlling the 
Chinese affected them in several significant ways.  Not only did it have the obvious 
consequence of limiting Chinese immigration to those individuals able to find 
sponsorship through a huiguan, it also meant that if a Chinese immigrant came in conflict 
with his huiguan or choose to disassociate from it, he was required by law to either leave 
Indochina or accept membership in another huiguan which, with very few exceptions, 
meant transferring his place of residence to an entirely different city or region.  
Furthermore, mandatory affiliation found reinforcement with the policy of requiring all 
Chinese residents of Indochina to carry identification cards, known as cartes de sejour or 
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residence permits, on their person at all times.  French authorities could demand that an 
immigrant produce his residence card at any time and without specific cause, and failure 
to comply with this regulation could result in an individual’s imprisonment until the 
congregational leader or the Bureau of Immigration vouched for him.  If no one vouched 
for him, the penalty was deportation.166   
 Exceptions to the strict, geographically-defined huiguan system existed in Tonkin.  
Chinese coolie labor made for mobile populations of insufficient numbers to warrant 
multiple huiguan based on native place, but comprised numbers too great, in the minds of 
the French administration, to be left without supervision.  This special statutory included 
Chinese employed by Tonkin’s public works, agricultural, and mining enterprises, 
designed primarily to account for the many Chinese employed in the Tonkinese mining 
enterprises of Hongay and Cong-trieu.  For Tonkin-based Chinese laborers, single 
corporate huiguan not differentiated by native-place fulfilled all the roles and 
responsibilities required of typical, sub-ethnically defined huiguan throughout the rest of 
Indochina.167 
 French designed everything about the colonial apparatus, from the administrative 
structures to the geographic divisions of the provinces, to enhance and enable greater 
French control over the five territories of Indochina.  In particular, by using Nguyen 
codes as a legislative base, French law forced long-established Chinese communities into 
a colonial cast from which deviation would be punishable by financial penalty or even 
expulsion from French territory.  From the perspective of Chinese, the French-imposed 
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congregational system was essentially of foreign design.  Conceived of by Vietnam’s 
Nguyen dynasty and transformed by the interests and mores of the French, the burden of 
this alien system of organization and control informed the social, economic, and political 
operations of Chinese communities in ways both minor and significant.168   
 The interplay between Chinese and French ideas about voting eligibility also 
highlights several significant points of contention between the French administration and 
the Chinese community over the necessity for or limitations of democratization within 
huiguan.  The electoral process further highlights the conflict over sovereignty within the 
Chinese community and the willingness of the French administration to intervene in the 
electoral process when they disapproved of the direction taken by huiguan.  For local and 
regional administrative purposes, French-colonial law mandated and carefully delineated 
the elections of huiguan presidents and vice-presidents.  During the colonial period, 
voting eligibility differed from province to province according to the size and prosperity 
of Chinese communities in any given region.  In small towns and outlying provinces 
outside of Cochinchina, universal male suffrage enabled all Chinese men over the age of 
eighteen to participate in the presidential and vice-presidential elections of their affiliated 
huiguan.  Different electoral standards determined voting eligibility in certain special 
zones, including Cochinchina, Cambodia’s entire Phnom Penh district, and the cities of 
Hanoi, Haiphong, and Nam Dinh in Tonkin.  In these areas, only prosperous Chinese or 
property owners enjoyed the right to vote.169  Despite broader similarities consisting 
primarily of financial requirements, Indochinese electoral policies differed considerably 
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from region to region.  Chinese themselves had input into the development of colonial 
policy in this regard.170   
 Overseas Chinese residing in Cochinchina enjoyed universal male suffrage in the 
early days of French colonization.  Of the four earliest laws addressing the issue of 
huiguan elections, the first three outline no minimum requirements for voting eligibility, 
and the fourth law, promulgated on January 23, 1885, actually confirms universal 
suffrage for Cochinchina when it states, in Article Sixteen, that each congregational 
president is to be elected by all of the Chinese “living in the neighborhood and belonging 
to the congregation.”171   Not until twenty-seven years after the establishment of the 
colony did the first laws appear limiting voting eligibility for the Chinese.  In this law, 
Article Twenty-Five decrees, “all those who are for any reason exempt from the poll tax 
shall not be voters.”172  This law prevented a small percentage of Chinese from voting, 
namely disabled or elderly people and immigrant workers, primarily agricultural laborers, 
residing in Cochinchina for less than one year.  It was the first step down a slippery slope 
leading to the effective abolition of universal suffrage for Chinese residing in Indochina.  
However, the impetus behind this change was not, as one might expect, the French 
administration.  It was huiguan leaders that requested stricter limits on eligibility to vote 
in these elections.173 
 Indochina’s collective Chinese community actively protested colonial laws they 
believed infringed upon their rights or dignity from the very beginning of French 
                                                 
170
 Ibid.  
 
171
 Ibid., 97.  
 
172
 Ibid., 53. 
  
173
 Ibid., 53-4. 
 71  
occupation.  Not only were these protests handed directly to French officials in the form 
of formal petitions and complaints, but they were also often forwarded to Chinese 
officials in the huiguan’s native place or even to the Chinese ambassador in Paris.  In 
1866, the Imperial Ambassador in Paris began to present formal petitions to the French 
Department of Foreign Affairs on behalf of the Chinese residing in Indochina.  These 
early petitions generally dealt with one of two subjects:  the poll tax, which increased 
significantly under French rule; and the system of immigration, which required Chinese 
to carry identification cards listing, among other things, their personal measurements, a 
policy from which residents of other nationalities were exempt, and one which the 
Chinese found particularly degrading.  When Paris failed to respond to the 1866 requests, 
the Chinese ambassador tried again, submitting further petitions in 1892, 1893, and 
finally, in 1903.174  
As nationals comprised a large percentage of Chinese communities in 
Cochinchina, the French Immigration Service bore responsibility for enacting and 
enforcing legislation pertaining to huiguan.  When the question of electing huiguan 
officers arose, the Immigration Service referred back to the large number of Chinese 
complaints they received spanning years concerning the electoral process.  The bulk of 
these complaints originated from prosperous and prominent Chinese merchants and 
businessmen who resented the breadth of Chinese suffrage because “it allowed many 
Chinese to vote who did not merit the privilege.” 175  Thus, monied elements within 
Chinese communities were one of the primary motivating factors behind French suffrage 
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restrictions placed upon the Chinese.  Vestiges of the importance of these wealthy 
Chinese can be seen in Vietnam’s Chinese temples today, where pictures of huiguan 
leaders still adorn the temple walls.176  
The complexity of regulating Tonkin’s Chinese community was due in large part 
to the financial realities of the region.  Unlike other regions in Indochina, Tonkin was 
home to a large population of Chinese laborers and coolies.  Despite the distance at which 
Tonkin lagged behind Cochinchina and Cambodia with respect to the size of its Chinese 
population, Tonkin’s mines attracted a significant population of Chinese coolies 
unmatched by either Cochinchina or Cambodia.177   In the two southern regions, the 
Chinese population was associated predominately with trade and pan-Southeast Asian 
mercantilism.  Although one could find Chinese coolie labor in the primarily Chinese-
owned pepper plantations of Cochinchina’s southernmost provinces, such as Ha Tien, 
indigenous laborers generally proved to be more cost effective in those areas.  Plantation 
owners accordingly hired Cochinchinese or Annamite workers to fill positions more 
typically occupied by Chinese coolies in Tonkin.178  These workers found employment in 
some agricultural ventures, but, as a general rule, worked in the many mines and mineral 
concessions scattered across Tonkin’s mountainous north.  This area not only possessed 
the mineral richness necessary to create a demand for manual labor, but enjoyed the 
added condition of being geographically close to China.  Thus, Tonkin provided a 
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welcome source of employment for manual laborers from China’s southern provinces and, 
in particular, the devastatingly poor provinces of Guangxi and Yunnan.179 
 
 
Figure 9.  Chinese from Guangxi (Quang-Si) in Tonkin180 
 
Despite labor patterns virtually assuring the presence of Chinese workers from 
most, if not all, of China’s southern provinces, laws governing huiguan in Tonkin made 
specific provisions only for huiguan composed of members from Cantonese and 
Fujianese communities.  This provision resulted from a law determining only 
homogenous groups with populations exceeding one-hundred eligible men could form 
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independent huiguan based on respective ethnic sub-regions.  Inevitably, this law, 
combined with existing laws on suffrage and property ownership, applied to privileged 
Chinese communities of established merchants and skilled workers based in Tonkin’s 
large urban centers.  This effectively excluded migratory laborers in the north.181  
Despite the careful detail with which they attempted to regulate Chinese 
communities in Tonkin, early colonial statutes failed to provide for the large numbers of 
Chinese coolies working in the region.  Accordingly, the law of 1910 itemized specific 
provisions for the large community of Chinese miners, declaring that any Tonkinese 
mining, agricultural, or engineering company employing fifty or more Chinese laborers 
would organize a single huiguan specific to the individual company.  Thus, all Chinese 
workers, irrespective of native-place, would belong.  No financial requirement limited 
voting eligibility for members of Tonkin’s corporate huiguan.182   
From the Chinese perspective, a dominant economically-based social hierarchy 
found reinforcement in a system where only community members of economic means 
could participate in the leadership process.  As wealthier Chinese members bore the brunt 
of expense for huiguan’s programs and institutions, they staked a logical claim to a 
greater share of the organization’s decision-making processes.  Moreover, wealth as a 
prerequisite for leadership enjoyed nearly unrivaled prominence as a determinant for 
status in Chinese communities in Singapore, Malaya, Dutch Indonesia, as well as the 
Americas.183  
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From the French perspective, Chinese resistance to the ideal of universal suffrage 
perhaps bore some weight, but not as much as the notion of appointing Chinese who 
could be held financially responsible for the misdeeds of huiguan members.  The 
importance of selecting solid, respectable individuals to lead Tonkin’s Chinese 
community was a paramount concern to the French provincial administrators for several 
practical reasons.184  Wealthy leaders possessed the resources to reimburse the French 
government for any expenses incurred as a result of Chinese misconduct, but more 
importantly, French viewed Chinese leaders with long histories in the region as more 
likely to support the goals of the regime than to risk the loss of their livelihoods.  
Additionally, general experience indicated that those with a vested interest in the system 
governed more responsibly than those with nothing to lose.  However, in the case of the 
corporate huiguan of Tonkin, these rules did not apply.185 
The membership comprising corporate huiguan largely slipped between the 
cracks of the traditional urban-centered Chinese social structure.  These Chinese laborers 
were nearly always poor and quite frequently illiterate.  Therefore, it is unlikely that any 
of them qualified to vote under the suffrage laws existing in the late-nineteenth and early-
twentieth centuries.  Additionally, companies tended to hire people from an assortment of 
native places in China so the formulation of a corporate sub-ethnic place identity proved 
problematic.186   
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A typical huiguan was reluctant to vouch for people about whom it knew nothing, 
fearful they would have to bear the financial brunt of any malfeasance committed by the 
person or disappearance of the individual from his workplace.187  Furthermore, in the 
case of engineering companies, such as those constructing the railway lines across 
northern Tonkin into China, the workplace was highly mobile and could shift from 
province to province in very short periods of time.188  This doubtless exacerbated the 
reluctance of a standard huiguan to accept responsibility for these coolies.  On the other 
hand, French administrators were quite displeased by the lack of traditional structures of 
social regulation within these labor communities.  To solve these problems without 
forcing other more orthodox Chinese huiguan to accept new members at random, the 
French elected to create a special system that provided these corporate communities with 
a strict structure of social governance without interfering with the basic scheme they 
established and extrapolated to apply to all other regions in Indochina.189   
Apart from the issues of suffrage, strict rules governed both an individual’s 
eligibility for leadership candidacy in the huiguan, as well as the actual mechanics of the 
voting process.  As with suffrage, laws governing eligibility for candidacy instituted 
much stricter criteria in Cochinchina, Cambodia, and Tonkin than they did in Annam and 
Laos.190  This standard justification for inequity appears to be that the small number of 
Chinese in Laos and Annam prevented them from enacting stringent financial 
requirements.  After all, the absence of any eligible candidates would surely throw a kink 
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in the electoral process.  Despite these differences, a number of the minimum 
requirements for eligibility remained the same in all five regions.191   
As established by the French administration, the eligibility requirements for 
candidacy for the office of huiguan president read much like the requirements for any 
contemporary political office.  To begin with, a prospective president was at least thirty 
years of age.  Although there were no requirements dictating a minimum duration for a 
candidate’s membership in the huiguan for which he sought the presidency, the French 
administration did require the candidate to reside in the territory of the huiguan for at 
least two years.  Additionally, eligibility depended on satisfaction of a morality clause:  
any criminal convictions, or any civil convictions in which a judge administered the 
penalty, permanently excluded individuals from seeking huiguan office.192  According to 
Nguyen, commercial law excluded a Chinese resident from candidacy for one further 
offense: 
Since the individuals who have been declared bankrupt by the courts are 
not eligible to hold offices, it would seem, though there are no specific 
statements to that effect in the law, that, by extension of this general rule, 
Chinese shopkeepers who have been declared bankrupt are not eligible for 
the office of the president of the congregation.193 
 
Although these rules appear to reflect a colonial legislative bias, one may hear the echoes 
of common Chinese patterns of leadership selection in the French-mandated system.   
Ch’ing-hwang Yen suggests that the Chinese model highlights three basic 
characteristics determining an individual’s eligibility to lead a clan:  “seniority in 
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generation and age, social standing, and integrity.”194  Wealth, or lack thereof, was an 
ever-present issue in Chinese huiguan throughout Indochina and, as discussed in the 
following chapter, America, permanently solidifying its place as the premier qualification 
for leadership.  Colonial biases merely required a financial scapegoat in case of expensive 
wrongdoing on the part of huiguan members.  Chinese motivations were a bit more 
complex.  Unlike in China, where scholar-officials stood at the peak of the social 
hierarchy until the twentieth century, wealthy merchants and entrepreneurs formed the 
core of the social aristocracy.  Typically, truly talented intellectuals stayed in China 
because these skills were highly valued.195  In the Nanyang network of businessmen and 
high finance, money and extravagance became the best measure of a man’s success.  In 
his study of Singapore and Malaya, Ch’ing-hwang Yen observes, “wealth was the main 
determinant of social mobility; those who possessed it moved up to the apex of the class 
hierarchy, and those who lost it descended even down to the bottom.”196 
 Extensive scholarship addresses native place organizations and their hierarchies 
of leadership in mainland China.  Some also examine these institutions in Southeast Asia, 
most notably in Singapore, Malaya, and Indonesia, and a third useful avenue for 
contextualizing issues of leadership in Chinese communities are found in the many 
studies of local elites in mainland China during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  
Scholarship most conceptually relevant to huiguan in Indochina involves an examination 
                                                 
194
 Ching-hwang Yen, Community and Politics:  The Chinese in Colonial Singapore and Malaya, 
(Singapore:  Times Academic Press, 1995), 41.  
 
195
 Ibid., 204.  Yen argues that only second-rate intellectuals traveled to Southeast Asia, resulting 
in a dearth of people able or willing to ensure the proper maintenance of Chinese social and cultural 
patterns in colonial territories.  Merchants, according to Yen, were too busy to see this issue and the 
intellectuals remained too unskilled and handicapped by their low prestige. 
 
196
 Ibid., 5.  
  
 79  
of leadership, whether based in China or in Southeast Asia.  This historiography best 
approaches the concept of leadership from one of two perspectives:  either by studying 
the activities and careers of local gentry and elites, or by pursuing a more institutional 
approach.  In their edited volume, 197 historians Joseph Esherick and Mary Rankin choose 
the first approach, seeking to define the nature and power of local gentry in China by 
studying numerous local individual elite families and their response to both the Chinese 
imperial state and to peasant society.  Esherick and Rankin readily accede to the 
inevitability of hierarchy in state-society relations.  However, they ascribe the prevailing 
scholarly assumptions about Chinese elite and the attributes characterizing them to 
European prejudice, namely Max Weber’s assumption that merit superseded wealth as a 
prerequisite for elite rule in China.198  In fact, Esherick and Rankin point out that tension 
and competition between local elites on the one hand and the state, as represented by 
imperial officials, on the other signifies “a ‘dynamic oscillation’ between integration into 
the imperial system and autonomy from it.”199  
 Scholarship supports such a wide variety of interpretations about the issue that 
clarifying local elite status is daunting.  In his study of Chinese rebellions, historian 
Philip Kuhn discusses the militarization of local elites, a phenomenon he argues 
increased gentry power vis-à-vis the state and left local elites supreme in the face of the 
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power vacuum created after the 1911 revolution.200  Similarly, in her work on Taiwan’s 
Lin family, Joanna Meskill emphasizes the endurance of a local gentry family as a result 
of their willingness to enforce control over the local population and over local watering 
rights. 201   Historian Hilary Beattie’s study of Anhui province also emphasizes the 
endurance of elite status over generations, although she attributes this longevity more to 
land acquisition, investment in family education, and careful stewardship of acquired 
assets than to any martial prowess.202  These depictions of local gentry as a relatively 
static category do not go uncontested.  Historian Bingde He describes a very different 
phenomenon in his book.203  Using the framework outlined by Chang Chung-li as his 
foundation,204 Bingde He emphasizes the probable existence of a great degree of social 
mobility for Chinese elite.  According to He, this social mobility and ability to rise to the 
status of local elite diminished concerns over the inequality of China’s social hierarchy, 
which thus allowed it to continue.205   
 For the purposes of an evaluation of Chinese communities outside of China, 
however, historian Keith Schoppa offers the most useful explanation of local elite status 
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in his study of China’s Zhejiang Province.  Schoppa emphasizes the varying and 
specialized nature of Chinese elites, suggesting that different types of elites emerged to 
meet the requirements of different areas of Zhejiang.  This variation resulted in the 
existence of highly commercialized and politicized elite in thriving, populated areas of 
the province.206  Mary Backus Rankin adds to Schoppa’s conclusions in her study of 
Zhejiang elite.207  Rankin reveals the “elite’s readiness to adopt new associational forms – 
chambers of commerce, educational associations, and a host of other professional 
associations and special interest organizations – following the removal of long-standing 
Qing prohibitions during the first decade of the twentieth century.”208   
 Thus, one can understand the emerging portrait of local elites in China, and this 
portrait mirrors Chinese local elite in communities outside of China, including Indochina 
and America:  a community enjoying a considerable degree of social mobility; accepting 
of new entrants into the privileged class; possessed of great flexibility in terms of the 
establishment of and membership in new forms of social and professional organizations; 
and a community in which membership criteria differed according to the characteristics 
of the groups’ local political, social, and economic environments.  What does this 
complex picture of elites contribute to one’s understanding of huiguan leadership?  
Although very few, if any, sources speak directly to issues of leadership in Indochina’s 
Chinese huiguan, scholars take an institutional approach in the study of leadership 
criteria in Chinese organizations in general, particularly in Southeast Asia and China.   
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Most notably, Ching-hwang Yen points out that social relations determined by 
kinship and dialect ties composed only part of the Chinese social milieu, opining that 
class status and class affiliations also had great significance in ordering the Chinese 
world outside of China.  He bases his fundamental analysis on two platforms:  firstly, 
overseas communities were immigrant communities, subordinate in terms of local 
government, and largely an urban community; secondly, Chinese society divided itself 
into a three-class paradigm209 which consisted of, from the top down, shang or merchants, 
shi or educated elite, and gong or workers.  He further suggests, as Bingde He, Keith 
Schoppa, and Mary Rankin did in the case of local gentry in mainland China, that great 
mobility and fluidity existed in this social structure, especially between the upper gong 
class and the lower shang class.210   
 In addition to profession, wealth and property ownership also served as a measure 
for social class and as an entrepôt into an entirely different lifestyle of leisure and plenty 
enjoyed only by the wealthiest echelons of the merchant class.211  According to Yen, this 
wealth-based class distinction proved important not only within the Chinese community, 
but also to colonial authorities.  Speaking of the British in the Straits Settlements, he 
writes,  
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As wealth was an important prerequisite for Chinese community 
leadership, the wealthy capitalists were given leadership status, and those 
among them who were able, charitable, and with ambition would become 
the leaders of the whole community.  In the choice of leadership for the 
dialect and clan organizations, the wealthy were readily accepted as 
leaders because they commanded high status and prestige in society and 
were able to make substantial donations when required.212 
 
For the wealthy, native place organizations also offered opportunities for leadership 
leading to increased visibility and greater prestige, not only within one’s own dialect or 
kinship group, but also in the overseas Chinese communities at large.  In terms of the 
leaders themselves, Yen names seniority, social standing, and integrity as the three most 
important criteria for choice of leadership.213   
 In his epic study of Hankou, William Rowe also reluctantly acknowledges the 
importance of wealth in determining eligibility for leadership in the guilds of Hankou, 
writing that for huiguan seeking leaders, “personal wealth and professional success 
constituted the best evidence of the financial capability needed to manage the collective 
accounts.”214   But despite admitting the interrelationship of wealth and local power, 
Rowe treats the notion of wealth as a golden ticket into huiguan aristocracy with some 
suspicion.  Rowe adeptly communicates the idea of a changing economic environment 
and its socioeconomic repercussions within Chinese native place organizations.  While 
this notion accurately reflects aspects of Indochina’s huiguan, the model is not a perfect 
fit for colonial Southeast Asia.   
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Some scholars portray wealth in overseas Chinese communities as a three- to 
four-generation parabolic arch, where wealth accrues and vanishes, sometimes in less 
than a hundred years.  In this paradigm, familial ties could be extremely significant in the 
short term but were unlikely to endure for a dozen or more generations.  Additionally, the 
goal for many overseas Chinese was to return to their native place to live out their 
retirements in familiar and comfortable surroundings.  Moreover, in the case of Indochina, 
trouble with French authorities encouraged or even forced some powerful Chinese to 
leave their positions of authority and make new beginnings elsewhere.215   
 The notion of wealth and status determining eligibility for leadership within the 
Chinese community also finds support in the writings of anthropologist Lawrence 
Crissman.  Crissman maintains the fundamental criterion for leadership is wealth.  If this 
wealth is combined with a foreign education that allows the leader to communicate freely 
with the government in charge, the community only benefits from that knowledge.  For 
an organization to wield any power in a local system, the leaders must have the money to 
gain access to positions of power.  This leads nicely to Crissman’s second assertion, 
which is that leadership in overseas Chinese communities typically overlapped with close 
interrelations.  Wealthy leaders quite simply had greater access to membership on 
committees and on governing bodies of high-level organizations representing the Chinese 
community as a whole.216   
In Indochina, overseas Chinese themselves acknowledged wealth as a primary 
factor in determining eligibility for huiguan president, as well as the president’s potential 
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for success.217  It seems unlikely that large numbers of huiguan officers enjoyed literati 
status back in their native places.  However, the inclusion of education and social 
standing as primary factors in assessing an individual’s suitability for leadership certainly 
applied to the Indochinese case as well.  Arguably, the imposition of colonial systems in 
mainland and maritime Southeast Asia resulted in the redefinition of the shi ideal among 
members of overseas Chinese communities.  This is also likely in Chinese communities 
in the Americas, though without the colonial component.  Familiarity with Confucian 
classics fell behind knowledge of French, English and Dutch in terms of practical benefits 
to everyday life.218   
Historian Ann Stoler also addresses the issues of colonial hegemony and 
indigenous resistance to the colonial-imposed labor paradigm, citing the phenomenon of 
avoidance as a primary means of labor resistance to colonial control. 219   Historian 
Michael Adas makes a similar point in his study of colonial Burma and Java. 220  
Although Stoler and Adas are interested in avoidance as practiced by the most subaltern 
populations of Southeast Asia, within the paradigm of colonialism, colonial will 
subordinated overseas Chinese, making the question of confrontation or avoidance 
equally applicable to them. 
Although overseas Chinese leadership typically enjoyed elite status in French 
Indochina, Indochina’s most powerful Chinese often avoided presidential office, and 
                                                 
217
 Nguyen Quoc Dinh, The Chinese Congregations, 95. 
 
218
 Ann Maxwell Hill, Merchants and Migrants, 34. 
 
219
 Ann Laura Stoler, Capitalism and Confrontation in Sumatra’s Plantation Belt, 1870-1979 (Ann 
Arbor, MI:  The University of Michigan Press, 1995), 6-13.  
 
220
 Michael Adas, “From Avoidance to Confrontation,” in Colonialism and Culture ed. Nicholas 
B. Dirks (Ann Arbor, MI:  The University of Michigan Press, 1992), 89-126.  
 
 86  
thereby colonial entanglements, as well, because they were unwilling to burden 
themselves with the many inconveniences the presidential office entailed.  In this way, 
Indochina’s most powerful Chinese avoided French control by ostensibly remaining 
outside official huiguan leadership.  In fact, the distance from community control was 
somewhat imaginary.  One knew that wealthy and powerful huiguan members treated 
their huiguan presidents like lackeys, convinced that they ruled by sufferance of their 
social and economic betters.  Colonial authorities attempted to mitigate this problem by 
requiring that the huiguan president be direct representative of the French, with direct 
access to the colonial hierarchy, a commission that included the right to levy fines upon 
recalcitrant huiguan members.  However, the very existence of this authority likely 
created more problems for the hapless president than it solved.  After all, pulled between 
French colonial authorities and the Chinese elite within one’s huiguan, the life of the 
president had little to recommend it.221 
 Much of the existing scholarship on Chinese business also emphasizes the 
uniqueness of the network-based Chinese business and leadership model, particularly in 
comparison to the hierarchical models presented by Western firms in China.  As historian 
Siu-lun Wong writes, “In the Chinese case, entrepreneurs tend to dominate the market by 
activating particularistic ties such as regional networks rather than by building up large, 
impersonal corporations.”222  Historian William Kirby also asserts this notion, claiming 
that “with its own organizational structures and values rooted in networks of family and 
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regional ties, what we may call a ‘capitalism with Chinese characteristics’ resisted the 
corporate structure.”223  While the importance of huiguan networks must be underscored, 
it is a mistake to assume that they did not represent a formal business structure with its 
own firmly established hierarchy.  Huiguan embedded this formal hierarchy within their 
very structure as an organization where wealth and seniority determined social 
prominence and thereby decided leadership matters as well.  
While scholars of business in China typically couch their arguments in terms of 
hierarchies or firms, which are considered “Western” by nature, and networks, which are 
considered “Chinese” by nature, one may pose the question of whether these notions also 
apply to huiguan in Southeast Asia and the Americas.  Sherman Cochran problematizes 
these categories:  
By drawing a seemingly timeless distinction between 
Western businesses with hierarchies and Chinese business 
with networks, they have run the risk of essentializing 
Western and Chinese businesses…it does not allow the 
possibility that a corporation (regardless of whether it was 
owned by Westerners, Japanese, or Chinese) learned to deal 
with and make use of both hierarchies and networks.224  
 
 The connections emerging from the institution of the huiguan were multifaceted.  
These connections ranged in scope and scale from small, personal connections between 
local businessmen in Cholon to relationships between merchants across the five 
territories of Indochina.  From these businesses and political contacts, relationships back 
to native cities in China evolved, and all of these relationships functioned within the 
context of huiguan-based systems of status and prestige.  Some of these systems resemble 
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huiguan in other overseas Chinese communities quite closely, while others, because of 
the long tenure of Chinese merchants and settlers in Indochina, as well as the vagaries of 
French colonial rule, were unique to Indochina’s Chinese populations. 
 Huiguan possessed great significance in several respects.  As the cornerstone of 
Chinese social, cultural, religious, political and economic life in Indochina, huiguan 
membership allowed Chinese members to tap into a vast network of personal connections 
that could assist them in any aspect of their legal, professional, or personal lives.  Intra-
huiguan contacts assisted Chinese with such things as character references for the 
colonial government, capital accumulation for local land and real estate deals, and all 
sides of labor issues, from helping a new arrival find employment to assisting a wealthy 
business owner acquire a workforce for his factory or corporation.  Inter-huiguan 
contacts, for example, between Cantonese huiguan in Tonkin and Cochinchina, not only 
assisted members with capital acquisition for business ventures, but also allowed 
increased access to regional markets by providing a reliable conduit for the collection of 
raw materials or the distribution of goods.225   
 In addition to the aforementioned roles, huiguan fulfilled two additional functions, 
the importance of which cannot be overestimated.  First, as Chinese organizations 
formally sanctioned and mandated by the French colonial government, huiguan 
legitimized their membership in colonial eyes and ensured that matters important to the 
huiguan received, at the very least, a hearing by colonial officials.  Secondly, huiguan 
served as direct conduits for contacts with native places.  Huiguan did not just have a 
personal connection to native place, but also enjoyed the backing of the respective 
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province through political and economic authority.  Despite the common assumption that 
overseas Chinese funneled money back to their native places in the form of unidirectional 
remittances to help the locality prosper, private interests based in Chinese native places in 
Indochina occasionally contributed capital directly to Indochinese business ventures.  
More to the point, companies based in Indochina and sister companies in Canton or Hong 
Kong frequently shared ownership among the same handful of Chinese businessmen, 
some of whom resided permanently in China.226   
 Some of the most prominent members of Chinese huiguan also involved 
themselves in secret society activities, and often, these upper-echelon members also 
enjoyed powerful roles in both the secret societies and their affiliated huiguan.  In these 
instances, huiguan leaders wielded public and private authority solidifying their place in 
colonial, indigenous, and Chinese politics.  Wealth and standing within a huiguan often 
translated to prominence or even dominance of a Chinese secret society, granting depth 
as well as breadth to the authority wielded by a prominent individual.227 
 Overseas Chinese lived lives fraught with danger and uncertainty.  The natural 
disasters that destroyed crops and leveled factories also took lives, and in Indochina, 
injury, plague and death felt impending.  For Chinese expatriates who left their native 
places in search of profit, fortune was a fickle friend.  Despite the proximity to China, 
many overseas Chinese in Indochina never made it back to their native villages and 
homes.  Even for those who survived colonial life, financial misfortune could strike 
unexpectedly.  No one could predict when bankruptcy or illness, fire or death, might 
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leave an individual in desperate need of material assistance.  In these times, Chinese 
huiguan assumed their mutual aid functions, acting as social insurance for members.  
Huiguan charitable functions also provide insight into areas of cooperation and conflict 
between the Chinese and the French.  Huiguan participated in local and international 
disaster relief, supported Chinese hospitals, and dealt with all of the issues surrounding 
death, including cemetery operation, burial, and the repatriation of bones.228 
 While huiguan concerned themselves with events in China, they also provided 
relief to victims of “backyard” disasters.  Floods and epidemics were commonplace, and 
even more frequent and frightening were the fires raging across Cholon’s quays on a 
regular basis.  In these situations, whether they affected the huiguan specifically or larger 
Chinese communities, huiguan often intervened to help countrymen in need.  Most often, 
this assistance came in the form of donated goods or community fundraising, but 
occasionally they contributed labor or other additional services as well.229  
 Huiguan responsibilities extended well beyond events in the cities or throughout 
Indochina.  Huiguan status depended not only upon its political and economic equity 
within Indochina, but also upon the way in which the native place viewed it.  Wealthy 
Chinese individuals enhanced huiguan prestige by pursuing such tasks as building 
schools or larger houses in their hometowns.230   Moreover, the surest way to foster 
goodwill in one’s native place was to rise to the occasion during times of need.  
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Therefore, one regarded remittances catalyzed by disaster as acts of necessity more than 
generosity; these remittances, however, alleviated the grim conditions caused by plagues, 
famine, flooding, or other unpredictable catastrophes.231 
 
 
Figure 10.  Inside a Chinese Temple in Cholon232 
 
  For Indochina’s overseas Chinese population, illness and hospitalization were also 
matters that fell into the bailiwick of the huiguan.  Huiguan-specific hospitals provided 
financial benefit to their members by giving them access to reasonable and recognizable 
health care, but the benefits of culture and morale were even greater.  For the Chinese in 
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general, treatment at an institution whose medical practices resembled those with which 
they were most familiar had to be comforting.  The added benefits of health practitioners 
speaking an individual’s own dialect would not only be comforting, but also perhaps 
reduced the potential for misunderstanding and serious mistakes regarding diagnosis and 
treatment.  Cultural benefits aside, however, the realm of health care was openly 
contested by Chinese practitioners and patients, as well as the French, who viewed public 
health as a matter of critical concern to the colonial apparatus.  Major huiguan often 
sought to construct hospitals of their own to deal with the growing demands of  
communities in their area. 
 Apart from the French belief in Chinese susceptibility to plague, death, and 
general contagion, the colonial administration begrudged every penny it spent on behalf 
of people for whom other guarantors could be found. 233   In other words, paying 
healthcare costs for an indigenous immigrant was one thing, but paying for a Chinese 
resident of Indochina was quite another.  For any Chinese resident, businessman, or 
worker, one of two circumstances had to be true, according to the French:  either the 
individual resided in Indochina legally, in which the relevant huiguan was responsible for 
all matters concerning his residency, activities, and state of moral and physical well-being; 
or he resided in Indochina illegally, in which he still belonged to a specific Chinese sub-
ethnic group, which had legal representation in the form of a huiguan, and which could 
be held responsible for all matters concerning his residency, activities and his state of 
moral and physical well-being.  In either case, it became clear during their early years of 
colonial tenure that the French Administration would refuse to pay if someone – anyone – 
else could be found to fit the bill.  
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 For Chinese in Indochina, funerary and burial services possessed an almost 
mythical importance in their concern for the dead, one of the most fundamental aspects of 
Chinese religion and custom.  One of the most essential functions of huiguan in 
Indochina was their ability to manage logistics for members who died far from their 
native soil.  Huiguan provided, in essence, burial insurance for their members.  A major 
benefit of membership was that huiguan either arranged for the repatriation of deceased 
members or granted them access to local burial grounds specific to each sub-ethnic 
group.234   In other words, if a Chinese resident could not be buried back in his native 
place, at least he rested among his compatriots.  Despite the ultimate goal of returning to 
one’s native place, the realities of colonial life and death meant that burial, whether 
temporary or permanent, on Indochinese ground was often inevitable.    
Just as huiguan oversaw the arrivals of Chinese citizens into Indochina, they also 
bore responsibility for their departures, whether as immigrants or deceased spirits.  The 
nearly universal desire of overseas Chinese to be buried on their native soil assumed 
major proportions in Indochina where disease, poverty, and backbreaking labor caused 
the demise of many Chinese too poor to return to China prior to death or to afford the 
repatriation of their remains in the event of their passing.  Not surprisingly, this desire to 
return home extended out from the major market centers of Cholon, Saigon, and Hanoi 
into the rural provinces.235   
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Figure 11.  Chinese Funeral Procession in Haiphong236 
 
 Whether the issue was disaster, death, or illness, huiguan worked closely with 
membership and with the French to find solutions most beneficial to their communities.  
Additionally, huiguan sought to share the burden of cost with the French, a matter that 
gained importance as the expense of French requirements grew.  For reasons of public 
health, French authorities meticulously regulated all aspects of sickness and death.237  
The French then passed on the added costs of these regulations was to huiguan.238  This 
inevitably created friction between the Chinese and the French, a friction that was also 
resolved through huiguan mediation.  By investigating Chinese desires, French 
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requirements, and the final resolutions, Chinese success at wringing concessions from the 
French becomes apparent.  Huiguan mutual aid functions were at once troublesome and 
essential.  By essentially providing a social security net that prevented total disaster from 
befalling their members, huiguan truly proved their worth to Chinese communities in 
Indochina. 
 While huiguan performed mutual aid functions that assisted overseas Chinese 
through the most critical periods of their lives, they also enjoyed social responsibilities, 
nurturing the very souls of their communities by taking responsibility for religious and 
secular festivals, political commemorations, and the education of young Chinese students 
in Indochina.  The first and foremost obligation of any huiguan in Indochina was to 
provide a meeting place for its members.  Thus, Chinese huiguan were responsible for 
constructing and maintaining temples and other cultural sites for their memberships.  In 
keeping with this particular obligation, it was the huiguan’s responsibility to organize the 
celebration of native-place holidays and ensure the observance of local religious festivals.  
As the colonial period progressed, locally-oriented cultural responsibilities began to 
assume a more nationalistic flavor as huiguan took on the task of collecting remittances, 
first for Qing or anti-Qing activities, and later for the new Chinese Republic.239    
 A final social arena in which huiguan involved themselves was education.  
Because of the vast cultural differences between each huiguan, Chinese memberships 
shared a nationality, but for the most part, they did not share a spoken language.  The 
values and concerns of each dialect group differed, as did the gods they worshipped and 
the professions they tended to pursue.  For this reason, the establishment of schools 
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unique to each native place or dialect represents a concerted effort to indoctrinate young 
Chinese students in the ways of their native place.  This indoctrination occurred in spite 
of the cultural confusion engendered by living overseas and at a time of great 
susceptibility in the students’ lives.240  The French also acknowledged the significance of 
Chinese youth and the importance of education, as evidenced by their own intense 
concern for Chinese instruction.241   
 
 
Figure 12.  Chinese Imperial Mission Arriving in Saigon 242 
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One of the most interesting aspects of huiguan in general is the concerted effort 
they directed towards maintaining the social and cultural integrity of their settlements 
abroad.  Overseas Chinese connections to native place did not freely give overseas 
Chinese a base of support for business ventures and a place of retreat in the event of 
disaster.  In returning for this nurturing, these ties implicitly required that overseas 
Chinese communities retain as many as possible the linguistic, cultural, and social 
practices of the native place.  One of the most efficient ways to achieve this cultural 
continuity was through the establishment of Chinese schools.  Not only did schools 
provide the fundamental language training required to keep young Chinese students 
living abroad functionally literate in Chinese and fluent in their native tongues, but, as 
schools were typically affiliated with specific huiguan, this ensured the transmission of 
many cultural and religious practices as well.243 
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Figure 13.  Chinese Dragon Procession in Cholon244 
 
As the only officially-recognized representative of Indochina’s Chinese 
communities, huiguan assumed a prominent role as mediators for their members.  This 
mediation took multiple forms.  Huiguan interceded on behalf of their members with 
French authorities, local indigenous administrators, as well as other huiguan.  This 
intercession might occur in a Vietnamese village, in the capital of the Chinese province 
from which the supplicant hailed, or even the halls of Paris’s Ministry for Foreign Affairs.  
Wherever arbitration occurred, it was likely to concern one of two matters:  immigration 
or commerce.245   
                                                 
244
 http://hinhxua.free.fr/autrefois/chinois/Cholon_la_procession_du_dragon.jpg., (accessed 
August 14, 2009).  
 
245
 Ibid., 126-133. 
 
 99  
 For colonial authorities, the Chinese residing in Indochina in general, and in 
Cochinchina in particular, represented a significant proportion of the total population.  In 
many respects, this situation empowered Cochinchina’s Chinese by requiring the French 
to carefully consider any drastic changes to immigration or police policies in order to 
avoid serious economic and political repercussions, both in the colonies and 
internationally.246  Policing the enormous Chinese community in Indochina, not just for 
overt criminal activities but for immigration violations as well, proved to be the most 
difficult task undertaken by the French with regard to the Chinese.  Huiguan mitigated 
this to some degree by placing final responsibility for unlawful Chinese activities in the 
hands of the Chinese themselves.  Not only did this ensure some small degree of self-
policing within the Chinese community, but it also guaranteed that the French could 
recoup any costs related to the suppression of crimes committed by Chinese or the 
deportation of illegal immigrants from the colony.  In return, the colonial administration 
granted each huiguan the right to refuse membership to any immigrant, or to repudiate 
current members at any time based on their unwillingness to vouch for the moral 
character of other said members.247     
 Two of the most difficult issues confronting huiguan in Indochina were 
immigration and head taxes.  As in other countries in Southeast Asia as well as in the 
Americas, Chinese usually opposed tax increases that applied to them, but despite the 
images of massive strikes and boycotts that caused many urban centers to grind to a halt, 
most of these protests were far more genteel.  In Indochina, huiguan usually stood at the 
                                                 
246
 Stephen H. Roberts, The History of French Colonial Policy, 1870-1925 (London, UK:  Frank 
Cass & Company, Limited, 1963), 58-59. 
 
247
 Nguyen Quoc Dinh, The Chinese Congregations, 115-116.  
 
 100  
vanguard of attempts to defend the interests of their communities, and the carefully- 
worded petitions they periodically forwarded to the Cochinchinese administration 
revealed not only a true concern for the welfare of their less powerful constituents, but 
also an awareness of international politics and a desire to find middle ground for both 
sides of an argument.248 
 The realities of community demographics require any study of overseas Chinese 
in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries to focus upon the lives and endeavors 
of men, while almost completely ignoring women and children in the process.  This 
omission is essentially unavoidable.  Women and children comprised a very tiny 
percentage of Indochina’s population and rarely appear in any documents except, perhaps, 
colonial pictures, where colonial visitors and scholars recorded them faithfully, along 
with all of the other ethnicities and indigenous curiosities capturing their attention.249  
The one documentary exception to this rule concerns immigration, when the legal status 
of wives or families became an issue for government officials, but they only rarely 
surfaced in immigration-related documents,250 leaving one to wonder what, exactly, the 
lives of Chinese wives were like in Indochina. 
 A critical point to consider when one investigates the wives of Chinese in 
Indochina is that these wives were not always Chinese.  Although it is unclear whether or 
not data detailing exact statistics exists, overseas Chinese did marry Vietnamese 
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women.251  Paradoxically, the French were quite protective of indigenous women when it 
came to relationships with Chinese men, preoccupied by the notion that cunning Chinese 
who would not attend to their welfare kidnapped them and shipped them to China against 
their will.252  While conflicts over the status of women typically revolved around whether 
they should be allowed to leave the country, disputes involving Chinese women most 
often centered around whether they were allowed to stay.253  Incidents of Chinese women 
fleeing abusive or unhappy relationships by crossing into Tonkin pepper colonial 
documents.  Some of these cases seem straightforward, but others reveal the complicated 
cultural milieu of the Sino-Vietnamese border region at the turn of the nineteenth 
century.254  
 In Indochina, the huiguan narrative is a story of ascendancy set upon a backdrop 
of decline.  In the twilight of empire, while China also descended into chaos and disorder, 
huiguan consolidated economic and political power on the periphery, offering succor 
during disaster to brothers in need.  They also involved themselves for the very first time 
in national Chinese politics through material contributions and moral support for efforts 
to rejuvenate the country and end Qing hegemony.255   
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As discussed in the following chapter, when Republican China later rose from the 
ashes of empire only to be broken yet again by foreign invasion and civil war, huiguan 
suppressed the competition characterizing their intercommunity relationships for a 
number of years in order to support two fundamentally important causes threatening the 
very existence of the institution: Chinese civil rights abroad and China’s territorial 
integrity and sovereign rights.  In this way, when China was brought to its weakest, 
huiguan became one of the vanguards of an international effort to mobilize for the 
defense and relief of China’s citizens.  Huiguan also became international spokespersons 
for China, agitating and propagandizing for its support on an international stage.  While 
the power and splendor of China declined, huiguan internationally ascended, in economic 
power, in political influence, and in cultural significance.256 
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Figure 14.  Bazar Chinois, Di’an, Cholon, ‘Big Market’257 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
FROM ZHONGGUO TO DADU, ‘BIG CITY’: HUIGUAN  
DEVELOPMENT IN SAN FRANCISCO 
For many years and up to the present day, San Francisco remains a vital social 
and cultural center of Chinese America.  As the first major physical space that a mobile 
Chinese population created for itself, San Francisco offered early immigrants economic 
opportunities and a sense of belonging in an unfamiliar and often antagonistic society.  
This chapter traces the origins and development of huiguan and its leadership in San 
Francisco, and emphasizes the organization’s political functions and vicissitudes of 
power and authority from the 1850s to the first decades of the nineteenth century.   
As early as 1849, merchants began to form huiguan in San Francisco’s nascent 
Chinese community primarily to maintain internal order and negotiate within and among 
the larger Euro-American society.  Traditionally delineated by dialect and native-place, 
huiguan underwent profound change in the nineteenth century.  Unlike Indochina’s 
huiguan, inter-huiguan conflict in San Francisco began during their earliest years of 
development and continued into the twentieth century.  The power and prestige of the 
organization and its success in creating a unified front against anti-Chinese 
discrimination, as well as the challenges to its traditional authority made by Chinese 
American organizations, depended on the outcome of these rival power struggles.  While 
remaining the pillar of Chinese Confucian tradition and the symbol of the conservative 
merchant elite, these forces converged on San Francisco’s Chinese community, while 
Chinese nationalism, revolutionary fervor, and calls to modernize the Chinese nation also 
forced the organization to reassess its traditional role in the Chinese community.   
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The fifth and final chapter discusses how, through the formation of huiguan in 
San Francisco, Chinese attempted to form a familiar, coherent community serving to 
transplant Chinese tradition that united as well as divided its members.  Mirroring many 
of the activities of huiguan in China and Indochina, these organizations provided 
economic assistance, including employment connections and loan opportunities, while 
successfully raising funds to establish community services, including the development of 
hospitals and schools.  Arguably, the most successful outcome of huiguan fundraising 
efforts was the retention of America’s top lawyers to challenge legislative exclusion 
individually and collectively.  As in Indochina, huiguan also utilized these funds to assist 
Chinese members to return home to China, if not in life then in death.  Huiguan 
continued its tradition functions of mutual aid and charity in San Francisco while 
participating extensively in efforts to preserve Chinese culture and tradition. 
The origins of San Francisco’s Jinshan Zhonghua Huiguan (or “Gold Mountain 
Chinese Association”), which would formally adopt the English name Chinese 
Consolidated Benevolent Association (CCBA), more popularly referred to as the Chinese 
Six Companies, dates from the early 1850s.  As a united federation of huiguan, it became 
the most powerful and influential Chinese organization in America.  As historian L. Eve 
Armentrout-Ma illustrates, the early social organizations emerging in San Francisco’s 
Chinatown had a profound influence upon nascent Chinese political parties, helping to 
define the constituencies of these parties, their organizational alternatives, and their 
political goals.258   
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While Chinese in San Francisco did not represent a static or monolithic social 
structure, huiguan competed for leadership within the community long before the 
formation of Chinese political parties, and this competition engendered an increase in the 
number of huiguan as well as periodic changes within their social balance.  The CCBA 
was but the top layer of a well-defined hierarchical organizational structure evolving in 
San Francisco over many decades during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  A 
number of Chinese associations organized on the basis of surname or regional groupings 
also eventually evolved under the umbrella of the CCBA. 
  Huiguan helped to establish a transnational and trans-Pacific foundation for San 
Francisco’s ever-evolving Chinese community.  Long emphasized yet largely 
misunderstood by Euro-American society, scholars’ translations of crucial Chinese 
historical sources continue to dismantle linguistic and cultural barriers in an effort to 
objectively analyze the history of huiguan and their importance to Chinese communities 
throughout America.259   By illuminating the many facets of San Francisco’s huiguan, 
one can begin to understand how this important social and cultural pillar of Chinese 
tradition constituted vital resources for its community.  By dispelling myriad ethnocentric 
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myths and stereotypes about huiguan, one may truly appreciate their meaning and 
significance to the cultural, social, and political history of Chinese in America.   
While huiguan remained symbols of Chinese community and tradition, anti-
Chinese agitators attacked them vigorously, believing both the organization and Chinese 
merchants profited by the overwhelming numbers of Chinese arriving to America,260 
while still other Euro-American perceptions exoticized them.  An analysis of Euro-
American public perceptions about huiguan in San Francisco is also an attempt to locate 
San Francisco’s Chinese in the Euro-American consciousness.  Through this analysis one 
observes the tenuous effort it took Chinese to build and sustain a community of their own.  
Utilizing English-language sources, as well as relying on the research of scholars who 
delved into Chinese-language sources, this chapter is, most importantly, an attempt to 
connect the development of the CCBA in San Francisco to the transnational development 
of huiguan in China and Indochina.   
This chapter mentions but does not considerably emphasize other Chinese 
associations in San Francisco outside the organizational structure of the huiguan, 
including Chinese secret societies (tang) or the multitude of specific trade and workers 
guilds, which are all subjects worthy of individual scholarly investigation.  Standing as 
the pillar of Chinese tradition, huiguan remained largely patriarchal and therefore this 
chapter does not explore the rich history of Chinese women in San Francisco.261 
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Dadu, meaning “Big City” or “First City,” was the name Chinese immigrants 
gave to San Francisco.  They referred to Sacramento as “Second City,” and Stockton as 
“Third City.” 262  Such names illustrate the central importance of San Francisco in the 
lives of Chinese from the beginning of their immigration to the American West.  As the 
major hub of cross-Pacific transit, hundreds of thousands of Chinese immigrants, along 
with goods and letters, traveled through the city from southern China to regions across 
America.  According to customs records, from 1848 to 1876, 233,136 Chinese arrived in 
San Francisco, while 92,273 left from the same port.263  Chen Lanbin, the first Chinese 
Minister to America, noted in 1879 that almost all Chinese in America used Jinshan, or 
“Gold Mountain,” as a gateway to trans-Pacific travels.264  Chinese continued to use 
Jinshan to refer to both California and the United States.   
On December 12, 1878, a Chinese crowd gathered on Clay Street to celebrate the 
opening of the Chinese Consulate, later referred to as the consulate general in San 
Francisco.  As the first diplomatic office for Chinese outside of Washington, D.C., it 
seemed timely, for the rising tide of anti-Chinese sentiment during this decade became a 
formidable political force in San Francisco and throughout the American West.  As San 
Francisco’s Chinatown stood at the epicenter of the Chinese American community in the 
United States, it was the most prominent target of attack.  On the same day, in the state 
capital of Sacramento, delegates at the second constitutional convention, one third of 
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them representatives of the Workingmen’s Party of California, denounced Chinese 
immigration during deliberations about the “Chinese question.”  Announcing his hope of 
driving the Chinese out of the city and out of the country, a San Francisco delegate 
claimed, “The trouble is how to get the guest out of the house.”265     
The hostile stance taken by the delegates typified the belief of the larger Euro-
American community, who viewed the Chinese with both fear and anxiety.  Many 
supported efforts to deny the Chinese rights to naturalize and thereby vote because they 
believed that, given such rights, the Chinese would become a great political threat “with 
most dangerous results to the State.” 266   Like the French colonial government in 
Indochina, many Euro-Americans also viewed San Francisco’s Chinatown as the worst 
source of filth and disease.  A week prior to the opening of the consulate, Denis Kearney, 
head of the Workingman’s Party, raided Chinatown in search of lepers and other 
“nauseating things.”  Accompanying him were people representing the whole spectrum of 
the Euro-American power structure:  a judge, a prosecutor, a reporter, and a police 
officer.267   
Following the discovery of gold in 1848, the Chinese population in California 
increased rapidly, though Euro-American s deliberately inflated the Chinese presence in 
an effort to depict it as a threat.  On the eve of legislative exclusion one article noted that 
the large influx of Chinese to California and British Columbia was primarily due to 
“Celestials” attempting to take advantage of the congressional recess in 1881 and “bring 
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coolies from the Flowery Land.”  Because the recent arrivals were “the lower grade of 
Chinese laborers accustomed to field and general work,” they were “not the class that 
serve[d] as recruits for the factories.”  In hypothesizing about what Chinese workers 
would do once the rail lines were complete, the article contradictorily quipped:  “But 
stupid and stolid as they are, they would, with the characteristic intuitiveness of their 
countrymen, speedily acquire knowledge of the branches of manufactures in which the 
Chinese are engaged.”268   
With the completion of the Central Pacific Railroad in 1869 and the subsequent 
economic recession of the 1880s, reports flooded the press which called for the expulsion 
of the Chinese who threatened scarce employment opportunities for Euro-American 
laborers.  What this report and others failed to acknowledge, however, was that the 
earliest Chinese immigrants were from Sanyi and Zhongshan (or Heungshan), a more 
wealthy and urban part of Guangdong province than the poorer, rural areas of China.  The 
article further surmised that merchants would also take advantage of the “period 
elapsing” to import large quantities of opium from Hong Kong for future use.  Although 
the article conceded Chinese workers would more than likely return to China once their 
two-year labor contracts expired,  it concluded there were “sufficient Chinese in the state 
to meet any demand for their services” and enunciated virulently a call for “speedy 
legislation on the subject.” 269   According to Harper’s Monthly, Chinese continually 
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“leaked” in from the northern and southern borders of America, and others arrived with 
forged papers.270   
Chinese residing in San Francisco strongly hesitated offering any information 
about themselves to outside authorities.  While attempting to gather data in Chinatown in 
1876, San Francisco’s county assessor realized that “the Chinese were loath to impart 
information.”271  In a visit to Chinatown, a reporter from the San Francisco Chronicle, 
also noted the “reticence” and “imperturbability” of those interviewed as “remarkable”:   
No sooner had the reporter, after passing some casual 
remarks, endeavored to bring the conversation to bear upon 
the immigration question than the Mongolians would 
become suddenly silent.  At length by dint of perseverance, 
it was learned that the Chinese themselves would never 
have dreamed of introducing such a large number of their 
countrymen had it not been for the demand made by the 
various corporations engaged in the construction of 
railroads on the Pacific coast and the British Territories.272    
 
While the views of those interviewed seem to match the article’s argument that “there 
were and are sufficient laborers here to supply all requirements,”  individual Chinese had 
sufficient reason not to trust Euro-American authorities, whose discriminatory policies 
and practices frequently breached legal principles and abrogated treaty agreements with 
China.   
In order to understand and appreciate the demographic significance of the Chinese 
population in San Francisco, as well as observe Euro-American reactions to it, one must 
investigate the Chinese American population in California during this historical epoch.  
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In 1876, explaining his earlier interest in the subject, Alfred Wheeler acknowledged:  “It 
has been alleged then that there was a very large number of Chinese in the state.”273  
Although more objective and reliable than the popular media’s fear- and racially-based 
perceptions and allegations, figures furnished by American governmental agencies were 
often inconsistent and tended to underestimate the Chinese population.   
Mary Roberts Coolidge made one of the earliest scholarly attempts to estimate the 
Chinese American population.274   Her figures suggest that by 1851 the West Coast 
Chinese population stood at 7,370.275  In the next three decades the Chinese population 
grew steadily, increasing in number from 25,116 in 1852 to 46,897 in 1860, to 71,083 in 
1870, to 104,991 in 1880.  It reached 132,300 in 1882, when Congress passed the first 
Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, and when the population of Chinese thereafter would 
continue to decline.  It must be noted that Coolidge’s estimates are higher than the census 
figures for the entire Chinese American population in America for 1860 and 1870, which 
were 34,933 and 63,199, respectively.  The 1880 census figure for the Chinese American 
population was 105,465, higher than Coolidge’s estimate of the West Coast population 
for the same year but lower than her number for 1882. 276   
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Coolidge’s numbers are based on official and unofficial English-language 
documents.  In 1854 The Golden Hills’ News, a San Francisco-based bilingual paper, 
estimated the total number of Chinese “who have arrived in the Gold Mountain [from 
China] is no less than 40,000 to 50,000.”277  In 1855, Chinese huiguan in San Francisco 
declared a collective membership of 36,687 (about 1,000 Chinese remained non-
members).278  Coolidge’s figures for the same two years are lower, 37,447 and 36,557, 
respectively.279  During a trip to the United States in 1876 Chinese intellectual Li Gui 
stated that the Chinese American population was about 160,000,280  and in 1878 San 
Francisco’s huiguan declared a collective membership of 148,600,281 which is very close 
to Chen Lanbin’s figure for 1879.282  Toward the end of this period another important 
Chinese visitor, Liang Qichao, wrote that there were 120,000 Chinese in America, a 
figure larger than the census figure of 89,693 for 1900.  Coolidge did not have an 
estimate for that year.283  Coolidge’s figures do, however, suggest the decline in the 
Chinese population during this period.   
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While American governmental records largely underestimated the Chinese 
American population, its precise size remains an enigma.  In 1876, the Congressional 
Committee on Chinese Immigration stated statistics “cannot be definitely ascertained.”284  
An overt anti-Chinese agenda provided the primary impetus for committee investigations 
on Chinese immigration rather than a desire to gather facts.  Chinese figures were not 
based on subjective guesswork but rather on firsthand data that huiguan and individual 
Chinese writers went to great efforts to collect. 285   In its official report, the 1876 
Congressional Committee concluded that “there is not sufficient brain capacity in the 
Chinese race to furnish motive power for self-government.” 286   Similarly, San 
Francisco’s Special Committee asserted in 1885 that the alleged filth and morality of 
Chinatown was “inseparable from the very nature of the race.”287  Anti-Chinese bias 
contributed significantly to the limitations of government record-keeping.   
While a majority of Chinese immigrants spent some time in San Francisco, a 
significant number of them stayed and worked in the city.  While it is not the primary 
focus of this chapter to address government population records nor Euro-American 
common perceptions about the Chinese in general, it is important not only to locate the 
space Chinese occupied physically in the city and culturally in the minds of its Euro-
American residents, but also to illustrate the central importance of San Francisco in 
Chinese American history. 
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Myriad Chinese organizations blossomed in San Francisco’s Chinatown, 
providing the social fabric connecting Chinese immigrants to one another.  One may 
divide these social organizations generally into two categories, distinguished primarily on 
the basis of membership eligibility.  Organizations determining membership eligibility by 
birth and possessing restrictive entrance requirements were primarily the surname or 
family associations, huiguan or regional associations, as well as huiguan federations.  
Organizations based on occupation or personal choice generally possessed open 
membership requirements and included Chinese Christians, merchant guilds, and the 
Triad secret societies, discussed in further detail in the following chapter.  All groups, 
regardless of open or restrictive membership requirements, represented variations of 
organizations originating in China. 288  While huiguan structures were not exact replicas 
of those found in China, they nevertheless followed the basic organizational principle of 
traditional native-place and kinship organizations.  By the 1890s, approximately ninety-
five percent of the Chinese in America were members of huiguan.  Moreover, throughout 
the Americas, in major centers of Chinese populations, huiguan organized federations.289   
In their most basic form, San Francisco’s huiguan were collectives of men from 
the same village who gathered for friendship and mutual support.  Since their association 
usually revolved around a store or shared rented rooms, Chinese referred to these early 
organizations as fong, literally translated as “house” or “room.”  They provided 
newcomers a place to stay, established members in the community a place to receive mail, 
and all community members a place to purchase supplies, exchange news from China, 
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and gossip.290   Huiguan also helped members find jobs, extended them credit when 
money was available, and maintained hostels where transient members could stay for a 
nominal fee.291  The popular press remained largely ignorant of the purposes of these 
hostels:  “Strange as it may seem, and contrary to expectation, an extended tour of the 
various lodging-houses in the Chinese quarter revealed there but [sic] few of the recent 
arrivals in the city . . . The lodging-housekeepers’ harvest has proved a remunerative one 
during the influx.”292 
As increasing numbers of Chinese arrived to the West Coast, a more formal 
version of the village or surname huiguan with officers and charters emerged, called the 
tongxianghui.  The tongxianghui provided Chinese residents from the same village or of 
the same clan or family name with help caring for the sick or infirmed.  Services also 
extended to relatives who remained in China through the efforts to raise funds for famine 
relief and the purchasing of weapons for defense against bandits.  These more structured 
organizations, managed by store owners and labor contractors who could provide jobs 
and loans, also ran credit unions based on the rotating credit principle.293  
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Figure 15.   “Marketing,” Arnold Genthe Collection, 1895-1906 294 
 
Huiguan offered protective services for its members, defending them against 
Euro-Americans as well as members of other huiguan.  Chinese remained distrustful of 
immigrants from other regions in China and continued to regard them as potential 
enemies.  Significant dialect differences further underscored these regional distinctions 
and exacerbated this mistrust.  China’s southern “regions” themselves were generally 
very small in the geographic sense, and the largest percentage of Chinese in San 
Francisco arrived from Guangzhou and its surrounding areas.  However, huiguan in San 
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Francisco, like Indochina, delineated themselves through native-place, institutionalizing 
both regional distinctions and their associated antagonisms.295     
 
 
Figure 16.  Pearl River Delta Administrative Regions, Early 1980s296 
 
Referring to large numbers of Chinese organizations in the United States, Mary 
Coolidge wrote, “Every Chinaman is enmeshed in a thousand other relations with his 
fellows.”297  Liang Qichao could not believe so many Chinese social organizations, more 
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than eighty in their variations, could exist outside of China.298  As the earliest Chinese 
formal organization in San Francisco, huiguan existed for decades as the most significant 
Chinese American social institution, joining an overwhelming majority of Chinese in the 
United States for social, political, and economic reasons.   
Similar to huiguan originating in China and Indochina, the merchant class 
governed the huiguan of San Francisco, exercising both economic power and social 
control over its members.  Him Mark Lai also explores the term gongsi, which Chinese 
did not use to describe huiguan in China.  When Chinese first began immigrating to the 
West Coast, they found themselves in a frontier region where America had yet to fully 
develop its governmental administrative apparatus.  Although Chinese immigrants to 
America perhaps borrowed the concept of gongsi from their compatriots in Southeast 
Asia, the term’s modern Chinese meaning is synonymous with “company.”  This may be 
an important reason why the latter became the accepted English translation of huiguan in 
the United States.  However, the link between the original meaning of gongsi and 
huiguan in America remains uncertain. 299   
Euro-American observers continued to refer to huiguan as “companies,” as this 
description of a “company house” in Harper’s illustrates: 
The smaller apartments below are occupied by the 
managers and servants of the Company.  The largest room 
or hall is pasted over with sheets of red paper covered with 
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writing.  These contain a record of the names and residence 
of every member of the Company, and the amount of his 
subscription to the general fund.  The upper story and the 
attic, with the outbuildings on the upper side, are, it may be, 
filled with lodgers, nearly all of whom are staying 
temporarily, on a visit from the mines, or on their way to or 
from China.  A few sick persons be on their pallets around, 
and a group here and there discuss [matters over] a bowl of 
rice, or smoke and chat together.  In the rear is the kitchen.  
All is quiet, orderly and neat. 
 
The same article remarked on the “Masonic” character of a similar huiguan building in 
New York City: 
What is apparent on the surface is an earnest of the 
beneficient [sic] character of its work.  It furnished, in the 
first place, a pleasant meeting room, in which to while 
away a leisure hour.  Chinese games are played.  The 
Chinese orchestra practices here; and the poetical contests, 
which are a feature of Chinese amusement are held in its 
large meeting rooms.300  
 
Despite this somewhat rosy, docile, and benevolent view, huiguan internal 
conflicts and rivalries between clans and regional groups provided the impetus for the 
formation of two specific types of organizations:  surname associations and sub-regional, 
or shantang associations.  Based on a more limited and closely related membership, these 
associations had functions paralleling the huiguan.  Quite often, they constituted power 
blocs within huiguan and had rights of representation within huiguan’s leadership 
circles.301   
The very number of individual huiguan proved especially problematic in 
presenting a unified front against anti-Chinese violence and rhetoric.  Therefore, the 
earliest huiguan formed in San Francisco later formed the cornerstone of the much larger 
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organization, the Jinshan Zhonghua Huiguan, or the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent 
Association (CCBA).  The CCBA represented, above all else, an example of a higher-
level organization formed by a growing Chinese sense of community in San Francisco, 
and this sense of community would ultimately attempt to transcend traditional clan and 
regional ties.  Since the Qing government in the late nineteenth century concerned itself 
primarily with domestic developments and increasing inner turmoil, it could provide little 
protection for Chinese in San Francisco.  Thus, the CCBA in large part addressed the 
need for the larger Chinese community to respond to and challenge anti-Chinese racism 
and legislative exclusion.        
Huiguan origins in San Francisco date as early as 1849, when Chinese merchants 
in San Francisco met to select an advisor, and in 1850 they organized Chinese 
participation in limited civic events.  However, the name of this first organization in 
historical documents continues remains unknown.302  As Chinese immigration to San 
Francisco increased in the early 1850s, regional rivalries catalyzed the formation of 
additional huiguan representing distinct constituencies.  Given the bonds between clan 
and village for peasants in Guangdong, individuals from the same region in China tended 
to seek each other’s company for mutual aid and comfort.  As immigrants from one 
particular village were usually limited in number, the basis of organization expanded to 
include larger constituencies in order to function more effectively.  Since speakers of the 
same dialect and sub-dialect generally lived in contiguous areas in China, dialect 
grouping became a logical criterion for organization.303   
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 The overwhelming majority of Chinese immigrants to San Francisco were from 
the Pearl River Delta and the Siyi (“Four Counties”) areas of Guangdong Province. They 
established several huiguan, each enrolling as members emigrants from districts speaking 
closely-related Cantonese language sub-dialects.  A small minority were Hakka, 
representing a dialect and culture different from Cantonese.  They established a separate, 
distinct huiguan.304  As in Indochina, the formation of huiguan in San Francisco occurred 
without the participation of Chinese gentry and scholar-officials, China’s traditional elite, 
since opportunities for upward mobility in China were appealing enough to prevent them 
from immigrating.  Chinese merchants, who were more affluent and, in general, more 
literate than their compatriots in China, assumed leadership roles abroad.305   
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Figure 17.  Chinese Linguistic Groups306 
 
The following discussion of huiguan names and their associated regional areas or 
clan affiliations in China are provided in Pinyin (literally “spelled sound” or “phonetics”), 
currently the most commonly used romanization of Mandarin Chinese, followed by the 
Wade-Giles romanization, the primary system of Chinese transcription for most of the 
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20th century.  Under the Wade-Giles system, Chinese Postal Map romanization for 
Chinese place names, established during the late-Qing dynasty, are also provided 
parenthetically, as well as popular huiguan names in English, if applicable (see Figure 
18).   
Chinese established the first two huiguan in San Francisco by 1851.  Merchants 
from the regions of Nanhai (Namhoi), Panyu (Punyu), and Shunde (Shuntak), three cities 
surrounding the present city of Guangzhou (Canton) formed the Sanyi Huiguan (“Three 
Counties,” Sam Yup Association, or Canton Company).307  The Siyi Huiguan (“Four 
Counties,” Sze Yap Association) was the second organization established by Chinese 
from the regions of Xinhui (Sunwui), Xinning (Sunning, now Taishan, or Toishan), 
Kaiping (Hoiphing), and Enping (Yanping).  These four districts are located in the Tan 
(Tam) River Valley, west of the Pearl River Delta.308   
Between September and October of 1852, Yuan Sheng (or Norman Assing), Cai 
Libi (or Lai Bik Tsoi), and Liu Zuman (or Jo Man Lau) from Xianshan (Heungshan, now 
Zhongshan, or Chungshan) and Zhuhai, including Doumen, became the founding leaders 
of the Yanghe Huiguan (Yeong Wo Association). 309   This association also included 
emigrants from adjacent Dongguan (Tungkun) and Zengcheng (Tsengshing), and later 
Boluo (Poklo) immigrants from Xin’an (Sunon), now Shenzhen (Shumchun), including 
Bao’an (Paoan).  A majority of Chinese immigrants from these latter regions spoke 
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Hakka, a contrast from the Cantonese spoken in other huiguan, and they separated to 
form the Xin’an Huiguan (Sun On Association).  The Xin’an Huiguan’s name changed 
several times, and today it is known as the Renhe Huiguan (Yan Wo Association), and its 
members remain overwhelmingly Hakka.310 
By 1853 huiguan in San Francisco represented four major regional dialect 
groupings.  Popularly referred to as “houses,” the associations popularly identified 
themselves as the Siyi, Yanghe, Xinwui, and Canton Huiguan.311  The English section of 
The Oriental listed them as the Yeung-wo, Canton, Sze-yap, Yan-wo, and Ning-yeung 
Huiguan (formed in 1853), according to Cantonese pronunciation. 312   Changes in 
huiguan ranks continued as membership numbers increased and ambitious leaders took 
advantage of clan and village loyalties to form rival power centers.  As leaders contended 
for status and power, they caused internal discord which often flared into intramural strife, 
and often resulted in dissidents splitting from the original huiguan.  Conditions in the Siyi 
Huiguan, for example, with the largest huiguan membership numbers, fostered the 
development of such situations.  Thus, it was the most susceptible to secession.313  
In April 1853, a dispute occurred between Xinning and Siyi members of the Siyi 
Huiguan, which also possessed the largest number of Siyi immigrants.  They seceded to 
form the Ningyang Huiguan (Ning Yung Association).  Violent conflict between members 
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of each faction in front of a Chinatown theatre only served to exacerbate hostilities 
between the two groups.  Yee Ahtye, also known as George Athei, influential leader of 
the Siyi Huiguan, persuaded fellow Yu (Yee) clansmen from Xinning not to join in the 
desertion.314  However, this group eventually deserted with Kaiping and Enping clans 
when a dispute arose over the presidency of the Siyi Huiguan in 1862.  These clans 
formed the Hehe Huiguan (Hop Wo Association). 
Merchants from Xinhui, representing the one remaining founding group of the 
Siyi Huiguan, subsequently led its reorganization as the Gangzhou Huiguan (Kong Chow 
Association), which at that time also included immigrants from the Heshan (Hokshan) 
and Sihui (Szewui) regions of China.315  Feelings of discontent remained between rival 
groups remained even after these secessions.  Frequent news items recounted fights 
between adherents of the Hehe Huiguan and members of the Siyi and Ningyang 
Huiguan.316  After a contentious battle over land to build a headquarters building and 
temple for the Sze Yap Huiguan,317 the new Gangzhou Huiguan fell heir to the land and 
building of the Siyi Huiguan, including what is today known as Kong Chow Temple, later 
promulgating the widely held misconception that Gangzhou Huiguan was San 
Francisco’s first huiguan.318   
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DATE HUIGUAN REGIONS OR CLANS REPRESENTED   COMMON NAMES/SPELLINGS  
Sanyi**   Nanhai, Panyu,Shunde    Sam Yup Association 
“Three Counties”     Canton Company 
ca. 1851 
Siyi   Xinhui, Xinning (now Taishan),   Sze Yap Association 
“Four Counties” Kaiping, and Enping 
 
1852  Yanghe**  Xianshan (now Zhongshan), Zhuhai,  Yeong Wo Association 
 including Doumen, Dongguan,  
Zengcheng, Boluo Immigrants from  
Xin’an, including Bao’an  (majority were 
Hakka) 
  
Xin’an  Hakka Majority seceding from    Sun On Association 
(name   Yanghe Huiguan     Xinwui Association 
changed  to    (remains overwhelmingly Hakka)   Yan Wo Association 
Renhe**)        
 
1853  Ningyang*  Seceding Siyi immigrants     Ning Yung Association 
   from Siyi Huiguan (originally  
   representing largest number of  
Siyi immigrants) 
 
1862  Hehe*   Yu, Kaiping, Enping clans seceding   Hop Wo Association 
from original Siyi Huiguan  
 
1864  Gangzhou* Merchants from Xinhui     Kong Chow Association 
(one remaining founding group of  
Siyi Huiguan); at this time also includes 
 immigrants from Heshan and Sihui  
 
1878  Zhaoqing* Several Kaiping and Enping clans seceding  Sue Hing Association 
from Hehe Huiguan  
 
1879  Hehe Huiguan  
secedes into three 
additional groups:   
  Yu Fengcai Tang        Yu Fung Toy Tong 
Tan Yiyi Tang        Tom Yee Yee Tong 
En-kai Tongxiang       Yen Hoy Association 
 Zhaoqing* (See above)      Sue Hing Association 
   
ca. 1883 Hehe*   Yee clan members from Taishan   Hop Wo Association 
Reconstituted remain dominant in the Hehe Huiguan, 
   although some Kaiping clans, notably the  
Xie, Hu, a large portion of the Deng  
and Zheng clans from Enping are also 
represented. 
         
Zhaoqing* secedes       Sue Hing Association 
                                                                                                                                                 
Interviews with former officers, older San Francisco Chinese, as well as more readily-available English-
language sources provided much of the information in the booklet.  
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once again from  
Hehe*  
 
1898  Reestablishment Tan (Tom, Hom), and Guan (Kwan, Quan)  Yen Hoy Association 
of En-Kai  deserting with several 
Tongxiang Kaiping and Enping clans within 
  Hehe Huiguan  
 
1908 Merger of Subsequently, Zhaoqing Huiguan   Look Yup Tong Sen Tong  
En-kai   accepts members from Sanshui, Sihui, 
Tongxiang Tong Lak Yip Hong San Tong 
and Zhaoqing  Qingyuan, Gaoyao, and Gaoming, 
communities belonging to the Liuyi  
Tonshan Tang. Thirteen Enping clans 
led by the Tang (Tong) clan also secede 
to join the Zhaoqing Huiguan. 
The majority of Zhaoqing members,  
however, were emigrants from Kaiping.  
Five of the six districts belonging  
to the Liuyi Tonshan Tang secede  
from original Sanyi Huiguan  
(due to a dispute over presidency) 
and join the Zaoqing Huiguan (the  
sixth, Hua Xian, possibly a  
tongxianghui, remains affiliated  
with the Sanyi Huiguan). Eventually  
immigrants from Yangjiang and Yangchun  
gain control and the organization becomes  
the second largest huiguan in 
membership and the huiguan 
with the greatest number of counties 
 represented. 
 
* Siyi immigrants continue to dominate the Ningyang, Gangzhou, Hehe, and Zhaoqing Huiguan 
** The Yanghe, Sanyi, and Renhe Huiguan, with memberships originating – represented heterogeneous 
populations, organized themselves by region with shantang (“benevolence hall”) as basic units. 
 
 
Table 1.  Timeline of Huiguan Development in San Francisco, Chinese Clans or Regions 
Represented and Common Huiguan Names and Spellings 
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As member-supported organizations with paid staffers, elected officers or 
“agents,” and clearly defined responsibilities, the Siyi Huiguan leaders held positions as  
servants and officers, all elected to serve six-month terms.  At these elections, no one 
expected all members to cast their votes.  However, they required representation by the 
collective interest of each county group.  The Siyi Huiguan, in part supported by 
membership dues, itemized its allocation of funds:  
1.  The purchase of ground and erection of the building 
used by us; 2. the salaries of agents and servants; 3.  fuel, 
water, candles and oil; 4.  assisting the sick to return; 5.  the 
bestowment of medicines; 6.  coffins and funeral expenses; 
7.  the repairs of tombs; 8.  expenses of lawsuits; 9.  taxes 
upon our frame house at Sacramento; 10.  drayage, and 
other outlay, for passengers landing or departing, by 
ships.319  
 
Huiguan membership numbers in San Francisco fluctuated, corresponding to 
demographic changes within the Chinese community.  In the 1850s, and according to The 
Oriental, the Yanghe Huiguan was the largest, with membership of fourteen thousand 
individuals.320  But both its membership and its clout declined by the 1870s, when the 
Ningyang Huiguan became the largest and most powerful, with seventy-five thousand 
members, all from Xinning County.321   
In 1881, the San Francisco Chronicle declared the “bulk of celestials” belonged 
to the “Sam Yap [Sanyi] and Ning Yang [Ningyang] Companies.”322   In the early-
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twentieth century the commanding presence of the Ningyang Huiguan’s building in 
Waverly Place announced its eminence.  Below the massive characters in front of the 
building spelling Ningyang Huiguan was an explanation of the two characters, ning and 
yang:  Ningjing fada, meaning “to peacefully prosper”, and Yangde fangheng, meaning 
“masculine virtues flourish at present.”323   
Instability continued to persist despite the final fragmentation of the Siyi Huiguan.  
Friction soon developed within the Hehe Huiguan over the Yee clan’s domineering 
presence.324  On September 21, 1878, the San Francisco Bulletin noted the split occurring 
in the Hehe Huiguan:   
For some time there has been much dissatisfaction among 
the Chinese belonging to the Hop Wo Company [Hehe 
Huiguan] regarding the management of the funds.  About a 
year ago there was an opposition to the selection of officers 
for the year, and a crowd of disgusted Chinamen favored 
the new president, as he was going to the Company’s house, 
with showers of soft cheese, liver, chow chow, etc. . . . The 
discontented were forced to submit, but recently they have 
determined to form a new company and today it begins 
operations.325 
 
The newly formed Zhaoqing Huiguan (Sue Hing Association) included members of 
several Kaiping and Enping clans.326  
Fragmentation continued when, in 1879, the original Hehe Huiguan, split into 
four new groups including the Zhaoqing Huiguan, Yu Fengcai Tang (Yu Fung Toy Tong), 
Tan Yiyi Tang (Tom Yee Yee Tong), the En-kai Tongxiang Huiguan (Yen Hoy 
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Association).  Through the mediation of Chinese Consul General Huang Zunxian, the 
factions reconstituted the Hehe Huiguan around 1883. 327   However, antagonisms 
remained and it is unclear from sources whether the Zhaoqing Huiguan refused to rejoin, 
or whether it rejoined only to secede again after a brief sojourn.328  In 1898 the Tan (Tom, 
Hom), and Guan (Kwan, Quan) clans deserted with several Kaiping and Enping clans 
within the Hehe Huiguan to once again reestablish the En-kai Tongxiang Huiguan.329   
In 1901, another thirteen Enping clans led by the Tang (Tong) clan also seceded, 
this time to join the Zhaoqing Huiguan.330  The En-kai Tongxiang Huiguan and Zhaoqing 
Huiguan soon found their respective constituencies too small to be effective and initiated 
merger talks, successfully completed in 1909.331  Subsequently, the Zhaoqing Huiguan 
accepted members from the Sanshui (Samshui), Sihui (Szewui), Qingyuan (Tsingyuen), 
Gaoyao (or Koyiu), and Gaoming (Koming) communities belonging to the Liuyi Tonshan 
Tang (Look Yup Tong Sen Tong, Lak Yip Hong San Tong).  Eventually immigrants from 
Yangjiang (Yeungkong) and Yangchun (Yeungchun) gained control of the Zhaoqing, 
making it the second largest huiguan in membership and the one with the greatest number 
of Chinese counties represented.  However, the majority of Zhaoqing members were 
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emigrants from Kaiping.  As for the Hehe Huiguan, members of the Yee clan from 
Taishan remained dominant in the organization, although Chinese-language histories 
represent some Kaiping clans, notably the Xie (Tse, Der), Hu (Woo), a large part of the 
Deng (Teng, Dong, Ong), as well as the Zheng (Chang, Jung) clans from Enping.332 
Due to the close identification of clan lineage groups from the Siyi area, the Siyi-
dominated huiguan – the Ningyang, Zhaoqing, Hehe, and Gangzhou – were also usually 
part of a surname association, or zongqinhui, meaning “kindred club,” including members 
with a common surname regardless of location.  The remaining three huiguan – the 
Yanghe, Sanyi, and Renhe – with memberships originating from areas where the 
population was more heterogeneous, organized themselves by region, with shantang, 
(literally, “benevolence hall”) as the basic units.  Sometimes huiguan also continued to 
use the more ambiguous terms of gongsuo (“public hall”) and tongxianghui (“same 
villagers club”).  Membership in one of these units qualified a person for membership in 
the associated huiguan.  Similar to the huiguan, both shantang and surname associations 
provided mutual aid and charitable services to their memberships.333 
Huiguan who did not have Siyi membership tended to have less turbulent 
histories.  Him Mark Lai attributes this to the fact that smaller memberships precluded 
the growth of large rival power centers that not only fostered but sustained open conflicts 
and instability in larger huiguan. 334  However, in 1901 five of the six districts belonging 
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to the Liuyi Tonshan Tang left the Sanyi Huiguan due to a dispute over the presidency. 
They joined the Zaoqing Huiguan while the sixth, Hua Xian, possibly a tongxianghui, 
remained affiliated with the Sanyi Huiguan.335   
Such intergroup animosity was one of the factors justifying the very existence of 
the huiguan – namely, to protect members from external threats.  The pitting of organized 
groups against one another tended to exacerbate these inherent antagonisms.  Therefore, 
disputes between individuals always had the potential of evolving into group conflict 
because each huiguan felt obligated to support its member or members.  In the 1850s, 
several disagreements escalated into violent battles, with each group backed by its 
respective huiguan with manpower and arms.  One example was the “Weaverville War” 
of 1854, which began over a gambling quarrel and ended with Yanghe Huiguan members 
pitted against the combined forces of the Sanyi, Siyi, and Ningyang Huiguan.336  Another 
open conflict occurred at a Chinese mining camp in 1856, pitting members of the Sanyi 
Huiguan against the Renhe Huiguan in a quarrel over a claim.337 
The number and scope of such conflicts decreased in the following decades, 
though huiguan antagonisms remained.  After the establishment of the Chinese consulate 
in San Francisco, pressure brought to bear by the office helped to resolve many huiguan 
disputes before they escalated into violent confrontation.338  Moreover, according to Him 
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Mark Lai, the consular office was instrumental in assuaging huiguan confrontations by 
helping to establish a system of presidential rotation within the CCBA among the various 
huiguan, as well as a system of rotating the presidency and other offices of each huiguan 
among the various affiliated shantang, or clans. 339   Even though this mechanical 
apportioning of the offices did not eliminate the domination of powerful individuals or 
groups, the institutionalized rotation of power eased tensions among contending 
factions.340   
However, the mistrust and prejudice between dialect groups aggravated existing 
huiguan conflicts of interest and inherent rivalries.  One large conflict occurred in the 
1890s when the huiguan of Siyi immigrants backed their constituents’ boycott against 
Sanyi businesses.  According to Him Mark Lai, the boycott was in protest of the Sanyi’s 
monopolistic domination of certain types of Chinatown businesses, especially in the 
import-export area.341  The Los Angeles Times, however, claimed the trouble originated 
with the murder of Chang Wai, a member of the Sanyi Huiguan, and the resultant arrest 
of Mok Tai, a Siyi Huiguan member for the murder.342   
According to the account, the Siyi Huiguan believed he was innocent of the 
charges and requested the Sanyi Huiguan call off the prosecution, but they refused.  The 
Chinese consul sided with the Sanyi Huiguan, which was comprised of the “wealthier 
classes of Chinese who do a big business as butchers” while the Siyi Huiguan comprised 
                                                 
339
 Ibid.    
 
340
 Ibid.     
 
341
 Ibid.  
 
342
 “The Chinese Boycott:  Ruin Stares the Sam Yup Companies in the Face,” Los Angeles Times, 
September 6, 1895.  
 
 135  
“the laboring classes, mainly customers of the Sam Yups.” Three additional huiguan 
sided with the Siyi against the Sanyi, while the Yanghe Huiguan, representing “the better 
class of merchants, holds aloof from the fray.”  However, this neutrality was short-lived 
as the Siyi Huiguan threatened the Yanghe with war if they did not join them against the 
Sanyi.  Jaw Men Sang, president of the Yanghe Huiguan, attempted to use diplomacy 
while maintaining neutrality in the quarrel, and in doing so, lost his presidential post.  He 
was succeeded by Bow Yee, a newly-arrived Yanghe Huiguan member from China.  The 
Chinese consul, generally a man “of great influence among his countrymen [was] now 
treated with contempt by all except the Sam Yups [Sanyi].”343  
A week prior to reporting on the alleged background of the dispute, the Los 
Angeles Times recounted the “factional fight” occurring between the Siyi and Sanyi 
Huiguan, culminating in “the disruption of the Six Companies, the most powerful 
organization ever instituted by the Chinese in this country.”  This report noted that all of 
the efforts of Chinese Consul General Li Yung Yew and other prominent Chinese to 
bring about a settlement between the two huiguan ended in failure.  Thus, the Chinese 
Minister in Washington, D.C. announced his intentions to arrive in San Francisco to try 
his “powers as peacemaker,” though the article was quick to conclude that “leaders of 
this warfare” could expect to “have their heads lopped off whenever they return to China” 
unless they complied with the demands of the Chinese Minister.  The secession of the 
Siyi from “the Six Companies” left the latter with the “small end of the organization” and 
a depleted treasury:   
The boycott started by the See Yups has nearly ruined the 
Sam Yup merchants and if not ended soon it will cause the 
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retirement from business of a large number of firms.  The 
boycott is being extended to every place in the United 
States where Chinese reside in any number.344 
      
In spite of mediation efforts by several consul generals, the confrontation lasted many 
years before the sides reached a truce.  It is difficult to ignore the class delineations 
represented within this feud, and indeed many huiguan rivalries evolved along class lines.  
This inter-clan and regional animosity did not subside until after the growth of nationalist 
sentiment in the twentieth century.  The maturity of second- and third-generation Chinese 
Americans educated in American schools who had little or no real regional or clan 
affiliation also ameliorated these antagonisms.345 
 The San Francisco Chronicle also noted the subsequent removal of Consul 
General Li Yung Yew from his post four months after the reports of the Siyi and Sanyi 
factional disputes.  The consul general received a dispatch from the Chinese Minister in 
Washington, D.C. effectively removing him from his position and appointing Fung Yung 
Hun, Li Yung Yew’s former secretary, as his successor.   
As Li Yung Yew was “extremely popular with the powers at Peking,” Chinatown 
was abuzz in rumors about Li Yung Yew’s fate.  Although he was a close friend and 
counselor of the Chinese Minister, and was appointed minister in 1891 after serving the 
Chinese emperor in diplomatic visits to South America, the report assumed the removal 
was “but preparatory to bestowing further honors upon his head, that he is to be 
appointed a special agent of the Emperor to negotiate a treaty between the court of 
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Peking and that of President Diaz of Mexico.”  Chinese in San Francisco, however, 
continued to assume the change in leadership was attributable to the factional dispute. 
 The Los Angeles Times would also report on the funeral procession for Bow Yee, 
president of the Yanghe Huiguan, who arrived in San Francisco one year prior to his 
death to replace President Jaw Men Sang in the midst of the huiguan factional disputes.  
Bow Yee “was buried . . . with all the honors that his countrymen could bestow . . . and 
Chinatown has been in mourning ever since [his death occurred three days earlier].”  The 
funeral procession further illustrates the cultural significance and importance Chinese 
placed on their dead, as well as associated funerary rituals:  
. . . the procession to the cemetery was over a mile in length.  
The remains were carried in a gorgeous hearse drawn by 
six white horses, while a brass band played a dirge.  
Several Chinese bands were also in the procession, and 
three large trucks carried the baked meats which were to 
nourish Bow Yee’s soul while on its way to heaven.346   
 
The article portrayed Bow Yee as “a big man among the Chinese” who “played an 
important part in their affairs here” and “was entrusted the delicate task of reconciling the 
quarreling Chinese.”347 
San Francisco’s huiguan possessed a long history of working together, however, 
when dealing with certain matters of common concern.  As early as 1853, Chinese in San 
Francisco formed a committee and elected merchants to act with huiguan presidents in all 
public affairs involving the Chinese community. 348   In succeeding years, observers 
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referred to “four great houses” or “five companies” in accordance with the number of 
huiguan existing at any particular time.   
Around 1862, Chinese established a gongsuo, or public hall, consisting of 
huiguan officers and committee members.349  This, however, appeared to be a loosely-
organized federation of huiguan, which by consensus made decisions on matters affecting 
the general interest of the Chinese on the West Coast.  It settled disputes between 
members of different huiguan, consulted on the best methods to seek relief from anti-
Chinese discrimination, devised means to bar the importation of Chinese prostitutes, and 
entertained public figures.350  Since there were six huiguan at the time, the Ningyang, 
Hehe, Gangzhou, Yanghe, Sanyi, and Renhe, many contemporaries referred to them 
collectively as the Six Chinese Companies, known popularly as the Chinese Six 
Companies.  No matter how they referred to the organization, Euro-American society 
recognized the federation as representative of the entire Chinese community in America.   
An anonymous editorial in the New York Times in 1878 attempted to clarify the 
meaning and true intentions of huiguan in San Francisco to the larger society.  Although 
the editorial is anonymous, it seems probable, due to a high level of understanding about 
the organization, that it was written by a huiguan member, merchant-official, or perhaps a 
Euro-American scholar or missionary.  It began by stating frankly that many people “who 
know little or nothing about [huiguan]” spoke much “nonsense.”  Moreover, many 
persons “who ought to know better” also failed to represent them correctly.351  
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In a “short and truthful account” of the ‘institutions,’ the writer began by stating 
the Six Companies were not ‘companies’ at all.  According to the author, the ‘Six 
Companies’ individually or combined were not engaged in trade or business “of any 
kind.”  The author further asserted: “The word ‘company’ is as near as we can 
conveniently come to a literal translation of the Chinese word (which I spare you) 
signifying, in this case, a voluntary association for the mutual benefit and protection of 
the members, and not for profit.”  The primary purposes of the organization for “which 
every Chinaman on the Pacific coast may, with sufficient exactness, be said to belong,” 
were its caring for the Chinese dead and, “at the proper season, to send their remains back 
to China for interment” as a “well-known and vital principle of their religion.”  While in 
China, surviving members of the family attended to the burial, “In California, where there 
are practically no Chinese families, the six companies are organized to perform this 
sacred office.”  Huiguan thus “voluntary subscribe[d] to pay the heavy expense of 
embalming the body of a fellow-passenger who may happen to die at sea on the voyage 
between San Francisco and China than see the remains ‘confided to the deep’ beyond the 
hope of happiness in the Chinaman’s heaven.”  While acknowledging the payments made 
to “his society at or before the time of his return to China,” with the “surplus of this 
fund,” companies took care of the sick and the poor.352   
Each “society,” the anonymous writer stated, “is composed of people coming 
from the same village, group of villages, or district[s]…” and “the inhabitants of these 
different districts speak slightly different dialects.”  Upon landing at San Francisco’s 
wharf, “the Chinaman is met by the representatives of the company composed of the 
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inhabitants of his own district in China, is taken to his ‘cousin-brothers’ or his ‘friends’ if 
he has any; if not, is cared for till he can find employment.”  The editorial  further 
negated the notion that the ‘Six Companies’ ‘import[ed]’ Chinese immigrants arriving to 
San Francisco:   
As a rule, their passages are paid in China by the Chinese 
merchants resident there, and afterward refunded by 
collections, as wages are earned, through the 
correspondents of the same firms in California.  The 
isolation of the Chinese, not only from the white people but 
from the members of all other companies, united to the 
high wages paid here, renders the task of making these 
collections comparatively easy.  There are some losses by 
death, some by dishonesty, but the total is small and the 
interest is very high.353 
         
During the height of the anti-Chinese movement, Chinese Consul General Huang 
Zunxian pushed for the formation of a single organization in San Francisco with more 
clearly delineated powers in order to provide more effective leadership in the fight 
against anti-Chinese discrimination.  Absorbing the earlier gongsuo, this new 
organization emerged on November 19, 1882.354  Zheng Zaoru, the Chinese envoy in 
Washington, D.C., gave the new organization its Chinese name, Jinshan Zhonguo 
Huiguan.355  California later incorporated it under its state laws in 1901.356  The English 
name, provided in California’s bylaws, is the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent 
Association of the U.S.A.  Other branches of the CCBA developed across America.357  .  
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The first CCBA president was Chen Wenquan (or Chun Mun Chuen) of the Gangzhou 
Huiguan.358   
The San Francisco Daily Alta California attributed the CCBA’s founding to “the 
fiftieth anniversary of the birthday of the mother of the Emperor of China.”  The Empress 
Dowager Cixi was actually the aunt of Emperor Guangxu, and she was the de facto ruler 
of the Qing Dynasty until her death in 1908.359  However, noting the rumors circling 
around the merger, the article stated:  “the Six Companies had consolidated in order to 
form a more compact body, and to carry out by such a combination in a more efficient 
manner the alms and objects of the various associations.”  While the Alta interviewed 
several Chinese residents, the reporter received contradictory answers related to “the 
consolidation.”  In an interview with the Chinese Consul General, however, in which the 
reporter acknowledged his limited English, he  
confirmed the report that the Six Companies had formed 
one association by the advice of the Counsel-General, and 
Chung Mun Chueng, of the Kong Chow Company, had 
been elected President.  By a subsequent inquiry at the 
office of the Sam Yup Company, on Dupont Street, the fact 
was ascertained that the companies had come together 
merely for the purpose of forming an organization to 
befriend the sick, homeless, and impoverished of their race 
in this city.  The companies in their business transactions 
will remain as distinct as formerly.360 
 
Huiguan membership in the CCBA did not always remain at six.  When the CCBA 
accepted the Zhaoqing and En-kai Tongxiang Huiguan, six companies were reality eight 
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for a few years.  However, contemporaries continued to refer to the organization as the 
Chinese Six Companies throughout these many permutations.  The organizations 
incorporated earlier huiguan presidential provisions into the CCBA presidency.361 
 
 
Figure 18.  “On Dupont Street,” Arnold Genthe Collection, 1895-1906362 
 
Huiguan presidents collectively comprised the CCBA’s shendong, or “gentry-
directors.”  Up until the end of the Qing dynasty, it was also customary for the CCBA to 
submit to the consul general a list of candidates to choose and appoint its other board 
members.  These board members were shangdong, or “merchant-directors,” a term 
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reflecting their class origin.363  Initially there was no limitation on the CCBA presidential 
term.  However, this quickly gave rise to leadership abuses and further factional disputes.  
Huiguan set a limit of six months to each presidential term, and by 1900 the length of 
each term decreased to three months.  Six huiguan rotated the CCBA presidential office 
among their organizations, without representation from the Renhe Huiguan, the smallest 
huiguan in membership.364   
In addition, the Chinese consul general assumed the right to confirm the 
president’s appointment, although during this period no fixed number of assigned 
directors represented each organization, a situation tending to work in favor of the Sanyi, 
Yanghe, and Gangzhou Huiguan, which had small memberships but represented a high 
percentage of merchants.  For example, in 1907, the consul general appointed forty-one 
directors, out of which the Ningyang Huiguan had eleven, while the Sanyi, Yanghe, and 
Gangzhou Huiguan, whose combined memberships numbered less than that of the 
Ningyang Huiguan, each had six directors, or a total of eighteen.365  This situation did not 
sit well with the leaders of the Ningyang Huiguan, the huiguan with the largest 
membership, who felt that they should obviously have a greater voice.  But when the 
CCBA drafted a revision to its bylaws in 1925, out of a total of eighty directors, it only 
assigned the Ningyang Huiguan twenty-two, while the Sanyi, Yanghe, and Gangzhou 
Huiguan each had twelve, or a total of thirty-six.366   
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Figure 19.  Officers of the CCBA in 1890, Bancroft Library, Berkeley, CA367 
 
In 1928 the Ningyang Huiguan began a national boycott of the newspaper Young 
China over published articles alleged to be insulting to the huiguan and its role in the 
CCBA.  Using this as a pretext, the Ningyang Huiguan withdrew from further 
participation in CCBA meetings and demanded rights commensurate with the size of its 
membership.  In the meantime, it withheld the exit permit assessments that normally 
passed to the CCBA as part of its contribution to the general operating fund.  As this 
amount constituted about half the budget, it had a serious financial impact on the 
remaining huiguan, forcing them to compensate for the deficit.  The CCBA board finally 
succumbed to the pressure, agreed to most of the Ningyang Huiguan’s demands, and 
incorporated it into its revised bylaws in 1930.368   
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The new bylaws set the board at fifty-five members, with the number 
redistributed to each huiguan in proportion to the number of registered members in 1926.  
Accordingly, the Ningyang Huiguan, having 48.5 percent of 26,676 registrants, entitled it 
to twenty-seven directors, one less than half the board total.  This pared the number of 
directors for the Sanyi, Yanghe, and Gangzhou Huiguan drastically to a total of thirteen.  
The revised bylaws also set the CCBA presidential term to two months, with the 
Ningyang Huiguan president filling the office every other term, while each of the other 
huiguan presidents, with the exception of the Renhe, rotated to fill the remaining terms.  
It was not until 1988 when the CCBA finally admitted the Renhe Huiguan into the 
presidential rotational scheme when it passed a resolution to add it in 1989.  However, 
the Renhe Huiguan did not have a presidential turn until November 2, 1990, when Li 
Kaiming (or Hoi Ming Lee) became the first Renhe Huiguan president to fill the CCBA 
presidency.369  
These changes mark a significant shift in the CCBA’s distribution of power.  
Population became the sole determinant for apportioning the number of directors instead 
of previously used criterion, which favored huiguan representing a higher proportion of 
merchants among their memberships.  The Ningyang Huiguan became the dominant 
voice on the CCBA board.  Since there was little chance that the remaining huiguan 
could work together to thwart the domination of the Ningyang Huiguan, a decision on 
any question by the Ningyang Huiguan would determine the fate of other huiguan within 
                                                 
369
 Ibid., 52. 
 
 146  
the CCBA.  Since this important change, no revision of the bylaws occurred, nor did the 
CCBA admit any new huiguan to its ranks.370 
After the establishments of the Chinese legation in Washington, D.C., and the  
Chinese consul general in San Francisco, the Qing government attempted to bring the 
powerful and virtually autonomous huiguan under control, pressuring the huiguan into 
correcting some of their more obvious abuses.  In the early 1880s, huiguan began 
recruiting titled scholars from China to serve as presidents.371  The practice, according to 
William Hoy, began as early as the 1850s.372  It gradually became a custom by the late-
nineteenth century.  In the 1870s the presidents of all huiguan remained in San Francisco 
after their tenure, at least according to their testimony before the 1876 California Senate 
Committee.373  Some leaders engaged in other business activities simultaneously.374  In 
subsequent years, the CCBA institutionalized the custom of selecting huiguan presidents 
by writing it into the CCBA constitution.  From 1881 on, for example, all fourteen 
presidents of the Ningyang Huiguan were such scholars, and thirteen of them earned 
high-level scholarly titles. 375    However, most selected scholars arrived to serve as 
president and then returned to China afterwards.376   
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In 1887 the Qing envoy to the United States issued orders requiring the provincial 
governor-general, who had jurisdiction over the huiguan district of origin in China, to 
validate the credentials of the president-elect.  The Chinese government then issued a 
diplomatic passport for the president-elect and one suiyuan, or personal staff member, to 
arrive as members of the consular staff.377  While the CCBA had to report the name of 
each huiguan president to the Chinese Embassy in Washington, D.C., and to the governor 
of Guangdong in China, the Chinese government did not have sole authority over the 
CCBA in San Francisco.  It was, rather, an expedient measure providing huiguan 
presidents diplomatic status for travel purposes in order to prevent hampering of their 
arrival by exclusion laws.  Moreover, each huiguan continued to select its president.378   
The intent for importing titled scholars as president ensured that the individual 
would not involve themselves in local factional politics.  However, the inevitable result 
was also a president who was unfamiliar with the condition of the Chinese community in 
San Francisco, at least at the beginning of his presidential term.  Moreover, the 
arrangement also made the huiguan an extension of the Chinese diplomatic service, 
serving as a channel between the Chinese government and the Chinese in the United 
States.  Huiguan continued to use this method to fill presidential offices until 1925, when 
the U.S. State Department objected to providing huiguan presidents diplomatic status 
because it was not in accordance with accepted international protocol.  In 1926 China 
acquiesced, issuing tourist passports only to the presidents-elect, and no longer allowing 
accompanying staff members to join huiguan presidents.  Because of this immigration 
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restriction, huiguan gradually began to fill the office of president with local candidates; 
the earliest was Chen Jingshan of the Yanghe Huiguan in 1926.379   
Huiguan leaders who arrived directly from China held the highest power in San 
Francisco.  Scholars chosen by home districts in China who passed civil service 
examinations at different levels represented the huiguan presidency.  As a voluntary 
adoption of China’s centuries-old method of selecting officials, this practice powerfully 
illustrates how Chinese tradition served as the mandate legitimating power in San 
Francisco’s huiguan.   
In 1903 Liang Qichao found this custom highly disturbing, viewing it as an 
obstacle to reform and progress.  Liang commented on Chinese leaders’ ignorance of 
American customs and language, and criticized the cruelty and oppression of a generally 
passive Chinese community.  While Liang perhaps correctly assumed the presidents’ 
ignorance of American customs and language, his preoccupation with Western notions of 
progress explains his disdain for Chinese desire and respect for tradition in San Francisco.  
By possessing scholarly titles as official acknowledgement of classical Confucian 
learning, huiguan presidents embodied traditional Chinese cultural heritage.  In San 
Francisco, association with that heritage carried more weight than did familiarity with 
Western culture.380 
China’s government did not dispatch all consular officials, however.  Sometimes 
the consulate employed former huiguan leaders, which enhanced its effectiveness in 
dealing with community affairs.  In 1888, for instance, two such officials worked for the 
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consulate.  In approving their employment, a senior embassy official especially praised 
one candidate for his discipline and elegant handwriting, a critical criterion for judging a 
scholar-statesman, and pointed out:  “In the Gold Mountain, where Chinese and 
foreigners live together . . . his knowledge of the people and place [San Francisco’s 
Chinatown] can help to resolve disputes.” 381   With the authority to approve board 
members of the CCBA, the consulate general stood at the apex of political authority in 
San Francisco’s Chinatown.382 
Qing diplomats in America also pushed huiguan leadership reforms that were 
successful to some degree, encouraging Consul General Huang Zunxian to say 
in recent years [huiguan] have issued financial statements 
of income and disbursements for public examination.  
Except for the salaries of the directors, no abuses have 
arisen due to misappropriations and embezzlements.  When 
I arrived I ordered the directors to arbitrate disputes.  Since 
the directors had regard for the huiguan’s reputation, each 
has done his best in performing his duties and has thereby 
gained credibility among the membership.  Thus the 
atmosphere has changed somewhat.383  
 
Huiguan buildings were ubiquitous in San Francisco’s Chinatown.  The Oriental 
provides a detailed description of the Yanghe Huiguan building: 
 As the reader has walked . . . his attention has been 
attracted by a large frame structure, evidently of Chinese 
architecture . . . A pair of lions, carved in wood, guard the 
wide doorway. . . . The two perpendicular inscriptions on 
either side are poetical lines.  They read, Tseung Kwong 
Ham Man Li, Sui Hi Po Tung Yan.  May the prosperous 
light fill a thousand leagues; May the auspicious air 
pervade mankind.384   
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The prominent Chinese motif of the building was not intended to draw the 
attention of Euro-American spectators.  San Francisco’s Chinatown was not yet a tourist 
attraction.  It embodied Chinese cultural traditions huiguan leaders fought to uphold.  
According to Yong Chen, Chinese in San Francisco modeled buildings after long-
standing Chinese traditional structures.   For example, a Panyu Huiguan building existed 
in Beijing where a rich merchant from Panyu County donated a large sum of money to 
maintain the huiguan house.385  As the huiguan’s physical prominence illustrates, the 
merchant class, continued to maintain control of the CCBA and its affiliated huiguan. 
Despite collaborative efforts in matters of immigration and foreign affairs, CCBA 
leadership in San Francisco’s Chinese community had many limitations.  Him Mark Lai’s 
translation of Chinese envoy Liang Cheng’s comments in 1907 perhaps expresses this 
most succinctly:   
When the [CCBA] was established it was entirely patterned 
after the traditional xiangyue system.  Thus its aims and 
objectives as well as its powers were lacking in definition, 
or were described only sketchily.  These simple principles 
are still being followed, but in reality they are 
irreconcilable with the structures required for autonomous 
rule.  The organization is also obviously incongruous with 
the concept of a chamber of commerce, since it not only 
cannot unify the merchants, do research on commercial 
affairs and compete with outsiders for supremacy in the 
marketplace, but in the community it cannot even discharge 
its obligations to its fellow countrymen in passing judgment 
on right and wrong and helping the sick and suffering.386 
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Figure 20.  “Family From Consulate,” Arnold Genthe Collection, 1895-1906387 
 
As member of the Chinese Reform Association, Liang Qichao also made the following 
observation:   
I looked at the huiguan’s bylaws and found that by and 
large they were patterned after organizations in the West – 
very civilized and very detailed.  But when I observe the 
implementation, then there was not a single instance where 
the actions were not contrary to provisions of the [bylaws].  
For example, the CCBA [is to the Chinese community] as 
the municipal government is to the entire city.  But each 
time a meeting is convened, less than one in ten of the so-
                                                                                                                                                 
developed the custom of gathering in the xiangyue offices to make decisions on matters of mutual concern.  
In other instances the xiangyue assumed a policing function in neighborhoods and also organized defense 
against external threats.   
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called huiguan presidents and directors attend.  
Enforcement [of the bylaws] is lax, yet no one raises any 
questions.  Sometimes because of minor differences of 
opinion, the various huiguan will refuse to contribute their 
share of the CCBA’s operating expenses and CCBA can do 
nothing about it.388 
 
Despite these well-founded criticisms, the following chapter’s examination of its 
associative functions, including legal charitable services for members in order to 
challenge legislative exclusion, and the maintenance of Chinese tradition and culture, 
underscores its role as an organization working for the interest and welfare of the Chinese 
community.  However, one must also emphasize that huiguan did not participate in 
matters that worked against merchant interests.  It thus specifically dealt with only those 
issues upon which all strata in society had a common interest.   
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CHAPTER 5 
 
IN DADU, ‘BIG CITY’: CHARITY, EXCLUSION,  
AND THE RISE OF CHINESE NATIONALISM 
From their inception, huiguan were the organizations by which the merchant class 
maintained social control in San Francisco’s Chinatown, influencing the lives of 
nineteenth-century Chinese immigrants as soon as they arrived in San Francisco.  
Huiguan buildings served new Chinese immigrants by providing a place to lodge as well 
as providing water and facilities for cooking.  Persons returning from inland towns on the 
West Coast en route to China, or persons having finished jobs who sought new 
employment, could also find temporary lodging there.389   
While huiguan offered physical protection for its members, they also offered 
rewards for the apprehension and conviction of those who perpetrated crimes against 
their respective memberships.  Largely to instigate anti-Chinese labor sentiment and to 
pass legislative exclusion, the popular press incorrectly claimed railroad contractors paid 
Chinese laborers thirty-two dollars per month, of which “probably $2 is paid per capita 
monthly to the headmen of the coolies, this leaving $30 to the laborers.”390   Despite this 
claim, huiguan did assess their memberships in order to raise funds for operating 
expenses and for projects of common concern.   
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Figure 21.  “Tradesmen,” Arnold Genthe Collection, 1895-1906391 
 
One of the most successful functions of huiguan in San Francisco were its 
measures to prevent the absconding of defaulting debtors.  Chinese intending to return to 
China had to report to their respective huiguan upon arrival to San Francisco.  If 
members paid all debts and other financial obligations in full, huiguan issued the member 
an assessment permit, after the member paid the assessment fee.  The revenues from 
these fees went toward the huiguan’s operating expenses.392  According to one observer,  
When the immigrant is about to return to China, [the 
huiguan] collects several dollars up to $10 or $20 from 
him. . . . The [huiguan] also made arrangements with 
steamship companies so that if [the huiguan] had not 
received this assessment from the immigrant, and [the 
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huiguan] had not issued an exit permit, then the steamship 
company will not sell him a ticket.  Because of this, no one 
returning to China sought to evade contributing this amount.  
The custom has been carried out for years and has become 
an accepted practice.393    
 
  The huiguan’s issuance of special permits ensured, as the Reverend Ira M. 
Condit noted, that “they [Chinese members] are not running away from debts or claims 
against them, and that they have paid the dues [required of each member].”394  According 
to Him Mark Lai, the practice of using the power of the huiguan in San Francisco to 
ensure payment of debts developed during the early years of Chinese immigration to 
guarantee that those who arrived by the credit-ticket system would settle their accounts 
before departure. 395  Since practically all Chinese departed through San Francisco during 
the nineteenth century, San Francisco’s huiguan were in a particular strategic position to 
enforce this requirement.  To ensure compliance, each huiguan sent an inspector to the 
docks to collect exit permits from departing Chinese as they boarded ships.396   
An exception to this rule were Chinese Christians, who refused to pay the tax on 
grounds that it would be used to support idolatry in huiguan temples.  After prolonged 
negotiations, huiguan finally allowed Chinese missions and churches to issue exit permits 
and assess members of their congregations separately.397  Liang Qichao also noted that 
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American authorities sanctioned and protected the right of the huiguan to collect money 
from all departing Chinese except converted Christians.398 
Because of the continuous flow of passengers leaving for China, the collection of 
departure fees remained a major source of revenue for almost all Chinese huiguan in San 
Francisco.  According to official records, from 1908 to 1930 nearly ninety thousand 
Chinese departed from the United States.  An overwhelming majority of these were men.  
During this period the huiguan regularly dispatched officers to make sure that every 
passenger had a “departure ticket.”  CCBA bylaws adopted as late as 1930 required every 
Chinese traveler over eighteen years of age to pay the departure fee.  Huiguan also 
imposed a ten-dollar fine on those attempting to dodge the fees and a fine of one hundred 
dollars for each huiguan officer assisting them.399 Late in the nineteenth century, dues 
increased to nine dollars per passenger.  They increased to eleven dollars early in the 
twentieth century, providing for an allocation of three dollars to the CCBA, four dollars 
and fifty cents to Chinese charity societies, one dollar to the Chinese Hospital, and one 
dollar to financing the fight against anti-Chinese legislation.400  When a special need 
arose, huiguan collected additional fees.  In 1914, for example, the CCBA required an 
additional fifty cents to required fees in order to help the Peace Association, established 
to respond to internal violence. 401   During the Great Depression dutiful collectors 
sometimes collided with uncooperative passengers.  After such a collision turned violent 
in 1931, the Pacific Mail Steamship Company demanded the arrest of collectors and the 
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Chinese consulate had to instruct the CCBA to restrain their fee collecting officers “in 
order to avoid the criticism of outsiders.”402 
Despite its success in preventing the absconding of defaulting debtors and 
collecting assessments contributing to the benefit of the community, huiguan did face 
challenges in mediating this role.  Moreover, not all native kinsmen felt like being 
charitable all the time.  On November 21, 1890, the New York Times reported the story 
that one of the most extensive merchandising houses in San Francisco, Tong Yoong and 
Company, who were also labor contractors, fled to China with forty-thousand dollars 
belonging to two-hundred and forty Chinese fishermen returning from Alaska.  The 
article ranked the firm of Geong Hen Ven and Haw Mee Sen in importance “next to the 
Six Companies.”  The absconders owed creditors over twenty-thousand dollars, making 
their total liabilities over sixty-thousand dollars.  The article further noted “failures” from 
the CCBA assessment system amounting to over two-hundred and fifty thousand dollars 
in that month alone.  A riot in San Francisco ensued.  The Chinese fishermen, left 
penniless after a whole season’s work, marched to the store of Tong Fung, one of the 
labor contractors’ bondsmen, and forcibly took possession of the store.  Fifty fishermen 
closed the heavy iron doors and declared they would remain inside until they received 
their wages.  Another crowd of fishermen occupied the store of Chew Chong, another 
bondsman, but failed to capture it due to police interference.  While the report 
acknowledged “serious trouble is expected,” the CCBA issued a proclamation stating 
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they would do everything in their power for the fishermen.  At the time of the report, 
Tong Fung’s store was still in the possession of the rioters.403  
Dutifully playing the role of the Chinese patriarchy in San Francisco’s Chinatown 
in the nineteenth century, huiguan leaders did not hesitate to use force on those who 
defied their authority.  For example, one Ah Ti allegedly “inflicted severe corporal 
punishment upon many of his more humble countrymen . . . cutting off their ears, 
flogging them or keeping them chained.”  These harsh disciplinary measures ceased only 
after the San Francisco County Grand Jury exposed them in 1853.404  In 1907, the New 
York Times also reported on a CCBA-issued notice for a meeting held to discuss the 
claims made by American and Chinese firms in which Chinese debtors repudiated monies 
owed after the San Francisco earthquake and subsequent fire.  Claims were to be placed 
in the hands of the CCBA on behalf of the Chinese government:  “Where insurance has 
been collected by debtors who have refused payment of the claims against them, the 
relatives of the debtors are to be captured in China, it is said, and thrown into prison, to 
be held until the debtors meet their obligations.”405  This type of “insurance” practice was 
not new to Chinese in San Francisco.  As early as the Qin Dynasty (221-206 B.C.E.), 
authorities began to hold the relatives of accused individuals responsible for their actions. 
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The power huiguan exercised over Chinese laborers also gave apparent credence 
to the charge that they imported emigrants from China to perform servile coolie labor.  
Initial charges occurred in the early-1850s, fueled by the notoriety of the Chinese coolie 
trade.  This impression persisted in the larger Euro-American society, effectively utilized 
by anti-Chinese agitators pushing for a legislative ban on Chinese immigration.  Euro-
American missionaries and Chinese Christians, both of whom were familiar with the 
operations of the huiguan and had no affinity toward it, consistently denied the veracity 
of these accusations.  While one cannot say for certain that huiguan were directly 
responsible for the importation of coolie labor, they did play an integral role in ensuring 
the smooth operation of the credit-ticket system of Chinese immigration for many 
years.406   
While huiguan could be authoritarian in their debt-collecting duties, the larger 
Euro-American society also recognized them for their charitable functions and 
contributions.  The Los Angeles Times reported the overcrowding of San Francisco’s 
Chinatown in 1886, caused by “the immense influx from interior towns,” and “owing to 
the anti-Chinese movement.”  “The Chinese merchants are doing no business in the 
country,” stated the Los Angeles Times, “and are withdrawing credit from the country 
merchants.  The Chinese companies are securing tickets to China for poor Chinamen for 
$25, and it is stated that $10 of this sum is paid by the companies.”407   
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Figure 22.  “Chinese Cook,” Arnold Genthe Collection, 1895-1906408 
 
Huiguan also maintained cemeteries, providing medicine and burial expenses for 
the poor, and donating passage money to China for the infirm and indigent elderly.409  
However, they provided so few other services for their membership that Consul General 
Huang Zunxian wrote in disappointment:   
According to my investigation each huiguan has 
comparatively large incomes.  Yet they have not provided 
for the welfare of the membership with this money 
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collected from them.  None of the huiguan can escape 
criticism on this point.  Although their reputation might not 
be as bad as stated by the white people, yet there are areas 
which they can justly be attacked.410  
  
Huang Zunxian decried the lack of social services that “fulfilled the people’s hope” and 
noted that its roots were in internal organizational weaknesses:   
The huiguan operate with few established rules.  The 
money they collect is not accountable to anyone.  If the 
directors and interpreters are men of integrity, then the 
organization’s functions are carried out reasonably well.  If 
not, then powerful individuals and large clans can entrench 
themselves; unscrupulous persons can purchase property, 
profit from it, and line their pockets.411   
 
Under the guiding principle of the CCBA’s tendency to only deal with matters 
that would not jeopardize huiguan interests and would instead benefit all strata of society 
could benefit, it provided support for San Francisco’s Donghua (in Cantonese, Tung Wah) 
Dispensary in 1900 and was one of the fifteen founding organizations of the Chinese 
hospital in 1920.412 Consulate officials also directly involved themselves with matters 
concerning the welfare of San Francisco’s Chinese community, including the 
construction of a Chinese hospital providing free services.  While the hospital generally 
supported the Chinese community, over ten Euro-American San Franciscans pledged an 
annual subscription of five dollars.  Donations continued, as well as the huiguan fees 
collected from departing Chinese passengers, which remained a constant source of 
considerable revenue for the hospital.413   Before the establishment of the consulate, 
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Chinese in San Francisco had health agencies.  In 1870, a Chinese Asylum on Pine Street 
housed a staff of eleven, including two doctors and a cook.  Most of the patients were 
Chinese laborers.414  Understanding the difficulties Chinese had in obtaining adequate 
medical care, the consul general, together with the CCBA, began collecting money to 
build a Chinese hospital.  In 1888, the consulate issued instructions to huiguan officials 
involved in the project to coordinate closely with one another without dodging 
responsibilities.415   
 In 1909 the CCBA established the Daqing Qiaomin Xuetang, the predecessor of 
the present-day Chinese Central High School, to teach Chinese language and culture to 
Chinese American children.416  To protect San Francisco’s Chinatown against nocturnal 
prowlers, the CCBA hired night watchmen to make rounds.  It also acted as a 
clearinghouse for fund-raising campaigns, in large part because these fund-raising 
projects could open many opportunities for donations to respective huiguan.  Many 
CCBA actions protected the interests of the business community.  For example, before 
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the advent of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, the CCBA acted as witness for 
changes of ownership and property sales.417 
Several Chinese immigrants to the United States traveled back to China.  In 1853, 
one year after the recorded arrival of 20,026 Chinese immigrants, 4,421 returned to China, 
outnumbering those immigrating to the United States in the same year.418  Moreover, 
China was not always the end of the American journey for those who returned.  After 
their return, many Chinese said farewell to loved ones and crossed the Pacific once 
again.419  
Scholars of Chinese American history often mention two important reasons for 
their return:  anti-Chinese discrimination and the unbalanced ratio of Chinese men to 
women in America.  However, many other immigrant groups in America returned 
without the presence of these two factors.  To comprehend Chinese immigrants’ 
pervasive desire to return to China, therefore, one must look at the cultural traditions and 
socioeconomic forces at work within Chinese society in San Francisco.  Most importantly, 
one must remember the importance of native community in the minds and lives of 
Chinese immigrants. 
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Figure 23.  “A Merchant” in Chinatown, Arnold Genthe Collection, 1895-1906420 
 
In her 1986 study Carol B. Brettel illustrates the importance of what she terms 
“migration to return” in the history of Portuguese immigration.  She concludes that this 
“can be viewed in the Portuguese context as an ideology that defines or gives meaning to 
experience.” 421   For many Chinese, the act of returning signified not only their 
commitment to family responsibility but also a mentality, if not an ideology, deeply 
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rooted in their homeland.  To Chinese, native community remained the center of their 
world and the place in which one could return to achieve ultimate self-fulfillment.  Only 
there could one fully appreciate and acknowledge their experiences, and especially their 
successes, overseas.  Indeed, as Yong Chen illustrates, doing so meant one sought 
ronggui, meaning “a glorious return.”422   
As in Indochina, not all immigrants wishing to return to China could do so in their 
lifetime, and, unable to return alive, many immigrants requested their bodies or ashes be 
sent back to China to be with loved ones.  That wish, wrote Reverend A.W. Loomis, 
demonstrated the Chinese “love for his native land, and the desire that his last resting-
place shall be where the ashes of his kindred lie.”423  The collective efforts of huiguan to 
ship the dead to China started as early as the mid-1850s.  In most cases, Chinese buried 
the bodies in America first before exhuming them for transportation to China.  On May 
14, 1855, the Sunny South left San Francisco for China carrying the remains of seventy 
Chinese.424  A few months later, on the night of November 12, 1855, the bones of another 
twenty people arrived by boat from Sacramento for transportation to China.425  This 
practice came under attack at the height of the anti-Chinese movement.  In the 1870s, the 
city of San Francisco even attempted to prohibit it.426  Sending bodies back to China was 
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not only time consuming but also entailed “a considerable expense.”427   It involved 
raising funds, locating Chinese graves, exhuming the bodies, and purchasing coffins.  
Euro-American hostility added a new cost.  In 1886 Zhang Yinhuan received a report 
from the consulate in San Francisco stating Euro-American authorities charged ten 
dollars for every coffin sent to China.  In a letter to the State Department Zhang protested 
that Chinese discrimination “is now applied to dried bones.”428 
The tradition nevertheless persisted because huiguan invested many resources to 
sustain it.  On April 28, 1856, three hundred and thirty-six Chinese coffins returned to 
China.  Eight Chinese charity groups handled two hundred and twenty-eight of them were 
and relatives handled the remaining eight.429  In 1862 the Panyu charity house under the 
Sanyi Huiguan carried out its first operation to ship the remains of deceased Panyu 
natives back to their land of origin.  By the spring of 1863 the charity house raised more 
than twenty-five thousand dollars and shipped the remains of two hundred and fifty-eight 
at an actual cost of $20,500.430  Transported back to their native community, as one 
Panyu man noted, the deceased could finally “rest in peace.”431   
Chinese exhumations also received attention in the popular press.  The New York 
Times reported that three Chinese merchants from San Francisco, Moy Ah How, Wong 
Ye Shin, and Lee Ma Yu, representing the CCBA, arrived in New York on a “novel 
mission.”  The article provided its own explanation for the practice:  
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The surplus in the treasury of the Six Company syndicate 
has grown so large that the managers have voted to reduce 
it by shipping to China the bones of every dead Chinaman 
in the United States.432   
 
The report further noted that the committee was in New York to visit Eastern cities to 
have Chinese buried there “because their friends were too poor to ship them to China 
immediately after death disinterred and forwarded to their native land.”  While the 
merchants emphasized “there was no particular superstition connected” with the 
exhumations, they occurred “to gratify the natural wish that one has to have his bones rest 
near those of his forefathers.”433  The New York Times also reported on the exhumations 
occurring in San Francisco.  On May 18, 1893, a representative of the “Ying [most likely 
the Yanghe] Company,” identified as “one of the Six Companies,” notified San Francisco 
health officers that within ten days they would proceed to disinter six-hundred bodies and 
send their remains to China.  The city of San Francisco detailed a corps of inspectors to 
supervise the exhumations.434  
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Figure 24.  Chinese “Death Ship” Sails, ca. 1858, San Francisco Maritime Museum435 
 
So much Chinese support for huiguan-sponsored charity organizations existed 
that these organizations managed to stay in business for relatively long periods of time.  
Some were even able to save a considerable amount of money.436  As late as 1913, the 
Los Angeles Times reported the disinterment of the “Los Angeles quota” for the “Great 
Funeral Ship” carrying the remains of “departed Celestials” back to China.  Under the 
general direction of the CCBA, Wong Su and an attorney from Santa Rosa, as well as 
Henry Sief, the city mortuary clerk, began searching burial records in an attempt to 
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classify one-hundred and fifty “relativeless” Chinese buried in the Chinese plot of the 
Evergreen Cemetery in Santa Rosa, California.  Along with three-hundred and fifty 
Chinese buried in Los Angeles cemeteries, the Chinese dead of Santa Rosa “join[ed] the 
great hegira of the dead to their native country, the funeral ship for which is to sail from 
some California port within the next few months.”437   
With the disinterment of over two-thousand bodies in northern California, where 
“the uneasy and restless souls are possessed of earthly kith and kin the transfer is 
arranged under [CCBA] direction, but in many instances the dead are unknown, and it is 
in their behalf that the Six Companies is interesting itself.”438  The investigatory group’s 
list of Chinese dead dated back to 1888, and the group spent several weeks on the job. 
Upon finishing the identification process, the legal work began.  The Chinese had to gain 
the consent of local authorities, as well as convince the California Board of Health that 
“divorce of the bones from the earth to which they were returned will not involve the 
health of those whose souls are still clothed in mundane style and taking the usual 
number of hours sleep every day.”  While the article recognized the “Chinese superstition 
[that] there is no rest until the remains are safely interred in native soil,” and that the “Six 
Companies and thousands of uncles, cousins and parents are going to the heavy expense 
of finding a new sepulcher for their departed,” the article acknowledged its practice in the 
minds of Westerners as an “interesting and strange ceremony . . . [that] will accompany 
the exhuming and preparation of the unusual cargo, and local Chinese will take suitable 
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cognizance of the occurrence.”439  The energy and money the living sent in carrying out 
the wishes of the dead reveals the importance the Chinese placed on cultural identity as 
well as their native land as the ultimate place of rest. 
 
 
Figure 25.  “New Year’s Day Before the Theatre,” Arnold Genthe, 1895-1906440 
 
For Chinese immigrants, cultural identity was not just a state of mind.  They 
publicly displayed and celebrated it.  One of the primary functions of huiguan in 
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Indochina and San Francisco was its celebration of Chinese New Year, where “gorgeous 
lanterns were suspended in front of doors or hung in rows from the numerous balconies,” 
and the crackle of firecrackers filled the air along with the thunder of gongs and drums.441  
Such celebrations, as The Oriental noted perceptively in 1855, helped the “heart of the 
old empire to give another grand beat and heave the tide of life for another year.”442  
Through New Year celebrations, San Francisco’s huiguan displaced Chinese identity 
with persistence and tenacity, virtually ignoring the larger society’s attempts to stifle 
these celebrations.  During the Chinese New Year of 1876, for example, a Chinese 
violation of San Francisco’s ban on fireworks led to the arrest of more than a dozen 
people and a fine of five dollars for each individual.443  
While Chinese celebrations often led to police arrests, the Chinese of San 
Francisco actively requested permission from police authorities to conduct New Year 
celebrations.  Writing on behalf of the CCBA to John Martin, Chief of Police in San 
Francisco on January 29, 1910, Hsu Ping Chen congratulated him on his “honorable 
appointment . . . and that you have already entered office to discharge your duty.”  He 
informed Martin that for Chinese New Year (February 9, 1910), there would be a display 
of Chinese goods to sell on Chinatown’s sidewalks for ten days before and after the New 
Year, and requested permission to “carry on their business in the above described.”  He 
also made one additional request:  “And again for the same favor will you also allow 
                                                 
441
 Catherine Baldwin, “The Sixth Year of  Qwong See,” Harper’s New Monthly Magazine 62, no. 
367 (December 1880):  72. 
 
442
 The Oriental, February 15, 1855.  The English Section. 
  
443
 Ibid., February 5, 1876.  The English Section. 
  
 172  
them to shoot ‘Frire Crakers’ [sic] for the celebration of the occasion on the New Year 
Eve and commencing until seven days afterward.”444 
During the festivities of the Empress Dowager’s birthday and the creation of the 
CCBA, the Alta described the Chinese cultural festivities in San Francisco:   
From the housetop of every prominent residence and 
business house in Chinatown floated the Chinese dragon, 
and the exteriors were decorated with gaudy lanterns.  The 
merchants took occasion to express their loyalty to the 
mother country by sumptuous banquets and entertainments, 
while the poorer classes celebrated the day in a more 
humble way.  The usual noisy explosions of firecrackers 
and bombs which occurred formerly on all heathen 
holidays were not heard, owing to the fact that the Police 
were ready to pounce upon any offender who gave vent to 
his patriotism in such a demonstrative manner.445 
 
The exhibition of cultural distinctiveness was by no means just a festive activity.  It was 
deeply imbedded in everyday life.  By wearing their “queer looking” 446 clothes and 
queue, Chinese in San Francisco and throughout America made a constant statement 
about their ethnic identity.   
The historian Daniel Boorstin affirms the social significance of dress in his 
discussion of the connection between “the American democracy of clothing” and the 
American democracy of politics:  “If as the Old World proverb went, ‘clothes make the 
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man,’ the New World’s new way of clothing would help make new men.”447  In similar 
fashion, one may say that the traditional style of dress helped the Chinese to maintain and 
announce their identity.   
The prevalence of Chinese dress also made a deep impression on Chinese visitors 
to San Francisco.  In 1868, a Chinese official in the Burlingame delegation asserted that 
less than one percent of the Chinese in San Francisco changed to a Western style of 
dress.448  The queue was another ubiquitous traditional symbol, with its cultural meanings 
well known.  Originally imposed on the Chinese by the Manchus, the queue, according to 
contemporary Euro-Americans, “ceased to be the symbol of the victory of the 
Mantchurians [sic]” in the late nineteenth century. 449   In a simplified analogy, one 
American stated that the queue “is what our Star-Spangled Banner is.”450  The Reverend 
Otis Gibson remarked, “So long as the queue is retained the Chinese fashion of dress will 
be retained.”  He summarized their cultural significance:  “These two things will forever 
make them a distinct and peculiar people.”451   
                                                 
447
 Daniel J. Boorstin, The Americans:  The Democratic Experience (New York, NY:  Random 
House, 1965), 92.  
 
448
 Yong Chen, Chinese San Francisco, 138. 
  
449
 M. von Brandt, Chinese Pigtails and What Hangs Thereby (New York, NY:  Tucker, 1900), 4. 
  
450
 Report of the Joint Special Committee, 640.  
 
451
 Gibson, The Chinese In America (Cincinnati, Ohio:  Hitchcock and Walden, 1877), 77.  
 
 174  
 
Figure 26.  “Children of High Class,” Arnold Genthe Collection, 1895-1906452 
 
During the second half of the nineteenth century, most Chinese Christians did not 
abandon the queue, and they also maintained their Chinese style of dress.  Countering a 
widely-held assumption that they discarded the two traditions, Reverend Gibson wrote:  
“That is a mistake.  Some two or three Chinese Christians have adopted the American 
dress and have discarded the queue, but the Chinese Christians have generally not done 
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so.”453  This reveals that Christian conversion did not signify fundamental assimilation.  
Perhaps wearing the same attire as their countrymen helped converts mingle with others 
in the community.  In reference to the presence of Chinese Christians, Chin Fong Chow 
stated:  “I would not know one if I should see him.”454  At the close of the nineteenth 
century Frederick J. Masters noted, “It is true that every Christian Chinaman does not cut 
off his queue or adopt American costume.”455 
Chinese cultural customs were under increasing attack by the anti-Chinese 
movement, viewing these traditions as a statement of non-conformity.456  As early as 
1855 an article in The Oriental stated:  “The Chinese in this city have often been made 
fun of, humiliated and bullied, because [they] do not dress the American way.”  At the 
1876 congressional hearing on Chinese immigration, when the Reverend A.W. Loomis 
testified that a Chinese man named Yung Wing “has been gathering up facts [concerning 
anti-Chinese discrimination],” the representative of San Francisco, Frank M. Pixley, 
interjected promptly and irrelevantly:  “We will cut off his queue.”  Loomis responded:  
“He is an American citizen.”  “Then he will not want a queue,” Pixley insisted.457  
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Pixley’s arrogance exemplified widespread Euro-American hostility toward the queue.  
In the same year, the city of San Francisco passed the Queue Ordinance, declaring that 
“every male person imprisoned in the county jail . . . should immediately upon his arrival 
at the jail, have the hair of his heat ‘cut or clipped to an [sic] uniform length of one inch 
from the scalp thereof.’”458   
Chinese in San Francisco resisted Euro-American pressures to conform, 
indicating once again that the persistence of cultural identity was not simply a result of 
oppression.  They held dear their way of dress because it represented a Chinese tradition 
too deeply rooted in their life to be easily discarded.  The refusal to cut one’s queue, 
however, was a much more complex issues.  As queues were a Manchu hairstyle imposed 
on the Chinese upon the establishment of the Qing Dynasty in 1644, to appear in China 
without a queue signified rebellion of the imposed regime, and therefore immediate 
execution.  Therefore, Chinese rebels during China’s 1911 Revolution declared a 
powerful statement of rebellion when they cut their queues.459  Demonstrating the lack of 
knowledge on the part of Euro-Americans, Chinese proved unwilling to cut their queues 
because, as an editorial stated, “the body and hair are inherited from parents to which 
[they] must not do any damage.”460  As a facet of each individual’s cultural identity and 
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dignity, having it cut by white officials meant “a grave humiliation.”  If that happened, 
the editorial asked, “how can [one] face the hometown fellows and relatives?”461   
The community made conscious and sometimes concerted efforts to uphold its 
cultural identity, often punishing those who strayed.   According to Reverend Loomis, a 
youth “provoked [the] wrath of his relatives and brought upon himself a fearful torrent of 
abuse and castigation,” because he exhibited “symptoms of forsaking the customs and 
traditions of his fathers” by discarding the Chinese style of dress.462   Acting as the 
guardians of Chinese cultural tradition, huiguan constitutions stipulated individuals who 
adopted Western-style clothes could not join, nor would these individuals enjoy huiguan 
protection.463   
One must emphasize, however that not all individuals conformed to traditional 
modes of Chinese dress.  Lisa See meticulously documents the details of her ancestors’ 
remarkable history through her utilization of sources found at the National Archives and 
several historical societies, as well as her compilation of nearly one-hundred interviews 
with relatives.  In her study, she recounts the life of her great-grandfather, Fong See who, 
while establishing his own business in California, married a Euro-American woman and 
fathered many offspring.  He would return periodically to China to redistribute some his 
wealth and launch another family.  Fong See adopted Western-styled dress as early as the 
1870s.464 
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San Francisco’s Chinatown thus became a contested battlefield between two 
cultures.  In 1876, in an attempt to counter Western influence, huiguan sponsored a 
lecture series.  Subjects of this lecture series included the Emperor Kangxi’s Confucian 
edicts on education from the early Qing Dynasty.465  In a public announcement, the 
huiguan explained the significance of the lectures.  In order to preserve the Chinese way 
of life in a land “not under the influence of [Chinese] civilization,” it stated, “we must 
listen to the Imperial Edicts.”466  The lecture series ran from 11:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. 
every day for several months.  In the course of the series, huiguan officials moved the 
lecture location from huiguan headquarters to a theatre to accommodate the increasing 
audience.467   
This event did not escape the attention of the missionaries.  Reverend Gibson 
reported:  “During the last few months the Chinese have employed a teacher or preacher 
from China to read and expound the teachings of Confucius, and the ceremonials of 
heathen worship.” 468   Gibson understood that it represented the Chinese “cultural 
counterattack” on Chinese missions:  “The constant preaching of the Gospel of Jesus has 
had the effect, at least, to excite the Chinese to take a little active effort to teach their own 
peculiar national doctrines.”469  Gibson continued:   
While Christian Chinamen have been expounding the 
Gospel of Jesus in the ‘Gospel Temple,’ a heathen 
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Chinaman has been expounding the philosophy of 
Confucius and the ceremonial of idolatry in a heathen 
theatre, on the opposite side of the street.470 
 
Reporting on the popularity of this lecture series on May 30, 1876, the San Francisco 
Chronicle estimated that six hundred to one thousand Chinese attended the lecture 
series.471 
 While awareness of Chinese culture and tradition constituted an important part of 
huiguan identity, Chinese in general did not overwhelm themselves with Euro-American 
efforts to transform them.  They preserved and proudly and publicly demonstrated their 
cultural distinctiveness, less as a response to racism than an outcome of the native-place 
connections deeply ingrained in each individual’s life.  It is a mistake to view this 
consciousness, illustrated in huiguan efforts to preserve Chinese tradition and culture, for 
nascent political nationalism.  As historian Yong Chen asserts, in the nineteenth century 
such consciousness defined itself primarily by cultural and historical ties.  Chinese in San 
Francisco were not yet participants in national political events in China.472   
This lack of nationalism among Chinese in San Francisco deeply disturbed Liang 
Qichao on his visit in 1903, and he wrote critically that they had “the quality of the 
clansmen, not that of the citizen,” and “the village spirit, not the national spirit.”473  
Liang’s criticism reflected his elitist, Western-influenced intellectualism and his 
eagerness to modernize Chinese society.  It eventually became clear, however, that 
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Chinese tradition in San Francisco, embodied in huiguan, constituted the fertile ground 
for the emergence of political nationalism. 
Increasing anti-Chinese agitation in California during the 1870s ultimately led the 
United States Congress to pass a series of Chinese exclusion acts beginning in 1882.  The 
implementation of these laws abruptly halted Chinese immigration.  Traditional huiguan 
foundations of power began to erode, relegating the maintenance of social control as 
secondary to the larger problem of ensuring the very survival of San Francisco’s Chinese 
community within this hostile environment.  The CCBA emerged as the acknowledged 
leader of the Chinese community, its ascendancy marked by a growing sense of identity 
among the Chinese as a larger community rather than as individual huiguan members 
asserting native-place connections. 474   
The primary objective of the CCBA in 1882 was to garner Chinese community 
support to effectively challenge legislative exclusion.  Placing its trust in the American 
judicial system, the CCBA was often successful in nullifying or modifying hostile 
measures.  However, the Chinese response to the anti-Chinese movement was not 
monolithic but, rather, multifaceted, disclosing both Chinese and Western influence on an 
emerging Chinese American consciousness.  Most of the time, local Chinese elite used 
the same approach as appointed Chinese officials.  They refuted charges made against the 
Chinese and stressed American ideals of equality and fair treatment.   
Chinese often expressed frustration over the hostile actions of Euro-American 
society anonymously.  For example, many individuals inscribed poems on the barrack 
walls of Angel Island’s detention facility, or wrote anonymous articles protesting 
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discriminatory treatment and Chinese exclusion.  Still others, particularly prominent 
Chinese merchants, diplomats and students educated in America, wrote articles in 
popular magazines and journals and gave speeches to middle- and upper-class Americans.   
After the passage of the first Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, and in his 
graduating address at Yale University entitled “The Other Side of the Chinese Question,” 
Yan Phou Lee, a Christian student brought to America by the Chinese Educational 
Mission, challenged the absurdity of Euro-American charges against the Chinese and the 
justification of exclusion.  In the same year of his graduation, both the Rochester Herald 
and the New York Times advertised the marriage of Yan Phou Lee to Elizabeth Jerdine of 
Rochester, New York.475  The article described how, in 1882, he was selected out of a 
contingent of young men who took a Chinese examination qualifying him to receive an 
education in America “at the expense of China,” and Yale was the preferred institution.  
According to the article, in the course of one year, while students faced studies at Yale 
with great enthusiasm and eagerness, the nation had a change of heart and recalled the 
students.  Captivated by the “republican air,” Yan Phou Lee chose to finish his education 
in the United States, never again to return to China “except on peril of losing his head.”  
He continued his studies at Yale, while paying for his education by reporting for the local 
press and completing clerical work.  Yale awarded him the Larned scholarship, and he 
was further distinguished by awards in political economy, history, and law, as well as his 
proficiency in English.  At the time of the published article, Yan Phou Lee planned to 
continue for one more year at Yale to earn his Ph.D. at the age of twenty-six.  He opened 
his graduating address by asserting, 
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The catastrophe [the violation of the U.S. Constitution] [is] 
too terrible, and has made too deep an impression to be 
forgotten.  Even if Americans are disposed to forget, the 
Chinese will not fail to keep the sad record of faith unkept, 
of persecution permitted by an enlightened people, of rights 
violated without redress in a land where all are equal before 
the law.476   
  
Yan Phou Lee decried the apathy of Euro-American society.  While alluding to 
the hypocrisy of America’s Christian populace, “enemies of the Chinese laborer” could 
be “counted by the millions,” while few individuals voiced protests against the 
humiliating treatment toward Chinese in America.  In a moment of prescience, regarding 
the alleged threat to employment opportunities for Euro-Americans and the subsequent 
efforts to deport Chinese laborers in America, he stated:  
For be assured that after the Chinese have all departed, 
those men who are determined to get high wages for doing 
nothing will turn against other peaceful sons of toil; and 
who would venture to say that there will be absolute safety 
for the native American?  Mob rule knows no respect for 
persons; the Chinese were attacked first simply because 
they were the weakest.477 
 
Yan Phou Lee further challenged the absurdity of assumptions made about 
“China’s four hundred millions waiting for an opening to inundate the country,” and 
provided contextual comparisons of the number of immigrants arriving from other 
countries at the same time to further refute this charge.  He spoke to the very nature of the 
Chinese community in attempt to dispel popular Euro-American myths about their nature, 
while also illuminating the functions of huiguan: 
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The Chinese are by nature and from habit gregarious, but 
not migratory.  They dislike to cut adrift from the ties of 
kindred, the associations of home, the traditions of 
fatherland.  The belief that their welfare in the future life 
depends on the proper burial of their remains in home-soil, 
followed by sorrowing children and tearful widow, curbs 
their desire to go abroad, even with the hope of bettering 
their condition . . . you will find that Chinese immigrants 
are usually poor on landing . . . and so they must rely upon 
their countrymen who have preceded them for assistance.  
This is afforded by the Six Companies, who accordingly 
have a lien on their wages.478 
 
The conclusion of Yan Phou Lee’s address called upon his fellow colleagues to remain 
steadfast in their “duties as lovers of justice and fatherland, in not [original emphasis] 
enforcing your opinions in public and in private, as well as in church and State.”479  
  In their collective effort, and in writing President Ulysses S. Grant in 1876 before 
the passage of the first Chinese exclusion act, huiguan declared:  not all Chinese women 
in the United States were prostitutes and that Euro-American  men were a part of this 
sordid business as well; that the Chinese diet, although different from that of many 
Americans, was hardly a cause for immigration restriction; that the Chinese Six 
Companies was not a secret tribunal; and that the Chinese in America were wage earners, 
not slaves.  “If these men are slaves,” they asserted, “then all men laboring for wages are 
slaves.”480  Huiguan also pointed out that the United States had a policy to “welcome 
immigration,” that the Burlingame Treaty of 1868 provided for Chinese immigration to 
America, and that Chinese “neither attempted nor desired to interfere with the established 
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order of things in this country, either of politics or religion.”481  In other words, no cause 
existed for singling out the Chinese for exclusion.   
Huiguan officials, including diplomats, intellectuals, and the local elite who spoke 
out against Chinese exclusion maintained a Sino-centric worldview, defending China as a 
country traditionally considering itself the center of the civilized world.  Huiguan 
protested American immigration policies because it offended their Chinese sensibilities 
and demanded fair treatment for themselves and their lower-class compatriots on the 
basis of China’s great civilization and past achievements.  When seeking equal treatment, 
huiguan often resorted to denigrating other ethnic groups to elevate the status of the 
Chinese.  Even their appeals to justice and fairness were tactics designed to force 
Americans to live up to the rhetoric of democracy, even if little indication existed that 
huiguan spokespersons actually believed in democratic processes.  
San Francisco’s racially-charged environment undoubtedly enhanced Chinese 
national awareness, and the formation of the CCBA was largely a response to these new 
conditions.  However, the numerous public documents issued in protest of anti-Chinese 
discrimination to American public officials, including the president of the United States, 
members of Congress, and San Francisco city officials used such terms as “our Chinese 
people” or “our countrymen.”  Huiguan reminded Congress that America and China had 
respective obligations to treat “our people resident here” and “your people resident in 
China” fairly; clear boundary delineations existed between “we” and “you.” 482     
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Huiguan published pamphlets, continued to send petitions to the federal 
government, and sponsored the publication of books written by Americans friendly to the 
Chinese.483  These cumulative attempts reflect a concerted effort in the 1870s to answer 
the charges against Chinese immigration and to correct the misconceptions about Chinese 
culture, traditions, and community life.  These efforts, however, failed to reverse Chinese 
exclusion. 
The passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act prompted many Chinese in San 
Francisco to reexamine their experience in the United States and to find the reasons for 
their ineffectiveness in challenging the anti-Chinese movement.  Lack of political 
influence was one deciding factor in the Chinese failure to defeat exclusionary legislation.  
The solution was, therefore, greater Chinese participation in American politics.  
Moreover, despite the hardships involved, many Chinese continued to respond to 
exclusion by maintaining transnational households, even for several generations. 484  
Others engaged in fierce battles against the law and its enforcement, charging the United 
States government with racial discrimination and injustice. 
The CCBA in San Francisco spoke on behalf of Chinese communities across the 
United States.  In 1885, the CCBA issued a proclamation describing the treatment of 
Chinese in the United States.  An article in the Los Angeles Times characterized the 
“Chinese Six Companies” as embracing the “troubles” occurring at Eureka, California, 
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Seattle, Washington and Rock Springs, Wyoming.  More than “troubles” occurred in 
these communities and others throughout the American West.  Years of widespread 
hostility against the Chinese culminated in violence during the 1880s, whereby Euro-
Americans forcibly expelled and killed Chinese, destroying Chinese homes, business, and 
personal property.  After the Rock Springs riot, anti-Chinese mob violence quickly spread 
to other regions in the West.  Historians estimate Chinese property damages totaled in the 
millions.485    The proclamation, as the article attests, “estimates the damage which the 
Chinese sustained.  Copies have been forwarded to the Chinese Minister at Washington, 
who, it is supposed, will make it the basis of a claim against the United States 
government.”486  
Chinese immigrants began to challenge the legality of the exclusion laws through 
the judicial system and protest American exclusion policies individually and through 
community organizations.  They hired lawyers and used the courts to affirm the rights of 
merchant families, returning laborers, and American citizens of Chinese descent and their 
families to enter and reenter the country.  The CCBA and the Chinese consulate 
sponsored many of the early court cases, and individual Chinese were also extremely 
successful at using the federal courts to overturn denials by the immigration service.487   
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One of the most valuable resources for CCBA and Chinese individuals during the 
exclusion era was the organized network of immigration lawyers facilitating Chinese 
entry and reentry through its record keeping and lobbying on behalf of Chinese clients, 
tasks that would prove extremely difficult for any organization on its own.  The number 
of immigration lawyers hired for Chinese immigration cases grew in direct proportion to 
the increasing complexity of the exclusion laws and their severe enforcement.  Chinese 
established a long history of hiring the best American lawyers to challenge anti-Chinese 
measures even before 1882.488   
As early as 1853, lawyers sent letters to Congress on behalf of Chinese miners to 
complain about California’s foreign miners’ tax.489   One of the most successful and 
diligent attorneys hired by the CCBA was attorney Carroll Cook, discussed later in this 
chapter, who spoke on behalf of the organization as well as individual Chinese.  Cook not 
only petitioned and protested the treatment of Chinese in San Francisco, but also made 
appeals on behalf of Chinese communities in San Jose and Los Angeles, as well as 
Chinese communities throughout America, including Arizona, Georgia, Texas, and West 
Virginia. 
    The passage of the Geary Act in 1892 not only extended Chinese exclusion for 
another ten years, but also, to the indignation of the Chinese, required Chinese laborers in 
the United States to register for certificates of residence, imposing heavy penalties on 
violators of the provision.  Angered by the Act, the Chinese vice-consul in San Francisco 
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asserted the system of registration required by the act placed the Chinese “on the level of 
your dogs.”490  The Geary Act faced organized resistance from Chinese communities 
across the nation and resulted in a resolution denouncing it as “monstrous, inhuman and 
unconstitutional.”491   The CCBA for its part urged Chinese laborers not to register, 
declaring the law unconstitutional and hiring lawyers to bring a test case in 1893, Fong 
Yue Ting v. United States.  The Supreme Court decision upheld the right of Congress to 
expel or deport Chinese, declaring the state’s unconfined power over immigration as 
sovereign. The Supreme Court decision upholding the Geary Act had a chilling effect on 
the number of Chinese arrivals:  39,579 Chinese immigrated in 1882; only 472 entered 
the United States in 1893. 492   
No time seemed to catch the popular press’s attention more in its discussion of the 
“Chinese Six Companies” than the passage of the Geary Act.  The New York Times, in 
particular, reported extensively on events in San Francisco’s Chinatown leading up to the 
Supreme Court decision.  Eight months before the decision, the CCBA reportedly sent a 
committee of seven men to New York to visit all of the stores in the “Chinese quarter” to 
secure signatures from all Chinese merchants for a petition.  This petition allegedly 
requested “agents’ be sent to America to “get acquainted with all the circumstances of the 
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Registration act by conferring with all Chinese in this city, and then to proceed to 
Washington and request President Harrison to take some action to nullify the law.”493   
 
 
Figure 27.  "Certificate of Residence," 1892494 
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One Times report informed its readership that Chinese had time to comply with 
the provisions of the Geary Act.  All Chinese laborers had one year to apply to the 
Collector of Internal Revenue within their respective districts for a certificate of residence, 
under rules established by the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury.  Any Chinese laborer found 
without the certificate would be arrested and “examined” before a United States Judge.  It 
remained to be seen, however, “whether the hundred thousand Chinamen in this country 
can be brought to disobey the law.”  The report concluded:  
. . . the whole question of the right to exclude Chinamen 
seems to be at stake, which is quite a different matter from 
the requirement to procure ‘tickets of leave’ as they 
indignantly call their certificates of residence.  The 
restriction of immigration is one thing and the imposition 
of hardships on residents is quite another . . . One thing safe 
to predict is that the great body of Chinamen will take no 
risk of imprisonment and final exclusion.495 
 
Rather than directing members to comply with the Geary Act during this time, 
however, the CCBA required each Chinese individual in the United States to contribute 
one dollar for the expense of the suit that would test the Geary Act’s constitutionality in 
the Supreme Court.  The CCBA would prevent Chinese members who refused to pay, 
according the Times, from returning to China “when he applies to the Six Companies for 
his papers.”496 
 In a separate article published by the New York Times, the CCBA, in response to 
queries from Collector of Internal Revenue John C. Quinn about whether the organization 
ordered Chinese laborers not to register under the Geary Law, returned this statement:   
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We have issued a circular advising Chinese laborers that 
the law requiring them to register is unconstitutional and 
cannot be enforced and therefore suggesting to them that 
they do not comply with the law.  This circular is based 
upon the advice of our attorneys that the law is 
unconstitutional and in violation of the treaty rights.497 
 
Due to these efforts, Chinese reportedly contributed $60,000 to fight the Geary Act in the 
courts while the CCBA sent their “renowned” attorney and appointed legal counsel to 
New York and Washington, D.C. as a “preliminary step.”498  
 Two months later, on the eve of the Supreme Court case, a New York Times 
interview with Collector of Revenue John C. Quinn revealed that, with regard to Chinese 
laborers acquiescing to the registration law, they acted “very sullenly” in their refusal to 
register.  Quinn stated, “. . . they [Chinese] laugh at the idea of the law going into effect.  
They seem to think that the Chinese Government will never permit its people to be 
removed from the United States.”499  Chinese “sullenness” seemed to be due in part to the 
CCBA’s efforts to issue circulars advising Chinese to not only resist the law, but to stand 
firm and prepare for a “vigorous defense.”  The CCBA denied this was a preemptive 
measure advocating violence, but rather advice to their membership to not become panic 
stricken and register on the last day allowed by the law.  Instead, the CCBA required 
individuals to contribute their quota to the fund for employing legal counsel to fight the 
law.500   
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Wherever the CCBA posted circulars, crowds of Chinese “eagerly scanned every 
character printed on them.”  As far as the Times was concerned, it was evident the CCBA 
advocated physical violence in order to resist the law.  However, an interview with the 
Chinese Vice Consul assured the reporter that:  “There will be no trouble . . . the Six 
Companies will not advise their countrymen to shed blood.  If the law is declared to be 
constitutional and no other legal defense presents itself, the Chinese will obey the law 
and depart from this country.  What my Government would do in this event I am not in a 
position to state.” 
One week later, when news that the United States Supreme Court confirmed the 
constitutionality of the Chinese Exclusion Act quickly reached San Francisco’s 
Chinatown, Chinese “quietly received” the news.  They 
. . . stood about in large groups before their own bulletin 
boards for some statement from the Six Companies, which 
had compelled them to refuse to register.  They were not 
inclined to accept the report through the American 
newspapers.501 
 
In response to the Supreme Court decision, the Chinese Vice Consul noted:   
Although the Geary Law has been declared constitutional, 
the Government is not prepared to immediately carry out its 
provisions.  It will entail great expense, for which no 
appropriation is made.  I have nothing to say in regard to 
the immediate effect the final decision of the Supreme 
Court will have on the Chinese in America . . . The treaty 
between China and America has been broken by the 
Government at Washington, and is no longer a contract, 
and will not be regarded by the Chinese Government as a 
factor governing any action they may see fit to take.502 
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On the same day, during the noon hour, a Euro-American crowd gathered in the vicinity 
of the Stock Exchange building in San Francisco to hear Dennis Kearney and other local 
anti-Chinese agitators urge listeners to hold mass meetings in approval of the decision.  
The crowd listened to the speakers, but displayed little interest in what they had to say.503 
 One year after the passage of the Geary Act, numerous articles flooded the press 
regarding Chinese laborers’ refusal to register.  The New York Times was indicative of 
the denouncement of Chinese refusals despite impending arrest, imprisonment, and 
deportation because 
…the almond-eyed alien applies to himself the injunction 
that ‘sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof,’ or it may be 
because he has given attention to the Geary registration law, 
with the assistance of legal talent, which has convinced him 
that his position under that law is more tenable than a great 
many who are talking and writing about the subject state.504  
 
Outside of the courts, Chinese continued to protest American exclusion policies 
through a variety of forums.  The CCBA, diplomats and individual Chinese persisted as 
vocal critics of their discriminatory treatment.505  In 1892, Yung Hen, a poultry dealer in 
San Francisco, asked a newspaper reporter, “Why do you not legislate against Swedes, 
Germans, Italians, Turks and others?  There are no strings on those people. . . . For some 
reason, you people persist in pestering the Chinamen.”506 
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   On the eve of renewing the Act’s ten-year exclusion regulations, the New York 
Times again reported the Chinese prepared themselves to make a “vigorous fight” against 
further Chinese legislative exclusion.  The CCBA issued an additional proclamation 
requiring every Chinese individual in the United States to immediately contribute one 
dollar to the fund to defeat exclusion.  In order to compel the payment of the assessment, 
the CCBA’s proclamation stated that if payment was not made within one month the 
amount exacted would double.  Those who failed to pay within two months would have 
their assessment doubled once more.  As the report concluded,  
Lest some should still seek to evade the enforced 
contribution, the proclamation adds that Chinese desiring to 
return to China will be compelled to exhibit a receipt 
showing they are paid up.  In default of such receipt they 
will be fined $10.  The proclamation has been posted in 
Chinatown, and is to be distributed all over the country.507 
 
  The formation of the Chinese Equal Rights League in New York was due in large 
part to protest the notorious Geary Act in 1892.  As its name suggests, the founders of the 
Chinese Equal Rights League had different goals in mind from the CCBA.  Articulated in 
a pamphlet published by the League in 1892 entitled “Appeal of the League to the People 
of the United States,”508 it denounced the Geary Act, contending that it  
was made to humiliate every Chinaman, regardless of his 
moral, intellectual and material standing in the community; 
neither was his long residence in the country considered.  
By this mean and unjust Act discriminating between 
foreign residents from different countries, [it] has traversed 
and contraversed the fundamental principles of common 
law.509 
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The appeal then exposed the deeper interests of the League, including equal 
franchise for Chinese.  The author of the pamphlet declared that the Chinese were 
industrious, law-abiding, and honest people; they paid taxes and thus supported the nation 
and the government; they loved and admired the United States government and 
appreciated its “unwavering love of human rights.”  “Our interests are here, because our 
homes, our families, and all our interests are here.  America is our home through long 
residence,”510 declared the author, who then raised a specific demand:   
“We, therefore, appeal for an equal chance in the race of 
life in this our adopted home – a large number of us have 
spent almost all our lives in this country and claimed no 
other but this as ours.  Our motto is:  Character and fitness 
should be the requirements of all who are desirous of 
becoming citizens of the American Republic.511 
    
Prior to the passage of the first Chinese exclusion act, the CCBA in 1877 also 
produced an important document, the Memorial of the Chinese Six Companies to the 
Congress of the United States.  A comparison of this document with the appeal of the 
Chinese Equal Rights League of 1892 reveals fundamental differences between the two 
organizations.  In the 1877 Memorial, CCBA leaders took a defensive tone, depicting 
themselves as guests, asserting treaty rights, and demanding hospitality and international 
justice.512   
The demands of the Chinese Equal Rights League prompted the formation of the 
more powerful Chinese American Citizens Alliance in 1895 in San Francisco, with 
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lodges throughout the United States.  Originally named the United Parlor of the Sons of 
the Golden State, the group attracted both Chinese born in America and naturalized 
Chinese Americans whose worldview was shaped by education in America and exposure 
to Euro-American culture.513  The group’s visibility grew during the exclusion era.  In 
1900, approximately eleven percent of the Chinese in the United States were born in 
America.  The figure increased to fifty-two percent by 1940. 514   The organization 
understood the duality of being engaged in China-centered nationalism in the early 
twentieth-century, thus experiencing a conflicted loyalty between China and the United 
States.  Foreign-born, traditionally-minded Chinese contemptuously  referred to them as 
“ABCs,” literally meaning “American-born Chinese” but also implying “brainless,” as 
well as juk sing (literally, in Cantonese, the hollow part of a bamboo stalk, also implying 
“empty,” or “useless”), because of their supposedly shallow understanding of traditional 
Chinese culture.515  Some American-born Chinese objected to the homeland orientations 
of traditional organizations like huiguan, which they felt hindered Chinese acceptance by 
the larger Euro-American society.  Moreover, as Sue Fawn Chung illustrates, American-
born Chinese raised among Euro-Americans acculturated to such a degree that they could 
not identify with the conservative, China-oriented segment of the Chinese population the 
huiguan merchant elite represented.516   
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In stark contrast, until the establishment of the first Chinese legation in 
Washington, D.C. in 1878, huiguan operated as diplomatic representatives for Chinese in 
America.  Since most Chinese were foreign-born at the time and had yet to plant 
generational roots in America, huiguan often justified the fight against racial oppression 
on the grounds of defending treaty rights and demanding hospitality and reciprocity in 
accordance with China’s sovereignty.517  The Equal Rights League of 1892 was more 
aggressive in its assertions.  Its members wished to be treated as part of the nation, 
demanding common humanity and equal rights.  The change from the huiguan’s initial 
defensive posturing to the Chinese Equal Rights League’s aggressive strategy could not 
alter the established national policy of Chinese exclusion.  A New York Times editorial 
illustrates how Euro-America construed the League’s appeal: 
The Chinese Equal Rights League has not chosen a very 
favorable time for agitating the repeal of the Chinese 
Exclusion Act, just when the public mind is occupied with 
the question of drawing closer the lines for excluding 
undesirable alien elements from our population.  The Geary 
Act was unnecessarily harsh and created an invidious 
distinction, and it would be well if all except the section 
continuing the present restrictions could be appealed, but 
the matter is hardly likely to receive favorable 
consideration at present.  The statement of the league put 
the case rather too strongly and ask [sic] rather too 
much. . . . It is asking too much to demand that Chinese 
residents here be ‘forthwith admitted to citizenship and 
given the franchise of the nation.’  The Chinese Equal 
Rights League should be more moderate in its presentations 
and more modest in its demands.518 
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One must underscore that despite the attempt to adopt more aggressive strategies 
to combat Chinese exclusion and the legacies of Chinese racism permeating San 
Francisco’s government agencies and city ordinances, the CCBA continued to appeal 
primarily through diplomatic recourse.  In 1913, the Los Angeles Times recounted the 
protest of Chinese Consul Li Yung Yo and the CCBA against police treatment of 
“reputable Chinese citizens” under Corporal Charles E. Goff.  Wong Quong, a wealthy 
merchant, filed the charge with the Police Commission in San Francisco, charging Goff 
and another patrolman with police misconduct.  The CCBA attained legal counsel and 
with the assistance of Consul General Li, appeared at the court hearing to aid Wong.  In 
his letter to the San Francisco police commission, Wong stated: “The Chinese residents 
of San Francisco have not been accorded the same rights as the American citizens and the 
rights of the most favored nation, as the United States is bound to extend to us.”519      
In the same year, the CCBA also protested against the enactment of the Alien 
Land Act.  It was the first legislative protest against alien land legislation from the 
Chinese in California.  The board of directors of the Panama-Pacific Exposition, the 
worlds fair hosted by San Francisco in 1915, was instrumental in forwarding the 
resolution drafted by the CCBA.  The board visited California Governor Hiram W. 
Johnson in Sacramento to deliver the resolution, while a news article noted that Governor 
Johnson declined to comment on it.   
The resolution stated the Chinese resided in the state of California by “virtue of 
treaties” guaranteeing “common rights of man,” as defined by California’s bill of rights.  
The CCBA pointedly addressed both the governor and the bill of rights as part “of your 
State Constitution.”  The CCBA then elaborated its desire “to promote wider and more 
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abundant trade between this State and China.”  The resolution also referred to China’s 
Republican Revolution of 1911 as “the movement that has caused China to imitate the 
example of your country by the adoption of a republican form of government.”   
Moreover, the CCBA linked China’s governmental reform with increased commercial 
trade for California through its assertion that “increase[ing] the consuming and 
commercial capacity of the Chinese people,” will “vastly increase their trade with the 
western nations.”  As “domiciled Californians” the CCBA formulated its argument as a 
protest that this State’s due share of such trade cannot be 
secured by legislation that humiliates us, brands us with an 
infamous inferiority, and shames us before the nations.  
Your proposed legislation impairs the capacity of our 
countrymen to earn a living here and to contribute to the 
commonwealth by their labor and enterprise, and we insist 
that it is unfriendly and inhospitable to the people of the 
youngest republic at the hands of the greatest republic in 
the world.520      
 
The resolution still reverberates with the delineations made within the Memorial of the 
Six Companies in 1877 by protesting  “your proposed” humiliating legislation harmful to 
“us” before “the nations,” in a stand of diplomatic protection for “our countrymen.”  The 
CCBA once again utilized the notion of China’s long-standing history and its position as 
the center of the civilized world while America was the “youngest republic at the hands 
of the greatest republic,” though China essentially became a republic not more than two 
years earlier.   
During the early twentieth century, Chinese across America looked to the CCBA 
for leadership in areas of common concern such as fighting exclusion laws and 
discriminatory actions against Chinese.  The power wielded by the CCBA attests to the 
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Chinese need for intra-community governance in San Francisco, given their exclusion 
from the American political sphere.  These expectations also extended to Chinese in 
American colonies and countries in Latin America that did not have Chinese diplomatic 
representation.  The CCBA continued to retain lawyers on an annual basis to facilitate the 
handling of these and other legal matters abroad, and hired legal counsel for specific 
cases in other locations.521 
In 1910, on behalf of the CCBA and in response to further police action taken 
against Chinese in the city, attorney Carroll Cook wrote to E.C. Laffingwell, San 
Francisco’s Chief of Police, as well as the President of the United States, to “[advise on] 
the conditions existing” within San Francisco’s Chinese community.  Following a 
meeting with San Francisco’s Chinese residents, the Chinese Consul General, the CCBA, 
and the Chinese Merchants’ Association, as well as the property owners in Chinatown, 
joined in the demand that if their presence in the community was desired, “existing 
outrages must cease.” 522   The CCBA secretary notified Cook to “take [necessary] 
actions . . . to put a stop to the outrages that are being perpetrated on their race, in the 
name of the law and through certain petty police officers.”523  While stating that “if it 
occurred among the white people in this community, [it] would result in their immediate 
arrest as violators of the law themselves,” Cook emphasized police continued to trespass 
on Chinese merchants’ private residences, “where . . . wives . . . are in their room retiring 
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and [went] through [these] rooms.”  Police regularly stopped Chinese men in public, 
looking for “coupons or for lottery tickets,” without warrant or authority to do so.  With 
regard to Chinese businesses, “[they] are entered, doors broken down and property taken 
away, without anybody being arrested for violation of any law, but all done simply [to 
terrorize Chinese].”  Cook concluded his letter by stating: 
I anticipate that the Chief of Police will use his best efforts 
to put an end to these outrages, but I desire the co-operation 
of your office, and if they are not stopped I shall be 
compelled to file criminal charges and civil actions against 
the officers responsible in this matter, as well as . . . 
charges against them before the Board of Police 
Commissioners.524      
 
Cook also brought an article published by the “Tai Tung Yat Bo Company” [most 
likely the Chung Sai Yat Po] to the attention of the CCBA in a letter dated October 15, 
1910.  Referring the article as “grossly libelous,” Cook stated, “if it were not that I hold 
the position that I do as attorney for your Association, I should feel called upon to cause 
the arrest of the editor of that paper for libel in the criminal courts.”  However, because 
Cook realized it would not “do for [him] to enter into litigation with the Chinese…,” 
since, as attorney for the CCBA, “I am supposed to, and do represent, all Chinese people; 
therefore, I cannot even for myself, not against Chinese people.”525   
The article Cook referred to contained statements about “pharmacy cases” 
pending in San Francisco’s “Police Court,” whereby Cook allegedly additional received 
commissions for these cases.  He emphatically denied the charge, insisting he only 
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received the monthly compensation provided to him by the CCBA.  The CCBA notified 
Cook about the pending cases, and the secretary of the CCBA requested Cook to defend 
its membership in similar cases pending in Oakland, California.  According to Cook’s 
own correspondence, the “special attorneys” appearing for the pharmacy board offered to 
consent to paying a fine of one-hundred dollars if the other half of the cases pled guilty to 
the alleged pharmacy violations.  Upon Cook presenting this proposal, the CCBA decided 
to accept the attorneys’ proposition rather than continue to make challenges within the 
courts.  Cook emphasized that no fee was charged because payments for services were 
rendered to him by the CCBA, either in San Francisco, or in the cases pending in 
Oakland.526 
The allegations Carroll Cook refers to in his letter to the CCBA most likely 
stemmed from the Chung Sai Yat Po’s fundamentally different stance compared to the 
CCBA with regard to the Chinese community in San Francisco, and to Chinese 
immigration in general. Through the Reverend Wu Panzhao, more commonly known as 
Ng Poon Chew, a prolific journalist and lecturer, Chinese Christians vocalized their 
political consciousness in Ng’s daily newspaper, Chung Sai Yat Po, the leading U.S. 
Chinese-language newspaper in the early-twentieth century.  The San Francisco-based 
newspaper’s editorials called for an anti-Qing revolt in China and linked it to the struggle 
for equal rights in America.  Like the Chinese American Citizens’ Alliance, and the 
Chinese Equal Rights League that preceded it, a small but vocal Chinese Christian 
community competed with the CCBA and its affiliated huiguan for the attention of 
Chinese Americans in the early twentieth century.   
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In small Chinese American communities, Chinese missions, in the absence of 
huiguan and other district or clan associations, stepped into the latter’s role and 
functioned in several ways to acclimatize Chinese who recently arrived to America to the 
new environment.  Through these missions, they offered English classes, living quarters, 
and social centers, all in one place.  In sizeable Chinese communities like San Francisco, 
Chinese Christians jostled with huiguan and other traditional Chinese organizations for 
potential converts.  Like the Chinese American Citizens’ Alliance, Chinese Christians 
rejected the elitist, conservative nature of the Chinese political leadership in San 
Francisco, thus attacking the core foundation of huiguan power by embracing more 
Western-oriented political ideals.527  
Some of the most fervent supporters of efforts to top the Qing monarchy were 
Chinese Protestants.  Chinese Christian churches in America served as sanctuaries where 
the Chinese revolutionary Sun Yat-sen and his followers took rest, promoted revolution, 
and raised money.  Convinced that America’s values of democracy, its republican form 
of government, and its modernity developed as a result of Christian influence, Chinese 
Christians compelled China to take a similar path.  Like the Chinese American Citizen’s 
Alliance, Chinese Christians extolled the lifestyle and form of government of a society 
that often discriminated against Chinese immigrants.  Therefore, their fellow conservative, 
traditionally-minded peers saw them as insufficiently “Chinese.”   The Chinese Christians 
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were thus marginalized in Chinatowns, which required them to band together for mutual 
support.  They soon established their own schools, missions, and newspapers. 
In the early 1900s Reverend Ng embarked on several nationwide speaking tours, 
attempting to make a case for Chinese contributions to the well-being of America and 
thus the need for immigration reform.528  In 1900, when Euro-Americans blamed San 
Francisco’s Chinese for a rumored bubonic plague and the entire community was 
quarantined, leading Chinese Christians, taking advantage of the inner turmoil and 
division within the CCBA, led the charge to end this demonization.  Through these 
efforts, Chinese Christians gradually established a tenuous credibility within the larger 
Euro-American community.529 
One week after he informed the CCBA of the Chung Sai Yat Po article, Cook sent 
a letter of thanks to the CCBA for re-electing him as its legal counsel for the next year.  
Both the secretary of the CCBA and the consul general, as well as several huiguan 
presidents, informed Cook of his reappointment, and in response, he stated,  
I have tried at all times during the past year to faithfully 
attend to all matters confided to me by your Association 
and I can only say to you that I shall do in the future 
exactly what I have done in the past and shall always 
consider that it is my duty . . . to do all within my power in 
the interests of your Association and in the interests of all 
Chinese in the Country.530   
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On the same day, Cook drafted a letter addressed to “Chinese Residents of the United 
States,” expressing his gratitude for electing him to another year of legal service.  Cook 
won by a landslide, receiving over twice the number of votes than the lawyer running 
against him.  Cook assured that, “. . . all your [Chinese] confidence is not in any way 
misplaced and as I have done during the past year I shall continue to do so [as] long as 
the Chinese people desire me to act for them and be always watchfull [sic] for their 
interest . . . [and] protect them in their rights . . . to see that what they are entitled to they 
obtain. 531  During his next year of legal service, he continually advocated on behalf of 
the CCBA and individual Chinese in the San Francisco community.  Particularly, Cook 
was instrumental in his appeals to immigration officials, as well as other governmental 
departments, regarding the treatment of Chinese at the new detention facility at Angel 
Island.  
During the early nineteenth-century, American immigration law remained firmly 
entrenched in the policy of Chinese exclusion.  There was no more powerful symbol of 
its institutionalization than the new immigration station built on Angel Island.  Before the 
construction of the new facility, early Chinese immigrants to San Francisco encountered 
a gloomy, poorly lit, two-story shed, known to the Chinese as Mu wu, or “wooden 
barracks,” at the Pacific Mail Steamship Company.  Chinese arrivals were held at this 
overcrowded, unsafe, and unsanitary facility until immigration officials cleared them.     
In 1910, the government erected a two-story wooden building to serve as the new 
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immigration station on Angel Island in San Francisco Bay.  Immigration officials and the 
government primarily justified the construction of this new facility as an effort to isolate 
newly-arrived Chinese immigrants with supposed communicable diseases.532   
First conceived of in 1903, the station on Angel Island represented the 
achievement of several goals of the Bureau of Immigration.  As San Francisco 
Commissioner of Immigration Hart Hyatt North explained, the new station would provide 
immigration officials with larger offices and Chinese immigrants with better detention 
quarters.  Most important, its location on an island would be the most effective means of 
keeping a watchful eye over the resourceful Chinese.  Furthermore, it was escape-proof.  
Officials at the new station subjected the Chinese to extensive and frequently 
humiliatingly invasive examinations.  The interrogation process remained protracted 
because officials believed most Chinese gain entry into the United States by dishonest 
means. 533  Those who failed the initial interrogation could appeal or be reexamined, but 
the process was undoubtedly a psychological burden for immigrants.  Throughout this 
period, Chinese relied on their transnational networks of family, clan, and community 
across the United States and in China to provide financial backing, immigration advice, 
crucial witness testimony, and legal counsel.  They continued to protest their treatment by 
immigration officials for years after the Angel Island station opened.   
The CCBA advocated the goals of the Chinese Equal Rights League when it 
issued circulars throughout San Francisco’s Chinatown calling on residents to “protest for 
equal rights,” and it sent telegrams to Hong Kong and Canton warning new immigrants to 
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avoid entering the United States through San Francisco’s new station.534  It also joined 
forces with the San Francisco Chinese Chamber of Commerce to send a lengthy petition 
to the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce in May 1911.  The petition documented 
numerous cases of injustice.  Angel Island immigration authorities responded by inviting 
the San Francisco Down Town Association, a large commercial organization, Robert 
Dollar of the Dollar Steamship Company, and Reverend Wu Panzhao (Ng Poon Chew), 
editor of the Chung Sai Yat Po, for an extensive tour of the immigration station.   
The group was appalled at what they witnessed and concluded Chinese 
immigration examinations were “unreasonable.”  An applicant, the commission reported, 
was “considered guilty until he proves himself entitled to land.”  The “high standards of 
proof required of Chinese in admission cases and the ways in which applicant and 
witness testimonies were read against one another,” they charged, “were sufficient to 
exclude every man, woman and child from landing.” 535   In addition, the observers 
reported that detainees were allowed to leave their quarters only once or twice a week for 
one-half hour.  The lavatories were “exceedingly unsanitary,” and the hospital was 
horribly inadequate.  The dormitories were so crowded and dismal, in fact, that one 
visitor demanded of the commissioner of immigration, “Is this a jail . . . and must all 
Chinese imprisoned here be treated as felons?  This is not the least unlike a cattle pen!”536   
As the CCBA’s legal counsel, and at the request of the Chinese Consul General 
on March 22, 1910, Carroll Cook wrote to Commissioner North to ascertain why the 
government charged fifty cents for “the transportation of Chinese witnesses and back” to 
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Angel Island.  Cook received this information from the Chinese Consul General, who 
informed him about the notice from the U.S. Immigration office, later published in a 
Chinese newspaper. While immigration officials required Chinese attendance at the 
station rather than in the city, “instead of taking their testimony here where they are 
available.”  Cook further asserted: 
Of course, you know that it is almost impossible for the 
Chinese Immigrants to get their witnesses to go over there 
under the most favorable conditions and that neither you 
nor the Government of the United States have any power to 
compel their attendance on behalf of the Immigrants, 
whose right to land is questioned, to tax them with fifty 
cents, to be paid to the Government, when they are ready to 
go voluntarily, seem to me to add an additional obstacle, 
which is wholly uncalled for, since the Government insists 
upon their making such [a] trip.537   
 
While he did not address the reasons why Chinese were summoned to the island as 
witnesses, Commissioner North promptly replied to Cook that the information regarding 
the fee charged was incorrect, and that two vessels, the ‘Monticello’ and the ‘Inspector,’ 
transported Chinese from the mainland to Angel Island and in “return for the convenience 
of this Service . . . all persons having business here are conveyed free of charge . . . and 
when witnesses are summoned here, they are always furnished with the necessary 
transportation”538 
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Approximately one week after his re-election as legal counsel in 1910, Carroll 
Cook further made a further appeal on behalf of Chinese in a letter to the commissioner 
of immigration on Angel Island in order to ascertain whether there was truth to the claim 
that the immigration office deemed “Chinese Merchants having an interest in the 
Mercantile business” as untitled to certificates of residence unless “[they are] actually 
engaged in the conduct of the business itself.”  Cook argued that many Chinese 
merchants were “similar to our capitalists” through their own banking businesses, which 
were “merchandise in money” and “other pursuits of such character which do not require 
their actual attendance at . . . places of business, but which still leaves them Merchants in 
the full sense of the word.”539  Cook further questioned the immigration office about the 
reported deportation of merchants “upon the claimed ground that they were suffering 
from, [as] the Department calls it, ‘Hook-worm.’”540  
  Although a response from the Commissioner of Immigration was not found, 
Carroll Cook sent an appeal to Charles Nagle, Secretary of Commerce and Labor in 
Washington, D.C. one week later, requesting the Chinese at Angel Island be relieved of 
medical examinations to detect the presence of hookworm.  “All Chinese merchants 
returning are greatly incensed at indignities to which subjected,” Cook wrote.  These 
methods “in vogue,” added Cook, compelled the submission of Chinese to “mutilations 
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of ear and fingers and to injections,” when qualified physicians could more effectively 
test for its presence.541   
 Luther C. Steward, U.S. Commissioner of Commerce and Labor, responded to 
Cook’s first inquiry on whether or not a Chinese merchant ‘having an interest in a 
mercantile business is not entitled to a certificate,’ by citing the Chinese Exclusion Law 
of 1893, which defined a “merchant” as:  “a person engaged in buying and selling 
merchandise, at a fixed place of business . . . and who during the time he claims to be 
engaged as a merchant does not engage in the performance of any manual labor, except 
such as is necessary in the conduct of his business as such merchant.”542  According to 
the 1893 exclusion law, when a Chinese individual submitted an application “on the 
ground that he was formerly engaged in this country as a merchant,” this person was also 
required to “establish . . . the testimony of two credible witnesses other than Chinese the 
fact that he conducted such business . . . for at least one year before his departure from 
the United States . . .”.  Steward further stated the Department of Commerce and Labor 
would not rule under this statute that a banker “could be brought within the term 
‘merchant,’” although, “. . . in instances where Chinese claim to be the non-laboring or 
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exempt status under the Exclusion Laws, the very nature of their claim would necessitate 
the consideration of each on its own merits.”543   
 In answering Cook’s second inquiry, Steward confirmed Chinese and other 
immigrant groups were subjected to medical examinations “incident to determining 
whether they come within any of the excluded classes” designated in Section Two of the 
Immigration Act of 1907, he denied the invasive methods in which examiners conducted 
these tests:  “The examination is made by a duly-appointed and qualified physician of the 
Public Health and Marine Hospital Service, assigned to duty in the Immigration Service 
as Medical Examiner.”  The actual exclusion of a Chinese applicant “so afflicted,” was 
accomplished by a “Board of Special Inquiry,” consisting of three officers, “the basis of 
their action being the medical certificate of the Medical Examiner as to the condition 
existing.”544 
 Cook appeal to Commissioner Steward at the end of the year requesting special 
passes to Angel Island for Lum Leong, Lee We Do, Ye Wing Chang, Dung San Lung, 
Chun Key, and Quong Hong Sing, the six secretaries of the CCBA.  Steward granted 
Cook’s request for the passes, complete with photographs attached, which permitted the 
huiguan secretaries to “board outgoing vessels for the purpose of supplying necessities to 
Chinese who have been ordered deported.”545   
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On November 25, while not providing a response to Cook’s first inquiry 
regarding the status of bankers, Charles Nagle, Secretary of the Department of Commerce 
and Labor responded:  
Your telegram . . . was received sometime ago and has been 
considered.  Inquiry from the authorities in charge at San 
Francisco satisfies me that the methods of examination 
adopted there are similar to those which are followed in 
other places . . . the medical examination which is directed 
from the common head in Washington and is not selected 
by this Department, is substantially uniform throughout the 
country.  I am assured that the test to which aliens are 
subjected is not only uniform, but is simple and calculated 
to impose as little hardship as possible.546 
 
Earlier in the same year, the New York Times reported on an alleged boycott 
organized in China against American goods, while Chinese merchants and “powerful Six 
Companies’ officers” in San Francisco remained “reticent.”  The article reported that the 
Chinese boycott’s alleged members were wealthy merchants who failed to obtain 
“original admission” to America, or the country deported them after a second attempt to 
re-enter the country, but it also pointed out as “another source of complaint” the “rigid 
system of examinations” required by port authorities upon entrance to San Francisco:  
“Wealthy merchants on re-entrance after visits to China are said to have complained 
bitterly of these minute physical examinations, particularly the new ‘tissue test’ to 
determine age and general condition of health.”547    
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The article further elaborated that those “in touch with the local Chinese business 
world” said the movement’s impetus was, ironically, the restoration of the original 
Pacific Mail Detention Station to “effect an amelioration of the physical examination.”548  
On the same day, the Los Angeles Times also reported on the proposed Chinese boycott.  
While the article also characterized “powerful Six Companies’ members” as “reticent,” 
refusing to discuss any details, the article also described the Chinese call to restore the 
original detention depot, reporting Chinese called the physical examination requirements 
both “debasing” and humiliating.”549  A call to restore the original detention facility is a 
powerful statement to the conditions that prevailed on Angel Island. 
In 1911, the CCBA and sympathetic representatives of the Down Town 
Association of San Francisco sent a ten-page memorial to President Taft reminding him 
that China and its population of four hundred million could “make the United States her 
closest occidental neighbor, the marketing place for her requirements.”  However, the 
merchants passionately warned, the mistreatment of Chinese merchants on Angel Island 
could potentially destroy commercial relations between the United States and China.  The 
memorial concluded with fifteen detailed recommendations for improving conditions and 
the handling of merchant cases. 550   Although detention officials made some 
improvements to the facility, substandard conditions prevailed, as did Angel Island’s 
endurance as a pervasive symbol of Chinese discrimination and exclusion.  
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A telegram from the CCBA in to President Wilson in 1918 reemphasized the 
importance of Chinese merchants to Chinese-U.S. trade and then demanded the “ruthless 
insults” made by immigration officers to “unoffending merchants” and their families 
cease.551  Infuriated by the mistreatment of Chinese residents the telegram asserted, “No 
matter how long their residence or how firm their right to remain, Chinese are being 
arrested, hunted, and terrorized.”  As a result, the Chinese population of the Pacific Coast 
was “fast decreasing.”552 
The CCBA and affiliated locality and clan associations were nominally non-
political organizations.  But during the first half of the twentieth century, Chinese in San 
Francisco and throughout America became increasingly politicized as they witnessed a 
China divided by corrupt warlords and threatened by foreign aggression.  By the early 
1900s, a China-oriented political consciousness permeated San Francisco and, to a degree, 
continued to undermine the foundation of the traditional huiguan power structure.  The 
humiliating defeat of China in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, the botched 
“Hundred Days’ Reforms” of 1898, designed to speed up China’s modernization but 
essentially serving to expand European economic imperialism in Asia, the continued 
discrimination suffered by Chinese in America, and the sociopolitical changes occurring 
within San Francisco’s Chinatown, awakened nationalist sentiment in Chinese at home 
and abroad.553   
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This integral role played by huiguan in San Francisco and throughout the United 
States was well known to governments in China throughout the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries.  Chinese diplomats continually sought to channel huiguan efforts to benefit the 
government in China.  Qing envoys exerted their control after the establishment of 
permanent missions in the United States, so much so that the CCBA did not openly 
espouse the revolutionary cause until after the 1911 Revolution.   
The emergence of Chinese nationalism was responsible for some of the social 
changes occurring within San Francisco’s Chinese community.  Ardent critics of the 
Qing government journeyed to America from the turn of the twentieth century onward to 
establish parties promoting their respective political agendas, and by the 1910s, a far 
broader segment of the Chinese population in America became interested in anti-
imperialist politics in China, which led in part to an identity transformation for Chinese.  
When fused with the racism experienced by Chinese in America, China-centered 
nationalism gave momentum to the forging of a new Chinese American identity.554   
In the years prior to 1911, when the Chinese Revolution occurred and toppled the 
Qing Dynasty, a failure to truly comprehend Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary ideology, 
coupled with Chinese tradition to obey the mandate of heaven, rather than rebel from it, 
limited the popularity of Sun’s ideology to some degree.  The Xingzhonghui, later 
renamed the Tongmenghui (also referred to as the Chinese United League or Chinese 
Revolutionary Alliance), was a secret society founded in Honolulu in 1895 by Sun Yat-
sen.  Chinese Americans’ early moral and financial support for this organization was far 
from overwhelming, due in part to the pro-Qing CCBA and Chinese Chamber of 
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Commerce.  As a result, Tonmenghui members in the United States focused on portraying 
the Manchus as foreign, thereby justifying the need to overthrow to overthrow the Qing 
Dynasty.  In contrast, the Baohuanghui (literally, “Society for the Protection of the 
Emperor,” but also translated as “Chinese Empire Reform Association) was established 
in 1899 in Vancouver by Chinese reformer Kang Youwei, who favored a constitutional 
monarchy in China.  This party competed for Chinese American support with Sun Yat-
sen, who remained the proponent of a republican form of government for China.555  
Chinese in San Francisco and throughout America, whose efforts became a part of 
the larger overseas Chinese politicization, soon offered monetary contributions, financed 
China-based commercial ventures to modernize the homeland, disseminated propaganda 
in North America, and even organized a military academy in California to train men for 
subversive work in China.  Branches of both parties mushroomed in the major 
Chinatowns of North America, and eventually in China and Southeast Asia.  The political 
freedom of the Chinese in America allowed these political parties to develop relatively 
unhindered.  Moreover, the shift of mainstream American attention from the Chinese to 
the Japanese “menace,” following the 1904 indefinite ban on Chinese immigration, also 
facilitated this ethnic mobilization.556 
 Like Sun Yat-sen’s Tongmenghui, the Zhigongtang (or Chee Kung Tong, “Active 
Justice Society,” also referred to as the Chinese Free Masons), was an anti-Manchu secret 
society that advocated an overthrow of the Qing Dynasty in order to reestablish Chinese 
authority and leadership.  Both organizations contested the prominent role played by the 
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CCBA and its affiliated huiguan in San Francisco’s Chinese community, yet the 
Zhigongtang had different, more traditional goals than those espoused by Sun’s 
Tongmenghui.  Sue Fawn Chung’s study of the organization from 1870-1949 illustrates 
that, like huiguan, the Zhigongtang functioned less as a political body and more as an 
organization offering Chinese immigrants protection, employment opportunities, business 
networks, and mutual aid.557   
Like huiguan, the Zhigongtang functioned as an important fraternal organization 
for overseas Chinese, yet it represented Chinese who were not represented by huiguan or 
larger kinship associations.  By the 1870s, almost every major Chinese community in 
America had a branch of the Zhigontang. 558   As a “loosely-connected international 
network” and “trade network,”559 the Zhigongtang traced its roots to the Hongmen of 
Guangdong Province and the Tiandihui of Fujian Province. 560   Although the Qing 
government banned the organization in China, its leaders in America often equated the 
organization to Masonic societies in America, thus attempting to increase its prestige in 
the eyes of the larger Euro-American society.  While Europeans continued to deny the 
connection between the organizations, the Zhigongtang did receive a measure of respect, 
as well as economic and political advantages, from Euro-American society.561 
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As an important cultural parallel, Chung examines the connections between the 
Zhigongtang in America and Chinese American funerary rituals.  Similar to huiguan, the 
Zhigongtang recognized that proper burial practices were fundamental to the Chinese 
worldview of life and death, and it was important for Chinese immigrants to know they 
would be taken care of properly far from home when they died.  Most importantly, 
however, Zhigongtang burial practices differed fundamentally from huiguan practices 
because the organization learned to adjust Chinese burial customs to accommodate 
American social and legal mores, as well as the increased acculturation of Chinese 
immigrants and their descendants in America. 562   Chung’s important scholarship 
addresses the Zhigongtang’s understanding of Chinese history and culture, as well as its 
transformation of traditional Chinese culture as a Chinese American organization. 
  One must also delineate the Tongmenghui, Zhigongtang and other secret 
societies from the fighting tongs, Chinese societies most well-known to Euro-Americans 
at the time.  Established as early as 1852, these structured, exclusive socioeconomic 
organizations also struggled for political and economic power within the community.  
Often pitted against one another as well as against the CCBA, tongs resorted to open 
warfare to settle scores.  They took control of and played a significant role in managing 
Chinese vice businesses, including gambling saloons, brothels, and opium dens.  Limited 
employment opportunities and low levels of acculturation, all products of the anti-
Chinese movement, drew individual Chinese to these organizations.563 
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Against the backdrop of growing nationalism, Chinese American politicization 
and identification with secret societies, and further racially-based agitation in America at 
the turn of the twentieth century, the call for a boycott of U.S. goods in 1905 in 
Guangzhou and Shanghai also evoked a response from the Chinese in the United States, 
whose resentment of the years of discriminatory treatment flared into outright hostility.  
The boycott, which lasted nearly a year and drew support from all major Chinese 
organizations including the Zhigongtang, Chinese Christians, and native-born Chinese 
Americans under the aegis of the Zhuyue Zongju, or Anti-Treaty Society, represented a 
significant departure from the CCBA’s previous emphasis on judicial and diplomatic 
recourse.  The boycott faltered when the Qing government, buckling under pressure from 
U.S. authorities, retracted its support for it.564 
 Nevertheless, the boycott checked certain blatant abuses:  raids on Chinatowns 
throughout America ceased, processing times for new immigrants shortened somewhat, 
calls for a more stringent registration process abated, and the momentum to expel all 
Chinese slowed to an eventual halt. 565   The failure of the boycott to reverse anti-
immigration laws, however, reinforced Chinese Americans’ sense of inferiority.  The 
boycott, as much as it united the Chinese community, also polarized it.  The CCBA and 
other affiliated huiguan organizations, the Baohuanghui, and various merchant guilds, all 
factions favoring constitutional reform in China, backed the demand that the United 
States admit all Chinese except laborers.  In opposition were those favoring revolution in 
China and the admission of all Chinese including laborers, namely the Zhigongtang 
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Tongmenghui, Triad lodges, Chinese Christians, and American-born Chinese.  When the 
boycott failed to elicit the espoused aims, each faction blamed the other for the failure.   
 
   
Figure 28.  Nationalist Demonstration, ca. 1911, California State Library566 
 
Despite organizational competition for the allegiance of San Francisco’s Chinese 
community, the CCBA remained the most powerful organization until the 1970s.  Many 
of its Sanyi leaders, however, lost much credibility when they failed to counter the Geary 
Act.  Community leaders of Siyi origin, who made up almost two-thirds of the Chinese 
population in America, now found the perfect opportunity to challenge Sanyi leadership.  
Boycotts of Sanyi businesses ensued, and soon tong wars broke out.567   
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Regardless of continual inter-huiguan disputes, President Theodore Roosevelt’s 
concessions to Japanese in 1909 resulted in an impassioned plea by the CCBA for the 
same rights and privileges long denied to the Chinese.  The tone of the plea was much 
more emphatic and assertive than earlier, nineteenth-century memorials.  It demonstrates 
that although and perhaps because Chinese nationalist consciousness was emerging in the 
early-twentieth century, the CCBA continued to represent Chinese throughout America 
through its appeals to the American government for equality and protection under the law.   
San Francisco attorney O.P. Stidger, who drafted the telegram for the CCBA, 
informed the New York Times that it was in protest of President Roosevelt’s exertion of 
power to prevent the segregation of Japanese children in California’s schools.  However, 
the president did not protest “the common practice of excluding Chinese from the white 
schools.”  The telegram also denounced the Chinese exclusion acts, stating that 
immigration inspectors on Angel Island continually violated the U.S. Constitution’s 
Fourteenth Amendment.568  The Times published a portion of the telegram one day later: 
We beg leave to refer you, Mr. President to the fact that 
there is a discrimination in favor of Japanese aliens as 
against Chinese residents, and privileged classes of this 
country.  Such a discrimination is very apparent from the 
fact that the Department of Commerce and Labor, governed 
by the policy of your Administration, imposes upon the 
citizens of Chinese descent, domiciled Chinese merchants, 
their families, the privileged classes of Chinese under the 
treaty, every conceivable embarrassment which is in no 
way suffered by the Japanese.569   
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The appeal further requested of the president to “right the wrongs” suffered by Chinese in 
Reno, Nevada, whose property was destroyed “without due process of law,” and its 
occupants, forcibly expelled from their homes, left the city homeless and destitute.  It 
also requested the president to “exert a strong protest against” school laws in California 
which discriminated against Chinese children, and assist the CCBA in testing the 
constitutionality of their cases within the courts.  The appeal also addressed immigration 
inspectors throughout the United States who “violated every letter of the Fourth 
Amendment” of the U.S. Constitution:  “Chinese are arrested, searched, and their papers, 
the only means by which they may be identified and saved the humiliation of arrest and 
deportation, confiscated.  Is there no remedy to protect these people from such flagrant 
injustice?”  The article concluded that immigration authorities often held Chinese in the 
United States “incommunicado” while investigating their rights to enter the country.  
Immigration inspectors continued to invade Chinese homes “without fear of reprimand,” 
while Chinese were “dragged from their hearths, confined in prisons without bail, advice 
of counsel, and even the right to consult their own medical advisors denied.”570   
  While regional and clan ties remained two bases for huiguan organization in 
nineteenth-century China, when immigrants journeyed abroad, they organized and 
applied these concepts to meet the needs of their new environment.  “Traditionist” 
huiguan571 did not exist in China; however, they operated in accordance with Chinese 
traditional mores and values.  While continuing to exist as a male-dominated power 
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structure, huiguan were virtual oligarchies established by the merchant class, and until 
well into the twentieth century, only merchants, or representatives appointed by  
merchants, served on huiguan governing boards.  In theory the system looked after its 
members in a paternalistic fashion, but leaders could also be corrupt and tyrannical or 
misuse their powers to further their own personal interests. 
 During the early period of their development, huiguan filled a crucial need for 
Chinese immigrants in San Francisco’s Chinatown.  Individuals could mingle with people 
from the same area who perhaps knew mutual friends or relatives.  Since a Chinese 
immigrant at this time usually expected to retire to his native village one day, it was also 
in his interest to maintain good relations with the huiguan, which provided the link to his 
land of origin.  Moreover, the organization gave him needed protection from threats 
arising due to clan or regional conflicts and due to persecution by Euro-American society.  
Thus, during this early period, as with huiguan in Indochina, the most severe punishment 
imposed on any individual was social ostracism, namely by banishment from the huiguan 
during his lifetime and excluding him from the huiguan-maintained cemetery after death. 
 After the passage of the first Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882, however, the 
Chinese population in America declined, and by extension the membership of locality 
and clan associations likewise shrank rapidly.  China also underwent rapid and profound 
change so that newer, younger Chinese immigrants increasingly tended to share a 
common ethnic identity as fellow Chinese that ultimately transcended regional and clan 
affiliations.  In America, a second Chinese generation in America also grew up, for 
whom regional and clan loyalties were much less significant than they were to the older 
generation.  Because of this newfound ethnic identification, the first half of the twentieth 
 224  
century saw a diminution of regional and clan antagonisms in San Francisco, a 
development that chipped away at the fundamental raison d’être for huiguan. 
  Class delineations in San Francisco’s Chinatown also loomed large and remained 
so for the remaining early twentieth century.  The failure of the 1911 Republican 
Revolution to secure full Chinese democracy also meant political consensus among 
Chinese in San Francisco remained elusive.  However, China’s 1911 Revolution in China 
further stimulated the process of social change in San Francisco’s Chinese community.572  
Huiguan attempted to modify their structure and activities to be more in step with this 
social change.   
Once guardians of Confucian orthodoxy and tradition, huiguan became vanguards 
of the new reform mentality.  For example, the Ningyang Huiguan, the largest and most 
powerful huiguan in San Francisco, was the first to institute new social practices.  It 
announced repeatedly that, in order to celebrate the opening of its new building, it would 
hold a new ceremony including guest speakers whose speeches emphasized the progress 
of China and of Chinese America, rather than the worship of the gods.573  In 1910, the 
Shaoqing Huiguan followed suit, voting against placing idols in their new building.574     
Thus, the social transformation of Chinese in San Francisco also involved cultural 
adaptation.  Many of San Francisco’s huiguan and shantang, however, continued to 
sponsor Chinese schools to ensure that future American-born generations received a 
proper Chinese education.  The location itself continued its traditional role in provided 
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members a place to socialize while concurrently maintaining its primary mutual aid 
functions.  Today, huiguan through shantang associations still administer cemeteries for 
their members.  In spite of these measures, huiguan influenced steadily declined after the 
first two decades of the nineteenth century, while the scope and operation of each 
contracted.575 
Mounting nationalistic feelings and increasing activity by China’s political parties, 
especially the Guomindang, the Nationalist Party of China, in the United States led to the 
CCBA’s deeper involvement in China’s political issues.  For example, the CCBA led 
opposition to President Yuan Shikai’s intentions to declare himself emperor in 1915.576  
Even more often, the CCBA provided propaganda and logistical support for the Chinese 
government in its struggle against foreign aggression.  As early as 1907, the CCBA sent 
telegrams to China protesting Britain’s infringement upon China’s sovereignty.  And 
when Chinese in San Francisco heard about Russia’s attempt to annex Outer Mongolia, 
they set up a bureau to collect money, planning to sponsor an expeditionary army to fight 
the Russians. They backed China’s fight against turning Germany’s special privileges in 
Shandong over to Japan in the 1919 Versailles Treaty, and after the Shenyang (Mukden) 
incident in 1931, huiguan mobilized the community to raise millions of dollars to support 
China’s resistance to Japanese invaders in the ensuing years.577 
A heavy concentration on Chinese politics emphasized by Guomindang partisans 
caused the CCBA and other huiguan in the United States to ignore or become oblivious 
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to the fact that Chinese Americans were increasingly integrating into and playing larger 
roles in American society.  Thus, huiguan increasingly divorced themselves from playing 
a relevant role in community affairs.  Newer generations of Chinese American leaders 
arose in San Francisco and throughout the United States who were products of a changing 
Chinese American society and therefore exhibited a greater awareness of these 
changes.578   
 
 
Figure 29.  Guomindang Flag above CCBA Headquarters on Stockton Street579 
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The future destiny of the CCBA and huiguan in San Francisco and throughout 
America is difficult to foretell.  Him Mark Lai contends that as long as there is an ethnic 
community based on common interests, the CCBA or an organization similar to it will be 
able to justify its existence. 580   Whether organization principles based on common 
locality, county of origin, or surname, originally derived from China, can be sustained in 
America in the future is doubtful.  For successive generations of American-born Chinese 
whose knowledge of Chinese language and culture is limited or non-existent, and for the 
many who only possess a vague idea about the ancestral village, such regional affinities 
may be weak or completely lacking.  Huiguan now have very limited constituencies even 
in Chinatowns, so it is difficult to see how huiguan can flourish or even survive at the 
present time as viable institutions.581   
One cannot doubt, however, the historical importance of the huiguan in San 
Francisco’s Chinese community, and of their historical importance to Chinese 
communities throughout America, Southeast Asia and throughout other regions where 
Chinese immigration occurred.  From the earliest moments of Chinese immigration, 
huiguan established and continued to stand as a pillar of complex traditional Chinese 
social relations defined by geographic, clan, and linguistic bonds and boundaries.  
Furthermore, they represented the early, predominantly bachelor Chinese population’s 
desire for community life.  These types of traditional relationships constituted the most 
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important organizational foundation of huiguan, extending its influence to Chinese 
communities beyond San Francisco. 
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CONCLUSION 
In the “Introduction” to their study of local Chinese elites, historians Joseph 
Esherick and Mary Rankin comment that they include merchants among the local elites 
“because of their wealth, often buttressed by resources commonly associated with the 
gentry, such as degrees (purchased or regular), landholding, cultural symbols, and 
community involvements” and because they “relied on some resources and strategies 
akin to those of the late imperial gentry.”582  In fact, the notion of merchants as elite 
nicely parallels the realities of huiguan in Indochina and San Francisco in the mid-
nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century.   
 Maintaining the status of local gentry within overseas Chinese networks, wealthy 
merchants received traditional perquisites of exalted status in exchange for upholding and 
fulfilling the obligations of the traditional elite, including mutual aid, community 
education, and defense against the larger hegemonic tides of national and colonial 
bureaucracies.  This placed Chinese elite in Indochina and San Francisco in an ironic and 
often conflicting position.  In many areas, ruling states, in this study either the French 
colonials or the United States government, reinforced the supremacy of the Chinese 
merchant class.  They did so in ways similar to the reinforcement of local, non-mercantile 
elite in imperial China.  For example, this reinforcement received the most concrete form 
in the office of huiguan presidents in Indochina and San Francisco; however, particularly 
in Indochina, Chinese members often undermined this physical manifestation of authority 
by electing huiguan presidential lackeys, rich enough to satisfy colonial demands but not 
really occupying the top rung of the huiguan hierarchy.  
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 This idea of colonial reinforcement is in no way intended to imply the absence of 
competition of power within and amongst huiguan; quite the opposite was true in San 
Francisco’s Chinatown.  In addition to regional rivalries and challenges, huiguan leaders 
and larger state, national, or colonial powers often found themselves engaged in fierce 
competition for dominance over the Chinese population within their respective 
communities.  Thus, huiguan challenged state, national and colonial hegemony not only 
through an assertion of personal power and prestige, but also to maintain virtual 
autonomy over their respective communities.  They did so in spite of the challenges made 
by larger state, national and colonial powers to enforce discriminatory legislative 
measures in an attempt to enforce what it perceived as its own autonomy, especially in 
times of national political or financial unrest.  
 The idea that frequently violent confrontations and feuds between huiguan 
contraindicated any type of intercommunity unity or identity also deserves close 
investigation.  This assertion might bear some merit during the late nineteenth century, 
but by China’s Republican Revolution in 1911, the political status of the Chinese 
community in Indochina and San Francisco changed.  With the rise of Chinese 
nationalism during the early-twentieth century, huiguan overcame earlier, regional 
rivalries, and during times of critical national importance, huiguan’s ongoing regional 
conflicts faded into insignificance against the backdrop of national solidarity and the 
support exhibited by the Chinese community at large.  A number of intercommunity 
organizations contributing to the development of schools, mutual aid associations, and 
political organizations in Indochina and San Francisco provide evidence of Chinese unity.   
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 According to Habermas’s model, a citizen gains access to the public sphere only 
after his stature as a “private” citizen negates his need for association with the “public” 
state.  If association with state authorities negates one’s “private-ness,” then, by 
definition, a majority of prominent Chinese in huiguan throughout Indochina and 
America were members of the “public.”  Perhaps a more accurate point of distinction is 
available, even without Habermas’s own writings.  In the liberal model of the public 
sphere described by Habermas, public power and private autonomy stand as competing 
social bulwarks:  
between the two spheres, as it were, stands the domain of 
private persons who have come together to form a public 
and who, as citizens of the state, mediate the state with the 
needs of bourgeois society, in order, as the idea goes, to 
this convert political authority to ‘rational’ authority in the 
medium of this public sphere.583 
   
Did huiguan occupy this role as mediator between public and private, even if its 
leaders were only secondarily “citizens of the state?”  A recurring issue concerns the 
degree of co-optation of huiguan by different groups and in different ways.  Huiguan in 
Indochina and San Francisco were particularly susceptible to co-optation, beginning with 
state, national and colonial governments whose regulations governed members’ lives and 
the very institution itself.  Perhaps more significantly, the imperial and republican 
governments in China co-opted huiguan repeatedly throughout the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries.  This co-optation took many forms, including commissions in 
the imperial bureaucracy, roles as mediators between China’s reformists and 
revolutionaries, financial power and control over arriving and departing Chinese 
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immigrants, and as political propagandists, agitating for change and reform in China, 
irrespective of their individual places of residence.  
 Philanthropy provides another window into the mediating role played by huiguan 
in Indochina and the American West, but this issue is not without controversy as well.  
Philanthropic activities stood as a cornerstone of Chinese elite responsibility and had 
since time immemorial.  This precedent of service to clan and kin and support of the 
downtrodden is a deeply-ingrained Confucian ethic.  Therefore, it poses a significant 
problem for historians hoping to use philanthropy as a measure of shared urban 
community or modernity.  However, while philanthropic pursuits signified local elite 
responsibility in the Ming and early-Qing Dynasties, changing social values could easily 
affect reasons for pursuing such activities without changing the activities themselves.  In 
other words, self- or private-interest and public- or state-interest absolutely can coincide 
without real contradiction.   
 All overseas Chinese, irrespective of huiguan affiliation, stood to gain by having 
well-trained and responsive fire-fighting units, decent and responsible schools, access to 
skilled doctors, or even required participation in public works, such as construction, canal 
maintenance, or road improvements.  Likewise, financial contributions to local defense 
and public safety also benefited both the public and the private spheres.  As for huiguan 
cooptation by French colonialists and the American government, or “state” officials, 
commission into a French colonial position or as diplomatic intermediary in America 
provided a corresponding increase in the authority and influence available to the 
respective Chinese community.  Essentially, huiguan strengthened private autonomy by 
allowing Chinese access to the public sphere.  It did so because, generally speaking, 
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among overseas Chinese, money and prominence were the measure of the game, the 
marker of success for both the individual and the community.  Access to even a few of 
the rights and privileges bestowed by colonial or national governments translated into 
tangible benefits in terms of private autonomy for overseas Chinese.   
 Concentrating on intersections between Chinese, French, and Euro-American 
interactions illustrates that while the national government or colonial powers held official 
authority, Chinese huiguan exercised unofficial control over decision-making in Chinese 
communities, not only in commerce but also in the wider arenas of politics, law, and the 
maintenance of cultural tradition.  Implicit in this conclusion is the ability of huiguan 
throughout Indochina and in San Francisco to manipulate larger state, national or colonial 
systems to their own advantage.  Likewise, they were able to use the government in 
France and China for assistance and protection when necessary.  These factors represent 
the internationalization of huiguan in Indochina and San Francisco, a phenomenon that 
allowed Chinese to be successful in the national and colonial milieu while still 
maintaining influence in their native territories.   
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